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The real situation of Europe would, then, appear to be this: its
long and splendid past has brought it to a new stage of existence
where everything has increased; but at the same time, the institu-
tions surviving from that past are dwarfed and have become an
obstacle to expansion . . . Will she be able to shake off these
survivals, or will she remain forever their prisoner?
-Jos6 Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses
I. INTRODUCTION
T HOUGH CREATION of a European common market has
been a goal since the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome in
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1957,2 movement toward a single market in commercial air
transport has consumed most of the ensuing half-century.
While economic unification has come relatively easy in many
sectors, creating a single market for air transport has proven to
be a difficult challenge. The history of European commercial
aviation is a colorful mix of national politics and economic pol-
icy. Although efforts to achieve regulatory liberalization were
undertaken in the years leading up to the creation of the Euro-
pean Union (EU, or the Union), comparatively little liberaliza-
tion occurred until the Union was achieved. While historically
the airlines of Europe had been heavily regulated, owned, and/
or subsidized by their governments,3 by the 1980s the European
Community (EC, or the Community) began to move toward lib-
eralization.4 National governments traditionally shielded their
2 In 1997, the European Union's Member States adopted the Treaty of Amster-
dam. Aside from some slight changes in structure of the Union's governance,
the Treaty of Amsterdam renumbered the articles of the Treaty of Rome. How-
ever, as the renumbering did not go into effect until 1999, virtually all regula-
tions, decisions, and directives referred to in this paper use the original
numbering system. To avoid confusion, the original numbering has been used
throughout this paper; however, the reader should be aware of these changes.
Below are the relevant articles of the Treaty of Rome mentioned in this paper,
followed by their new numbers tinder the Treaty of Amsterdam. Please see the
Treaty of Amsterdam for a comprehensive guide:
Article 2 = 2, Article 3 = 3, Article 5 = 10, Article 7 = 14, Article 48 =
39, Article 49 = 40, Article 50 = 41, Article 51 = 42, Article 74 = 70,
Article 75 = 71, Article 84 = 80, Article 85 = 81, Article 86 -= 82,
Article 87 = 83, Article 88 = 84, Article 89 = 85, Article 90 = 86,
Article 92 = 87, Article 93 = 88, Article 175 = 232, Article 198 = 262,
Article 229 = 302, Article 234 = 307, and Article 235 = 308.
3 Michael Feazel, New GAT7I Negotiations Could Give Impetus to Airline Deregula-
tion, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 8, 1986, at 58. For an overview of early interna-
tional negotiations for air rights, see Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Little Prince and the
Businessman: Conflicts and Tensions in Public International Air Law, 45 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 807 (1980); PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL AVIATION 7-22 (1987).
4 American aviation was also heavily regulated prior to 1978. See PAUL STEPHEN
DEMPSEY & WILLIAM E. THoMs, LAW AND ECONOMIC REGULATION IN TRANSPORTA-
TION 26-29, 121-133 (1986).
Percentage of capital held in 1979 by States in the main European scheduled
airlines was as follows:
Aer Lingus 100%, British Airways 100%, Sabena 100%, Air France
99%, Alitalia 99%, Lufthansa 82%, KLM 78%, Air Inter 50%, and
Luxair 26%.
BULL. EUR. COMM. Supp. 35 (May 1979) (cited in Comment, Introducing Competi-
tion to the European Economic Community Airline Industry, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 364,
365 n.7 (1985)). More recently, a number of European airlines have been par-
tially or wholly privatized. For example, British Airways has been completely
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airlines from the rigors of the marketplace, perceiving the in-
dustry to have public utility characteristics. Governments uti-
lized air carriers to promote public policy objectives beyond
allocative efficiency, such as increasing tourism and foreign ex-
change, augmenting international prestige, enhancing national
security, reducing unemployment, and promoting domestic air-
craft manufacturing.5
With the implementation of the EU Council's Third Package
of liberalization in 1993, these positions began to change. Na-
tional flag carriers now are forced to compete on equal terms,
and are increasingly being run as competitive enterprises. To-
day, the EU commercial aviation market is well on its way to
becoming a market without state-imposed anticompetitive re-
strictions.6 Some experts predicted that liberalization would
force unprofitable carriers out of business, into mergers, or into
buyouts.7 Airlines initially responded to liberalization by form-
ing massive alliance structures.8 It remains to be seen whether
these cartels are beneficial for the consumer. 9
privatized, and the Dutch government today holds only an 11% interest in KLM.
See KLM Royal Dutch Airlines ANNUAL REPORT 1997-98, at 86 (1998).
For historical reference, the following list indicates the levels of government
ownership of the largest European major airlines in 1992:
Air France 100%, Iberia 100%, Olympic 100%, TAP-Air Portugal
100%, JAT-Yugoslav 100%, Aer Lingus 100%, Alitalia 83%, Aus-
trian 76%, Finnair 70%, Sabena 53%, SAS 50%, Lufthansa 48%,
KLM 39%, Swissair 23%, British Airways 0%, and Icelandair 0%.
D. Woerth, International Aviation: Cabotage, Foreign Ownership and Interna-
tional Marketing Alliances Appendix 1, Address at the University of Denver/
Smithsonian Conference on Airlines, Airports and Aviation, Washington, D.C.
(May 28, 1992).
5 Frederik Sorensen, Progress Towards the Development of a Community Air Trans-
port Policy, IATA MAG.,June-July 1985, at 3, 7-8 [hereinafter SORENSEN]; Paul Ste-
phen Dempsey, Turbulence in the "Open Skies ": The Deregulation of International Air
Transport, 15 TRANSP. LJ. 305, 362-63 (1987) [hereinafter TURBULENCE].
6 This new era is easily captured by the following industry statement:
"[e] uropean airlines will face continuing upheaval over the next five years as they
seek to lower costs and improve productivity, bowing to the inevitability of a more
competitive environment where unit costs, employee productivity, good service
and customer loyalty separate the winners from losers." Carole A. Shifrin, Air
Transport, Market Rigors Squeeze European Flag Carriers, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar.
14, 1994, at 64.
7 See, e.g., Carole A. Shifrin, 5 Year Outlook: Air Transport, European Airlines to
Enter 21st Century with New Look, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 15, 1993, at 67;
European Deregulation Expected To Lead to Airline Mergers, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Mar. 9, 1987, at 203.
8 See Pierre Sparaco, European Deregulation Still Lacks Substance, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 9, 1998, at 53 [hereinafter SUBSTANCE].
9 See id.
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In the short time since the establishment of the EU, true cab-
otage rights have become a reality." Growth rates of mid-sized
carriers have surpassed that of the larger, national flag carri-
ers. 1 Due to increased competition, landing fees are decreas-
ing, new carriers are entering the market, and carriers are being
forced to improve on-time departures.12 State aid (government
subsidy) is increasingly becoming a historical concept." While
growing pains-particularly with respect to the degree of liberaliza-
tion-have occurred,14 commercial aviation on the Continent is
drastically different today than it was even in the early 1980s.
Simply stated, the face of European commercial aviation has
already transformed. As the EU moves ever closer to a seamless
union-one without border crossings and tariffs and with a
common currency-the issues confronting the European avia-
tion community are rapidly changing. While cabotage has been
a primary concern for the EU, the focus is increasingly shifting
towards the representation of the EU commercial aviation com-
munity as a whole. As the British Airways/American Airlines al-
liance 5 and the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger case 6 both
demonstrate, EU commercial aviation players are realizing the
importance of banding together in an increasingly global avia-
tion marketplace. Without a doubt, this arena is where the next
14 Implemented in 1997.
" SUBSTANCE, supra note 8, at 54 ("[M]id-size independents such as British
Midland, KLM uk, Air Europa, Spanair and Norway's Braathens are growing
faster than national carriers.").
12 Pierre Sparaco, Europe's Regionals Hit Hardest by User Charges, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Aug. 28, 1995, at 52.
IS See, e.g., Pierre Sparaco, Air Transport, Wise Men Reject State-Aid Rescue, Av. WK.
& SPACE TECH., Dec. 13, 1993, at 31.
14 See SUBSTANCE, supra note 8, at 54. Sparaco notes, as is certainly true, that
EU liberalization has much ground to cover before true success can be claimed.
He notes that while EU officials claim such success, "airline fare structures are far
from being revolutionized, dramatic service improvements have not materialized
yet and no major consolidation initiatives are in sight." Id. These are critical
issues that the EU must address. This chapter will confront and assess such criti-
ques and what the EU is doing to solve these problems.
15 See generally G. Porter Elliott, Learning to Fly: The European Commission Enters
Unfamiliar Skies in Its Review of the British Airways-Amen can Airlines Alliance, 64J. AiR
L. & COM. 157 (1998) (examining the alliance in the context of Article 85 of the
Treaty of Rome, the European Commission's extraterritorial application of the
EC Competition Rules, and the Merger Regulation of 1989).
16 See generally Amy Ann Karpel, Comment, The European Commission's Decision
on the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and the Need for Greater U.S.-EU Cooperation in
the Merger Field, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 1029 (1998) (delineating the European Com-
mission's actions and subsequent resolution of the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas
merger).
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great European commercial aviation debate will occur. As was
noted in an industry publication, " [t] he EU's ultimate goal is to
support European carriers' efforts to preserve a major role in
the globalized market and allow effective competition against
U.S. giants."'17 National flag carriers now are forced to compete
on equal terms, and are increasingly being run as competitive
enterprises. Today, the EU commercial aviation market is well
on its way to becoming a market without anticompetitive
restriction.
European aviation policy has always been the product of con-
flicting and competing legal, economic, and political interests.'"
The principal actors include scores of airlines (many still pub-
licly owned or subsidized),") the European Union, 2 and a num-
ber of air transport associations including the Association of
European Airlines (AEA), the International Air Transport Asso-
ciation (IATA), and the European Civil Aviation Conference
(ECAC). 2' The achievement of any sort of cohesive policy is fur-
ther complicated by a labyrinth of bilateral air transport agree-
ments,2 2 old European Community regulations and directives,
and an increasingly competitive regional air transport market.21
After the United States deregulated its domestic air transport
market 24 and began to export its ideology abroad, many observ-
17 Pierre Sparaco, New Carrier Relationships Create Legal Complexities in Europe, Av.
WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 17, 1997, at 61, 62.
18 See generally Break It Up, but Not the American Way, Europe's Air Cartel, ECONO-
MIST, Nov. 1, 1986, at 23, 93-107, 241-55 [hereinafter AIR CARTEL].
19 Id. at 23. Many European nations are, however, moving toward privatization
of their national airlines. For example, the Thatcher government privatized Brit-
ish Airways. Subsidies are also a major factor in the well being of governmentally
owned airlines. In the early 1990s, the French government provided Air France
with $400 million, the Belgian government gave Sabena $300 million, and the
Italian government gave Alitalia $300 million. DOT Says "Hands Off' Best Approach
to Helping Competition, AVIATION DAILY, Mar. 6, 1992, at 427.
20 The fifteen Member States are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
21 EEC Deregulation Proposal Blocked While ECAC Plan Proceeds, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., July 7, 1986, at 33.
22 See generally Dr.J. Naveau, Bilateralism Revisited in Europe, 10 AiR L. 85 (1985);
DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 47-75.
23 Michael Feazel, EEC Officials Draft New Directive to Ease Regional Airline Regula-
tion, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., April 14, 1986, at 37. See also SUBSTANCE, supra note
8, at 53.
24 See PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
DEREGULATION: THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION (Quorum Books
ed., 1989).
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ers argued that rigid regulation and pricefixing created ineffi-
cient markets and excessively high fares. 5 Capacity controls,2 6
tariff coordination and pricefixing, 27 market access restric-
tions,2  and revenue sharing (pooling) agreements29 were
targeted by liberalization proponents. In the 1980s, the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands led the fight for liberalization,
entering into a number of liberal bilateral transport agreements
with other nations.3 0 At the same time, the more conservative
southern European nations, such as France and Greece, advo-
cated a more modest relaxation of the regulatory reins.3' New
airlines, such as Ireland's Ryanair, entered the market to take
25 See, e.g., R. AMACHER, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 318-19 (2d ed. 1983).
For an examination of U.S. domestic airline deregulation and its exportation
abroad, see Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics
Board-Opening Wide the Floodgates of Entry, 11 TRANSP. L.J. 91 (1979), and Paul
Stephen Dempsey, The International Rate and Route Revolution in North Atlantic Pas-
senger Transportation, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 393 (1978).
26 Capacity is defined as the total available aircraft seats on given air routes
over a given period, usually expressed in terms of available-seat/kilometers. Ca-
pacity controls, which fix the number of seats that airlines from two different
Member States will offer, are concluded in bilateral air transport agreements be-
tween nations. Analysis by the Council of Europe, Committee on Economic Af-
fairs and Development of U.S. Deregulation of Air Transport and Its Inferences
for a More Liberal Air Transport Policy in Europe, May 21, 1984, at 79; Commis-
sion of the European Communities, CIVIL AVIATION MEMORANDUM No. 2, PRO-
GRESS TOwARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNrrY AIR TRANSPORT POLICY 32-33
(1984) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM 2].
27 Governments impose price controls in an effort to guarantee revenues and
enhance the viability and safety of airlines and ensure nondiscrimination among
consumers.
28 Market access restrictions determine which airlines will be granted particu-
lar air rights. See Dr. Z. Joseph Gertler, Nationality of Airlines: A Hidden Force in the
International Air Regulation Equation, 48 J. AIR L. & COM. 51, 54 (1982).
29 Pooling agreements between airlines equalize the revenue between airlines
based on capacity offered. MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at 33. Traditionally,
before liberalization, 70 to 80% of the route-miles performed in Europe had
been subject to pooling agreements. Michael Feazel, ECAC Leaders Expected to Ap-
prove Liberalized Regulatory Proposals, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH.,June 17, 1985, at 28,
29.
30 Michael Feazel, European Civil Aviation Leaders Commit to Increased Liberaliza-
tion, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., June 24, 1985, at 36 [hereinafter INCREASED
LIBERALIZATION].
31 Id. See also British Caledonian Reduces AEA Activity in Deregulation Dispute, Av.
WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 7, 1985, at 36 (discussing attitudes of European airlines
toward deregulation) [hereinafter BRITISH CALEDONIAN].
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advantage of areas that were amenable to competition. 2 Some
established airlines also advocated increased liberalization."
The EC itself-and then the EU-promulgated a series of com-
prehensive regulations mandating intra-Community air trans-
port liberalization. This series, known individually as
"packages," culminated in the Third Package, put into effect in
1993. The Third Package brought the EU commercial aviation
market ever closer to true cabotage rights. The Treaty of Rome
established the EC in 1957 for the purpose of enhancing eco-
nomic efficiency among the western European nations. 4 The
EU was established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. 35 On
January 1, 1993, the EU began functional operation and the
power embodied in the Treaty of Rome passed on to the EU.36
The Treaty of Rome includes rules intended to promote compe-
tition in various economic sectors, including transportation.:
Nevertheless, until the packages were promulgated, for nearly
three decades the EC/EU left aviation outside the mainstream
of European integration.3
The four governing bodies of the EU-the Council, the Com-
mission, Parliament, and the European Court of Justice-share
responsibility to interpret and implement the governing trea-
ties.3 9 The Council, whose members represent the Member
States, is responsible for carrying out the objectives of the EU
through legislative enactments.4° The Commission, comprised
of nonpartisan members chosen by common agreement by the
Member States, gives recommendations and advisory opinions
to the Council.41 Parliament has the duty of advising the Coun-
cil on issues relevant to the development of the EU.42 The
Court of Justice interprets the provisions of the Treaty of Rome
'1 Sean D. Barrett, Irish Airline's Model for Deregulation, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10,
1986, at 35.
3- BRITISH CALEDONIAN, supra note 31, at 36.
34 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art.
2, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter TREATY OF ROME]. Salient provisions are set forth
in DEMPSEY, supra note 4, at 451-59.
35 TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. (C 224) 1 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter TREATY OF MAASTRICHT].
36 Id.
37 TREA'Y OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 3.
38 M. Wouters, Some Aspects of E.C. Law in Relation to the Air Transport In-
dustry I (unpublished address of April 1, 1992) [hereinafter WOUTERS].
3" L. HENKEN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 1077 (1980) [hereinafter HENKEN].
40 3 Eur. Union L. Rep. (CCH) 4401, 4405 (1987).
41 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4472, 4481 (1987).
42 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4302 (1987).
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and enforces its requirements. 43- Each of these governing bodies
has its own conception of how the competition rules of the
Treaty of Rome should be applied to air transport.
This paper examines the EC/EU's movement toward air
transport liberalization. It begins by identifying the various
commercial air transport organizations in the EU and discusses
their respective positions-historical and current-on liberaliza-
tion. It proceeds by examining the actions that the member Eu-
ropean governments have taken on the subject, and reviews how
these actions foreshadowed multilateral agreements. It dis-
cusses the Treaty of Rome's competition rules and their applica-
tion to the field of air transport. The paper then focuses on the
current structure of the EU. It also reveals how the Single Euro-
pean Act was the catalyst in not only the establishment of the
EU, but also the acceleration towards air transport liberaliza-
tion. The paper proceeds to review the important Court of Jus-
tice cases that circumscribed the zone of application in which
the competition rules can regulate air transport. It next details
how the EU institutions, early on, utilized the Treaty of Rome
and the Court of Justice decisions to develop the foundation for
a unified European transport policy. The paper then moves to a
detailed discussion of what is commonly considered the contem-
porary environment for commercial air transport regula-
tion-the sequence of 'packages.' The section breaks down the
regulatory environment by sector area-for example, pricing,
market access, state aid, etc. It also considers the relevance of
the EU merger regulations to air transport. In addition, this sec-
tion discusses EU regulations of non-economic air transport is-
sues. Finally, this chapter looks into the future of EU air
transport and examines the prospectus for further liberaliza-
tion, paying particular attention to true cabotage and the EU
acting for the European commercial aviation market as a whole.
Table 11.1 describes the primary events that were responsible
for the contemporary regime. Our discussion in this paper also
proceeds chronologically.
43 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4600 (1981).
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Table 11.1 - European Community/Union Events Leading to
Air Transport Liberalization1
1944 The International Convention on Civil Aviation signed in
Chicago.
1958 The Rome treaty becomes effective.
1962 February The anti-cartel Regulation (No. 17) becomes effective.
November Transport is withdrawn from the scope of application of
Regulation No. 17.
1969 December End of transition period.
1974' French merchant seamen's case decided.2 Articles 48-51
applicable to sea transport.
1977-1984 Air Transport deregulation in the USA.
1978 Council establishes priority list of problems to be examined
in air transport-Parliament votes resolution on competition
in air transport.
1979 June First direct election to the European Parliament.
July First Memorandum of the Commission on aviation.
1980 Parliament emphasizes the need for a proper application of
Articles 85 and 86 to the air transport industry.
The Sterling Airways complaints against SAS investigated by
the Commission tinder Article 89.
1981 First proposal of the Commission for the application of
Article 85 and 86 to air transport.-
1982 Parliament endorses Commission's proposal - little progress
in Council.
1983 January The European Parliament brings action before the European
Court of Justice against the Council for inactivity in the field
of transport.4
July Directive on interregional services adopted by Council.
1984 March, 2"" The Tribunal de Police de Paris decides to seize the Court of
Jtstice with the question of the application of Art. 85 to air
transport.'
March, 20" The Commission presents "Civil aviation Memorandum No.
2" including a proposal on the application of the
competition rules to air transport.
August The Nouvelles Frontieres case is laid before the ECJ
(applicability of Art. 85 to air transport).
1985 May The Parliament's transport case is decided.6
June Commission presents the European Council the White Paper
on the completion of internal market by 1992.
September The Advocate General Lenz delivers his opinion in the
Nouvelles Frontieres case.'
Commission proceeds against Member States in the air
transport sector.
43 Otto Lenz, Address at the International Law Forum Conference at
Krumbach, Austria (Sept. 3, 1999).
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1986 January The Saeed case is led before the ECJ (applicability of Articles
85, 86 and 90 to air transport),8 referring to the opinion of
Advocate General Lenz.
February The Single European Act, providing for majority voting on
air transport matters, is signed.
April The ECJ decides the Nouvelles Frontieres case: applicability
of Art. 85 to air transport.9
1987 June The Council reaches agreement in principle on a package of
measures [based on the Commission's proposals of 1984 and
198?] to increase competition in the civil aviation sector (so-
called "first package").
July 1 " The Single European Act enters into force.
December The "First Package" is adopted by the Council.
1988 January First Package becomes effective. °
1989 April The Saeed case is decided." The court confirms the
Nouvelles Frontieres decision as to Art. 85, declares Art. 86
directly applicable and rules on the applicability of Art. 90.
September Commission adopts a package of proposals on the second
stage of liberalization of air transport in the Community. 2
1990 July/November The "Second Package" of air transport regulations enters into
force. ' -
1991 July The Commission proposes the "Third Package" of air
transport regulations. 4
1993 January The "Third Package" becomes effective.'
5
Speech by Otto Lenz at the International Law Forum Conference at Krumbach, Austria (Sept.
3, 1999).
' ECR 74/359.
"OJ Nr. C 291 of 12/11/81, p.0004.
4 ECR/85/1513 (Parliament's transport case).





0 OJ Nr. L374/87 of 31.12.87.
"ECR/89/803.
12 OJ C 258, 11/10/1989 p. 0003.
" OJ Nr. 217 of August 11, 1990.
14 OJ C 258, 04/10/1991, p. 0002.
O'5 J L 241, 24/08/1992 p. 0001.
II. THE TREATY OF ROME
A. OBJECTIVES OF THE ROME TREATY
The EC was established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome.44 By
the mid-1980s it consisted of Belgium, Denmark, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom. With the addi-
tion of Spain and Portugal on January 1, 1986, the EC grew to
44 TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34. DEMPSEY, supra note 4, at 241-43.
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twelve member nations.45 In 1992 the Treaty of Maastricht was
signed and the EC became the European Union at the end of
that year.46 By the dawn of the 21st century, the EU had grown
to 15 members, having added Austria, Sweden, and Finland in
January 1995. 41 It is widely anticipated that most of the remain-
ing European states will join by 2012.48 The twin goals of the
Union/Community, as described by Peter Sutherland, former
EC Commissioner for Competition, are "the completion of a
genuine, barrier-free internal market and the restoration and
enhancement of the competitiveness of European industry. 49
The Treaty of Rome bound together the nations of Western
Europe for the purpose of creating an economically efficient
market in Europe and restricting anticompetitive behavior on
the part of the Member States.' The objectives of the Treaty of
Rome include harmonious development and expansion of eco-
nomic activities, increased economic stability, an improved stan-
dard of living, and closer relations between the Member
States.5' To accomplish its goals, Article 3(e) of the Treaty of
Rome directs the EC/EU to adopt, inter alia, a common trans-
port policy.5 2
The Treaty of Rome has essentially become the Constitution
of the European Union.5 1 Consequently, community law, in-
45 H.A. Wassenbergh, Regulatory Reform-A Challenge to Inter-Governmental Civil
Aviation Conferences, 11 AIR L. 31, 40 n.26 (1986). Originally, only six nations
(France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg)
joined to form the European Economic Community (EEC), later renamed the
European Community (EC). On January 1, 1973, the original six became nine,
with the addition of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. Greecejoined
in 1981. West Germany annexed East Germany in 1990. Turkey, Austria, Malta
and Cyprus all have applied for membership. However, attempts to integrate the
EC within its 1992 target put expanded membership on hold.
41 TREAiY OF MAASTR[CHT, supra note 35.
47 THE WORLD ALMANAC 866 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1998).
48 Projections for membership:
The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland may be admitted as
early as 2003. By 2007: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. By 2012:
Bulgaria and Romania. Probably after 2012: Croatia (which has not
completed its application) and Turkey.
Who Will join Europe's Club - and When?, ECONOMIST, April 8, 2000, at 53.
4, Peter D. Sutherland, The Competition Policy of the European Community, 30 Sr.
Louis U.LJ. 149, 149 (1985) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND].
50 TREAlY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 3.
51 Id. at art. 2.
52 [d. at art. 3(e).
5- See SUTHERLAND, supra note 49, at 149.
992
COMPETITION IN THE AIR
cluding competition law, takes precedence over the law of the
individual Member States, and the governments of those states
must bring their laws into conformity with the mandates and
decisions of the EU ministers and the decisions of the Court of
Justice.54 The Treaty of Maastricht, in providing for a Union,
also provided for a common currency, known as the Euro, which
was inaugurated on January 1, 1999. In 1997, the EU took an-
other step towards greater cohesion when its Member States
signed the Treaty of Amsterdam. 5 The Treaty of Amsterdam
expanded EU citizen rights, increased freedom of movement,
and increased freedom of employment.56 At the dawn of the
21st Century, the EU was embarking on Agenda 2000, which en-
deavored to enlarge and strengthen the Union by admitting
countries from central and eastern Europe into the EU.57
B. COMMON TRANSPORT POLICY
The Treaty of Rome was enacted with the presumption that
"national economies can be unified only if there is an efficient
system for moving people and goods.""8  The importance of
transport in Europe is evidenced by the fact that the industry
accounts for more than 7% of Europe's gross national product,
(GNP) for approximately 7% of total employment, for 40% of
Member States' investment, and 30% of Community energy con-
sumption, and has shown almost continuous growth for the past
54 Id.; Don't TakeEuropa to Brussels, They Cry, ECONOMisT, Nov. 8, 1986. [herein-
after DON'T TAKE EUROPA]. National courts of Member States may be used to
enforce the competition laws of the Treaty of Rome, and this route is being en-
couraged by the Commission to reduce its increasing workload. Only national
courts may award damages in private litigation for injuries suffered through in-
fringement of Articles 85 and 86. Compare TREATry OF ROME, supra note 34, at art.
177; 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4656 (preliminary rulings by Court of Jus-
tice), with TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 183; 3 European L. Rep. (CCH)
4575 (jurisdiction of national courts).
55 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Trea-
ties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2,
1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter TREA-rv OF AMSTERDAM].
56 European Union, The ABC of the European Union, at http://europa.eu.int/
abc-en.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 1999).
57 European Union, Agenda 2000 - For a Stronger and Wider Union, at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/agenda2000/overview/en/agenda.htm (last visited Feb.
28, 1999).
58 Anastassopoulos, Report Drawn Up on Behalf of the Committee of Trans-
port on the judgment of the Court of Justice on the Common Transport Policy
and the Council's Obligation in Relation Thereto, EUR. PARL. Doc. (A 2-84/85/
B) 15 (1985) [hereinafter REPORT].
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20 years.59 The draftsmen of the Treaty of Rome were cognizant
of the integrating function of transport as well as its unique
problems. Thus, they gave special consideration to air transport
under the Treaty of Rome. A major consideration was the coor-
dination of sovereign rights both inside and outside the bounda-
ries of the EC."
The importance of transportation in the overall scheme of the
European Community was underscored by separate provisions
in the Treaty of Rome for a common transport policy." Never-
theless, in 1962, when the Council adopted Regulation 17
(which implemented Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome),
it specifically exempted transportation from its application. 2
The solicitude for transportation arose, to a significant extent,
because of longstanding bilateral and multilateral agreements
among Member States. These agreements concerned interna-
tional airline coordination that already existed at the adoption
of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, such as the Chicago Convention
on International Civil Aviation of 1944, and the multitude of
bilateral air transport agreements between European nations. 3
The draftsmen of the Treaty of Rome were unable to design a
policy to benefit the EC while maintaining the integrity of extra-
EC treaties. 4 Consequently, air transport policy made little
headway during the EC's first two decades, since most European
governments were satisfied with the status quo. 5
A common transport policy for rail, roads, and inland water-
ways was adopted in 1968."" Special consideration was given air
transportation in Article 84(2), which provided: "The Council
may, acting [unanimously,] decide whether, to what extent and
by what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for
51, European Union, Transport Services: Current Position and Outlook, at http://
europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/vb/124040.htm (last visited February 2, 2000).
6) EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 469) 14 (1980).
61 Common Transport Policy, 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1812 (1974).
62 N. Argyris, The EEC Rules of Competition and the Air Transport Sector, 26 CoM-
MON MKT. L. REV. 5, 6 (1989) [hereinafter ARGVRIS].
63 See TURBULENCE, supra note 5, at 307-08, 314-18, 325-42.
64 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1945.05 (1974) ("[w]ith respect to transport
by sea and air, Article 84(2) makes the applicability of the Title 'Transport' de-
pendent upon a unanimous Council decision").
65 SORENSEN, supra note 5, at 3.
66 DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 245; Council Regulation 1017/68, 1968 O.J. (L
241) 10.
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sea and air transport."6 7 A formal policy for sea transport was
not adopted until 1986.8
In view of the widely perceived shortcomings in the EC's ap-
proach to air transport policies and procedures, it was to be ex-
pected that the debate would turn to the general Competition
provisions of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. 69 The
applicability of these rules to air transport within the EC/EU has
been a central issue since the mid-1970s. 70 While it was con-
cluded that the competition rules would, indeed, be applied to
air transport, the question was where, when, and how.71 As we
shall see later in this paper, even though the European Court of
Justice declared in the 1986 Nouvelles Frontieres case that the com-
petition rules applied to air transport, significant questions re-
mained unanswered.72
C. COMPETITION RULES
Competition was intended to play an essential role in achiev-
ing the objectives of the EC.73 In order to diminish barriers to
the free flow of commerce, the draftsmen included Articles 85
and 86 in the Treaty of Rome, prohibiting anticompetitive activi-
ties.74 The Commission declared that competition is the best
motivator of economic activity and is essential for the improve-
ment of living standards and employment prospects.75 As a ba-
sic policy issue, Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome incorporates the
goal of efficient economic integration of the Community.7" Ar-
ticle 3(f) directs the implementation of a system assuring that
competition will not be distorted within the Common Market.17
67 TRFAVi'y OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 84(2).
- Council Regulation 4056/86, 1986 OJ. (L 378) 4.
69 DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 245.
7) TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at arts. 85, 86.
71 WOUTERS, supra note 38, at 55-56.
72 Id. at 56.
73 DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 242.
74 TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at arts. 85, 86.
75 P. S. R. F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 167 (4th ed.
1985) [hereinafter MATHIJSEN].
76 TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 2.
77 Id. at art. 3. Activities in Article 3 which are pertinent to competition
include:
(e) the inauguration of a common transport policy;
(f) the establishment of a system ensuring the competition shall
not be distorted in the Common Market;
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The competition rules generally aim at preventing the intro-
duction of obstacles to free trade. Still, this does not mean that
Union policy on competition is basically restrictive. Indeed, co-
operation among enterprises is permitted and even encouraged
where the effect is to promote competition both inside and
outside of the Union. 8 The primary thrust of the competition
laws of the EU is to maintain a "beneficial, unified economy. 79
Unlike the United States, EU competition laws are aimed only at
anticompetitive practices that produce abusive, harmful effects
in the marketplace. S°
The Commission may exercise considerable discretion in en-
forcing the competition rules of the Treaty of Rome.8' Articles
85 and 86 are administered by the Commission as set forth in
Regulation 17.82 Under Regulation 17, the Commission may
grant "negative clearances," declaring agreements not to be vio-
lative of Articles 85 and 86. Pursuant to Article 85(3), it may
grant exemptions from the applicability of Article 85(1). Upon
application of Member States, natural or legal persons, or upon
its own motion, the Commission may take steps to put an end to
violations, conduct investigations, and levy fines and penalties.83
1. Article 85
Article 85(1) prohibits as "incompatible with the common
market; all agreements between undertakings, decisions by as-
sociations of undertakings and any concerted practices which
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of com-
petition within the common market. ... . In order to fall
(g) the application of procedures which shall make it possible to
co-ordinate the economic policies of Member States and to remedy
disequilibria in their balances of payments.
(h) the approximation of their respective municipal law to the ex-
tent necessary for the functioning of the Common Market.
Id.; see also MATHISEN, supra note 75, at 179.
78 MATIIIJSEN, supra note 75, at 168.
7:, DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 241-55.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 242.
82 MATHJSEN, supra note 75, at 181.
83 Id. at 182-83.
84 TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 85(1). Article 85 (1) "in particular"
prohibits practices which, aside from satisfying the other criteria, consist of:
(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of
any other trading conditions;
996
COMPETITION IN THE AIR
within the prescriptions, agreements having proscribed objects
need not be cast in the form of a legally binding contract.85
Such an agreement within Article 85(1) may be written or oral,
and may be inferred from the circumstances, and may consist
merely of an informal and nonbinding combination to restrict
competition. 6 If such a binding agreement exists, a violation
has occurred even if it is not implemented. A violation of the
Treaty of Rome may also be found if informal agreements are
followed by certain practices. Impermissible binding agree-
ments or practices may be inferred from circumstantial evi-
dence, including behavior having an anticompetitive effect.87
However, an anticompetitive effect alone, such as a parallel
price increase, does not establish the existence of a prohibited
agreement. Rather, such conduct may be the result of indepen-
dent decisions or other factors not reflecting violations of the
competition rules.8 8
The competition rules apply only to practices that affect trade
among Member States.89 In an agreement between a Member
State and a non-EU nation, anticompetitive provisions would
not be prohibited unless those provisions had an anticompeti-
tive object or effect within the EU.90 "An agreement 'may' affect
trade when it 'is capable of constituting a threat, either direct or
indirect, actual or potential, to freedom of trade between Mem-
ber States in a manner which might harm the attainment of the
objectives of a single market between States.' """ It should be
(b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical de-
velopment or investment;
(c) Market-sharing or the sharing of sources supply;
(d) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in
respect of equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competi-
tive disadvantage; or
(e) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the accept-
ance by a party of additional supplies, which, either by their nature
or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the
subject of such contract.
Id.
85 CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY & GRAHAM D. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COM-
PETITION 49 (3d ed. 1987).
86 Id.
87 MATHIJSEN, supra note 75, at 169-70.
88 Id. at 170.
89 Id. at 172.
90 Id. at 172-74.
91 Id. at 172 (quoting from Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, Consten & Grundig v.
Commission, 1966 E.C.R. 299, at 341).
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noted that, because the prohibitions extend to agreements that
"affect" trade, even agreements that have the effect of increasing
the volume of trade or which do not involve imports or exports
may be prohibited.12 The European Court of Justice has indi-
cated that in order to constitute an impermissible "distorting,"
competition "must be prevented, restricted or distorted to an
appreciable extent."'' 3 In summary, in order to fall within the pro-
hibition of Article 85(1), an agreement must (1) consist of an
agreement or concerted practice between undertakings, (2) dis-
tort, prevent or restrict competition, (3) within the European
Union, (4) to an appreciable extent.9 4
Under Article 85(2), any agreements or decisions prohibited
by the Treaty of Rome are automatically void.9 5 With respect to
entire agreements, however, only those clauses or provisions
found to be in violation are void; the remainder of the agree-
ments may remain in effect.96
92 MATHIJSEN, supra note 75, at 172 n.17, 174-75.
93 Id. at 173 (emphasis in original). Case 56/65, Societe Technique Miniere v.
Maschinenbau Ulm 1966 E.C.R. 235; Case 5/69, Volk v. Vervaeke, 1969 E.C.R.
295; Case 22/71, Beguelin Import v. GL Import Export, 1971 E.C.R. 949.
N The "appreciable extent" requirement was deemed of such importance that
on May 27, 1970, the Commission issued a "Notice of Agreements of Minor Im-
portance," known as the De Minimus Rule, which gives further guidance as to
when the effect of an agreement on the European Community can be considered
too weak for Article 85 (1) to apply. However, the notice is only for guidance and
is not binding on national courts of the European Court ofJustice. In practice,
the De Minimus Rule means that the Commission need not be notified of agree-
ments where (1) the turnover of the participating undertakings does not exceed
200 million ECU, and (2) the goods or services which are the subject of the
agreement together with their substitutable products or services, in that part of
the market where the agreement has its effect, do not represent more than 5% of
the total market. The Rule has since been updated, most recently on September
3, 1986. Oddly, the threshold requirements of the De Minimus Rule do not coin-
cide with those of the Merger Regulations. In order to have Community dimen-
sion under the Merger Regulations, the parties (undertakings) to the merger
must have (1) worldwide turnover of 5 billion ECUs, (2) they must have an Euro-
pean Community turnover of 250 million ECUs, or (3) they must obtain two-
thirds of their turnover within a single member state. With the coming into force
of the Merger Regulations, mergers need not proceed toward notification di-
rectly under Articles 85 and 86, but under the Merger Regulation itself.
95 MATIIJSEN, sufra note 75, at 175.
96 Id. at 173. Exceptions of the "automatically void" provision exist for agree-
ments executed before March 13, 1962, when Regulation 17, the first regulation
implementing Articles 85 and 86, was enacted. Id. at 175. However, even the so-
called "old" agreements may be voided if found to be in violation of the Treaty.
Id. at 175-76.
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The Commission may grant declarations of inapplicability of
the operation of Article 8 5 (l).9- 7 The Commission may grant
negative clearances, declaring that the agreement does not dis-
tort, prevent or restrict competition, and therefore does not fall
under the definition of Article 85(1). If negative clearance is
not given because the Commission is of the opinion that the
agreement does prevent, restrict or distort competition under
the definition of Article 85(1), the Commission may still grant
an exemption under Article 85(3), but only after the Commis-
sion has been notified and the four conditions specified in Arti-
cle 85(3) are satisfied as follows:
(1) The agreement must contribute to improving the produc-
tion or distribution of goods or to promoting technical and
economic progress,
(2) consumers must get a fair share of the resulting benefit,
(3) the agreement may not impose restrictions which are not in-
dispensable for the objectives under (1) and (2), and
(4) the agreement may not afford the parties the possibility of
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of
the products in question.9"
2. Article 86
Article 86 addresses the abuse of market position within and
affecting the internal market.99 As the Commission and the
Court have applied the foregoing rules, the following main types
of agreements have been found likely to be prohibited: "(a)
agreements relating to prices and conditions of sale; (b) limita-
tions on markets and productions; (c) agreements whereby a
vendor agrees not to compete within the market of the pur-
chaser; (d) exclusive dealing agreements such as supply agree-
ments; collective exclusive dealings; and (e) joint purchasing
and joint selling agreements."' 10 1
Practices such as tariff agreements, pooling agreements, and
capacity and territorial restrictions raise questions under Article
97 Id. at 176. The Council gave the Commission the power to look into agree-
ments between companies with the promulgation of Regulation 17. The Com-
mission can take agreements into consideration upon the request of the
contracting parties, most commonly upon notification by them, or less com-
monly, upon notification by a competitor.
'1 See TREATY OF RoME, supra note 34, at art. 85(3).
99 Id. at art. 86.
100 MATHIJSEN, supra note 75, at 177-78; TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art.
85(3). See generally ARG'RIS, supra note 62, at 9.
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85 even under the most liberal of bilateral agreements. Both
Council and Commission Regulations have been promulgated
to define Article 85(3)'s application to aviation. Council Regu-
lation 3976/87 gave the Commission the power to implement
Article 85(3), which the Commission did in Commission Regula-
tion 2671/88. The Council Regulation runs parallel to Council
Regulation No. 17, in which the Commission received the power
from the Council to issue exemptions under Article 85(3).
However, since air transport was excluded from Council Regula-
tion No. 17, Council Regulation 3976/87 gave no power to the
Commission to exempt agreements under Article 85(3) for
agreements regarding some aspects of air transport. For exam-
ple, the Commission was given power only for regulation of air
transportation between community airports. The Commission
was only allowed to grant exemptions to certain agreements:
those that have as their objective (1) joint planning of capacity
to assure the spread of service at non-peak periods, (2) revenue
sharing not to exceed one percent, (3) certain tariff consulta-
tions, (4) slot allocation and scheduling, (5) computer reserva-
tions systems, (6) ground handling, (7) interlining, or (8)
catering, all within certain specific restrictions. The Commis-
sion Regulation permits "consultations" between airlines to pre-
pare joint tariff proposals subject to the approval of the
aeronautical authorities of the Member States, provided inter
alia that participation in the consultations is (1) voluntary (2)
open to any carrier that operates or proposes to operate on the
route in question (3) the resulting tariff is not binding (thereby
preserving the carriers' right of independent action), and 4)
does not discriminate on the basis of the passengers' nationality
or residence, and that discussions not include capacity or agent
remuneration issues.""
Article 86, which complements Article 85, forbids abuse of a
dominant position enjoyed individually or collectively by a
group of undertakings.0 2 The concept of "dominant position"
I' Commission Regulation 2671/88, 1988 OJ. (L 239) 9. Commission Regu-
lation 2761/88 expired on January 31, 1991, and has been replaced by Commis-
sion Regulation 84/91, 1990 OJ. (L 10) 14.
1)2 MATI*IJSEN, supra note 75, at 179. Article 86 states that prohibitions are
aimed at abuse of a dominant position "within the Common Market or within a
substantial part of it" which affects trade between Member States. TREATY OF
ROME, supra note 34, at art. 86; see also 2 European Union L. Rep. (CCH) 2101
(abuse of dominant position). The Article goes on to state:
Such improper practices may, in particular, consist in:
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indicates a position of economic strength allowing the possessor
to "behave to an appreciable extent independently of its com-
petitors, customers and ultimately of the consumers." ' 3 Domi-
nance is the power to hinder effective competition, to behave
independently of the market. 104 Whether an undertaking or
group of undertakings enjoys such a position must be estab-
lished in view of relevant product and geographic markets, the
market share possessed therein,0 5 and the likelihood of actual
or potential entry eroding the position of the dominant firm. 10 6
Although the dominant position must be over a substantial por-
tion of the Common Market, the territory of a single Member
State arguably could be sufficient for Article 86 to apply. Most
European national airlines hold dominant positions in their
own countries. 17 However, dominance is established not by size
alone, but as noted above, by considering a number of factors. 08
(a) the direct or indirect imposition of any inequitable purchase or
selling prices or of any other inequitable trading conditions;
(b) the limitation of production, markets or technical develop-
ment to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in
respect of equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competi-
tive disadvantage; or
(d) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the accept-
ance, by a party, of additional supplies which, either by their nature
or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the
subject of such contract.
TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 86. Compare these latter "in particular"
provisions with those in Article 85(1), supra note 84.
103 Case 322/81, Michelin v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3461; Case 85/76, Hoff-
man La Roche v. Comm'n, 1979 E.C.R.461; Case 27/76, United Brands v.
Comm'n, 1978 E.C.R. 207 (dominance consists of "a position of economic
strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent competition be-
ing maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an
appreciable extent independently of its competitors."); MATHUIJSEN, supra note 75,
at 179-80; DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 248; C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, COMMON MAR-
KET LAW OF COMPETITION 8-004 (3d ed. 1987).
104 BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 103, at 8-004.
105 "IT]he view may legitimately be taken that very large shares are in them-
selves, and save exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of a domi-
nant position. An undertaking which has a very large market share and holds it
for some time ... is by virtue of that share in a position of strength." Comm'n v.
Hoffman-La Roche, Case 95/76, 1970 E.C.R. 461, [1979] 3 CLMR 211.
106 Id.; MATHIJSEN, supra note 75, at 180-81, DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 248.
107 DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 248.
108 MATHUSEN, supra note 75, at 181.
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The concept of "abuse" of a dominant position refers to an
adverse impact on competition.""' Any activity that "interferes
with one of the basic freedoms or the free choice of purchasers
or consumers or freedom of access to business, must be viewed
as limiting competition and therefore as an 'abuse.'"'"' The
methods employed to affect competition are irrelevant. Activi-
ties that are "detrimental to production or sales, to purchasers
or consumers, and changes to the structure of an undertaking
which lead to competition being seriously disturbed in a sub-
stantial part of the common market are prohibited by Article
86."11' The mere existence of a monopoly does not establish a
violation of Article 86; rather, only practices detrimental to con-
sumers and the economy bring the proscriptions into play.' 1 2
3. Distinguishing Articles 85 and 86
In distinguishing Articles 85 and 86, it is important to note
that unlike Article 85, Article 86 does not provide for exemp-
tions.113 Under Article 2 of Regulation 17, the Commission may
grant a "negative clearance," which merely certifies that because
it perceives no violation, the Commission sees no reason to pro-
ceed against the entities involved." 14 However, this does not
confer "absolute immunity"; the Commission still reserves the
power to determine subsequently that a violation exists and to
proceed with enforcement.'1 5
As noted above, while Article 86 prohibits abuse of monopoly
power, the mere existence of the monopoly is not prohibited. 116
Rather, a violation consists of the use of monopoly power in a
manner injurious to consumers-an abuse of market position.
A national airline might be held to occupy a sufficiently domi-
nant position over a large enough part of the Common Market
(its own country) to bring the provisions of Article 86 into
play.1 7 Price-fixing and capacity-limitation agreements by firms
in monopoly positions might be held to be violations of Article
io)9 Id.
11o Id.
-I' Id. at 179.
11 DEMPSEY, sup)ra note 3, at 248.
H3 Id.
114 Id. at 249, n.61.
11-5 Id. at 249; see also Unlawful Practices by Dominant Concerns, Application of
Article 86, 2 Common Mkt, Rep. (CCH) 2111 (1978) (CCH Explanation).
ii" DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 248.
117 Id.
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86.118 Therefore, an argument could be made that airline fare-
setting and capacity limitations and other agreements and prac-
tices violate Article 85 absent a Commission regulation permit-
ting such practices.
Direct application of the competition rules could have re-
sulted in the prohibition of many European airline practices
under both Articles 85 and 86. Indeed, the Commission
threatened to (and subsequently did) take action on its own if
the Council failed to act on a common air transport policy.' 9
An understanding of the competition rules as they affect air
transport requires further review of the governing institutions of
the EU and the actions they have taken in response to air trans-
port issues.
The drafters of the Treaty of Rome also recognized the mar-
ket harm of state financial assistance to business otherwise
known as "state aid" or government subsidies. Embodied within
Article 92, the Treaty of Rome prohibits all state aid to firms
unless such aid fits certain narrow provisions. These provisions
generally focus upon social, humanitarian, disaster relief, or cul-
tural aid.1 211 In practice, the prohibition of state aid in commer-
cial aviation has only really gained force since the late 1980s.
Until that time, the Council ignored violations under the guise
that it could not regulate air transport. Article 92 played a
prominent role as liberalization emerged and the Council be-
came more aggressive in enforcing Articles 85 and 86 with re-
spect to air transport. Arguably, the turning point in the
competitiveness of the European commercial aviation market
turned on the Council's determined stance of reducing the in-
fluence of state-aid. 121
III. INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
AIR TRANSPORT POLICY
A. INTRODUCTION
The institutions of the Treaty of Rome were created to ensure
proper compliance and implementation of its provisions. 122
118 Id.
I " Id. at 250.
120 TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 92.
121 See generally Carole Shifrin, Air Transport Market Rigors Squeeze European Flag
Carriers, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 14, 1994.
122 HENKEN, supra note 39, at 1077.
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The four governing bodies of the EU-the Council, the Com-
mission, Parliament, and the European Court of Justice-have
devoted considerable attention to the question of how the
Treaty of Rome should be applied to air transport. The Council
consists essentially of representatives of the member govern-
ments. Most EU states originally owned or subsidized their air-
lines, and therefore, resisted liberalization. The Commission is
essentially the secretariat or bureaucracy of the EU government.
Its mission is to facilitate implementation of the Treaty of Rome,
whose principal purpose is to create a unified economic union
of free trade within Western Europe. The Commission sought
liberalization, and proposed several texts to implement it (the
so-called "Memoranda"). But the Commission only has the
power to propose law to the Council, and may act only after the
Council gives it power to act. At first, the Council resisted the
proposals of the Commission. However, the Court of Justice is-
sued several opinions that suggested the Council had a duty to
act in the area of air transport, and that if it failed to do so, some
of the competition provisions of the Treaty of Rome might es-
sentially become self-executing. With this prodding, the Coun-
cil did finally adopt several of the Commission's proposals and
made them law (the so-called "packages"). Let us examine the
conflict and cooperation between these super-governmental
units in greater detail.
B. FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION-
THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT
An analysis of the functions and activities of the EU governing
bodies would not be complete without an understanding of a
major motivating force within the EU-the goal of a unified in-
ternal market, which was legislatively in place by 1992.123 The
Single European Act (SEA), which entered into force in July
1987, was intended to facilitate and compel the creation of the
Union. As we shall see, the SEA provision allowing majority vot-
ing may have moved the Council to action on air transport.
This provision replaced the previous requirement of unanimity
in Council decisions. ' 24
123 Creation of Internal Market, 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 202.07 (1978)
(CCH Explanation); They've Designed the Future, and It Might Just Work, ECONOMIST,
Feb. 13, 1988, at 45-48; Thompson, EC92, NATION'S BUSINESS, June 1989, at 18.
124 Single European Act, 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 101.15 (1978) (CCH
Explanation).
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The attainment of a bona fide internal market in all economic
sectors, including aviation, requires not only the removal of
trade barriers, but also a "fusion of the members into a single
economic area ... extended to include freedom of movement
of workers, the right of establishment, the free movement of ser-
vices and capital, and a common transport policy."'1 25 The Com-
mission assumed a prominent role in urging and planning for
the eventuality of this economic and political unification. 126 In
1984, the Commission called attention to a marked slowdown in
the progress toward the internal market throughout the 1970s.
The Commission proposed the creation of a comprehensive
program for the achievement of a genuine internal market.127
The program included not only the simplification of procedures
as intra-Community frontiers, but also the complete abolition of
procedural formalities at the borders.128 The Commission also
stated that the internal market would be incomplete unless citi-
zens of the European Community could reside in other Member
States-even without economic justification.129
In June 1985, the Commission revealed a "White Paper," a
major proposal for progress toward an internal market. 30 This
set of specific, detailed proposals was submitted for considera-
tion at the Council's Milan meeting. Reciting the Community's
recognized need for an internal market, the Commission indi-
cated that a definite target date and detailed plans had been
missing and were needed. As a result of its deliberations, the
Commission set the "bold target" of completion of the internal
market by 1992.' 1'
125 Creation of Internal Market, supra note 123, at 202.07.
126 See Proposals Aim to Strengthen the Community's Internal Market, [1982-
1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,415 (1982) (information
memorandum from the Commission, June 1982); Commission Submits Program
for the Consolidation of the Internal Market, [1982-1985 Transfer Binder] Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,595 (1984) (information memorandum from the
Commission, June 1984) [hereinafter COMMISSION SUBMITS PROGRAM].
127 COMMISSION SUBMITS PROGRAM, supra note 126, 10,595.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Completion of the Internal Market Sought by 1992, 4 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 10,693 (1985) (information memorandum from the Commission,June
1985).
13' Id. In the bulletin announcing the White Paper, the Commission recited
the need for removal of barriers in numerous sectors of the Community and,
among other matters, called for encouragement of industrial cooperation and
the removal of disruptive taxation schemes as well as the free movement of goods
and services. The Commission noted that removal of barriers to the flow of ser-
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The Council meeting in Milan, for which the White Paper was
prepared, was the juncture at which firm Community efforts
commenced toward the creation and implementation of the Sin-
gle European Act. 132 Ultimately, the signatories of the SEA
agreed to the target date of December 31, 1992. ' ,3'
The SEA grew out of efforts initiated by the European Coun-
cil to advance the European Community toward a European
Union.'13 4 In response to the European Council's Solemn Decla-
ration at Stuttgart in June 1983, the first draft of the treaty was
presented in February 1984. The Act was signed by representa-
tives of the then twelve Member States on February 4, 1986, but
did not take effect until July 1, 1987, after ratification by all
Member States.' 35 The majority of the SEA's provisions were
amendments to the Treaty of Rome or new provisions to be ad-
ded to it.'36 The SEA sought to create a genuine internal mar-
ket in which the remaining barriers to free movement of goods,
persons, services,and capital were removed. 13 7 To almost every
extent, the Union has become successful in this regard. In sign-
ing the SEA, the Member States committed themselves to estab-
lish an internal market by December 31, 1992, although this was
in reality only a statement of political intent at the time.'
The SEA made a number of institutional changes in the oper-
ation of the EC. The role of the European Parliament was ex-
panded, and it was granted some degree of control over Council
decisions. The role of the Commission was also expanded and
vices had proceeded more slowly than for goods, but reaffirmed and explained
the importance of service industries. Service industries included "traditional" ar-
eas such as "banking, insurance, and transport."
132 Single European Act a Milestone on the Road Toward a European Union, 4
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,812 (1986) (CCH Comment) [hereinafter
MILESTONE].
133 Single European Act, supra note 125, at 101.15.
13, Id. The European Council grew out of previously unsuccessful meetings of
Heads of State and Government, starting in 1972, intended to solve economic,
social, and political problems. At the original meetings in 1972 it was decided to
pursue the goal of attaining a European Union that would govern all relations
between the Member States by 1980. This goal was confirmed at the Paris Sum-
mit in December 1974. At that time, it was formally decided to conduct such
meetings three times a year and as otherwise necessary. These meetings were to
constitute the European Council, and their purpose was to pursue solutions to
the problems the ordinary Council could not solve. European Union, 1 Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 101.13 (1978) (CCH Explanation).
135 Single European Act, supra note 124, at 101.15.
1'36 MILESTONE, supra note 132, at 10,812.
137 Single European Act, supra note 124, at 101.15.
138 Id.; MILESTONE, supra note 132, at 10,812.
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changed, particularly in regard to its interaction with the Parlia-
ment. The Council was allowed, at the request of the Court of
Justice, to set up a court to hear, among other matters, appeals
brought from Commission decisions on competition. 3 '
A major barrier to the establishment of an internal market
was the right of veto that every country maintained.1 40 The right
to veto (the so-called Luxembourg compromise) was extracted
by the French in 1966 in order to terminate General De Gaulle's
"empty-chair" period, a boycott maintained to defend French
sovereignty.' 4 ' The SEA made no provision for this right, under
which, if a Member State declared a Council decision to be ad-
verse to its vital national interests, and if enough other Members
agreed (which they usually did), then the veto could not be out-
voted. 14 2 Nonetheless, this opportunity was significantly diluted
by the replacement of unanimous voting with qualified majority
(54 votes out of 76) and weighted voting (the larger nations
have 10 votes; the smallest has two) on a number of subjects,
including development of a common transport policy. 4 ' Thus,
the Council can now act by a qualified majority in deciding
"whether, to what extent and by what procedure appropriate
provisions may be laid down for sea and air transport." 144
Two years after issuing the White Paper, the Commission
stated that in a second annual report "[t]he Community must
do better" in order to achieve an internal market by 1992. The
Commission acknowledged numerous failures in itself, the
Council, and Parliament to keep up with workloads, but looked
with optimism to the improved decision making to be imple-
mented through the Single European Act. The Commission
stressed the importance of cooperative and expeditious involve-
ment by officials of member governments and the necessity of
not letting "national and sectorial interests take over."'145 In
these movements toward an internal market, the Commission
recognized the importance of a unified transport policy. Con-
139 MILESTONE, supra note 132, at 10,812.
140 DON'T TAKE EUROPA, supra note 54, at 55; MILESTONE, supra note 132, at
10,812.
141 DON'T TAKE EUROPA, supra note 54, at 55.
142 Id. The article adds that "[t]he veto power is often abused." Id.; see also
MILESTONE, supra note 132, at 10,812.
143 Id.; Single European Act, supra note 124, at 101.15
144 TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 84; WOUTERS, supra note 38, at 2.
145 Faster Rate of Progress in the Completion of the Internal Market Needed, 4
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,882 (1987) (information memo from the Com-
mission, May 1987).
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sidering the significance of commercial aviation in the transpor-
tation infrastructure, initiatives directed toward liberalized
competition and flexibility assumed critical importance and fo-
cus in the mid to late 1990s.
C. PARLIAMENT
Meeting alternatively in Strasbourg, France, and Brussels,
Belgium, the EU Parliament comprises more than 600 mem-
bers' 46 who are elected directly by the citizens of Member
States.'47 Parliament's members are expected to act for the ben-
efit of the entire European Union, rather than on behalf of
their respective governments. 141 Parliament has the duty of ad-
vising the Council on issues of importance to the development
of the EU.' 49
As a matter of procedure, the Commission issues recommen-
dations to the Council that are subsequently referred to Parlia-
ment for further comment and recommendation. Parliament
generally comments on the potential legal and political implica-
tions of the proposed regulation. 5 ' However, under the Treaty
of Maastricht, Parliament gained more legislative power, and
now shares "co-decision-making" powers with the Council in cer-
tain substantive areas.' 5 1
D. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
Sitting in Luxembourg, the European Court ofJustice is com-
posed of fifteen judges who are appointed for terms of six years
by "common accord" of the Member States.' 52 Also appointed
by the Member States for similar terms are nine advocates gen-
eral who in turn "deliver, in open court and with complete im-
partiality and independence, opinions on the cases brought
before the Court." 53 As the highest court in the Union, the
146 The European Parliament, European Parliament Overview - History, available
at http://www.europarl.eu.int/presentation/defaulten.html (last visited Feb. 2,
2001). In 1999, Parliament had 626 members.
147 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4306 (1987).
148 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4302 (1987).
149 Id.
150 See generally id.
151 The European Parliament, European Parliament Overview - History, available
at http://www.europarl.eu.int/presentation/default-en.html (last visited Feb. 2,
2001).
152 The European Court of Justice, Composition and Organization, available at
http://curia.eu.int/en/pres/co.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 1999).
153 Id.
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Court of Justice renders decisions on the application to Member
States. The Court interprets and enforces the provisions of the
Treaty of Rome. 15
4
Several problems arise when the Court interprets the Treaty
of Rome and, in effect, changes Union policy in the absence of
governing regulations promulgated by the Council. In such sit-
uations, Member States must administer competition laws with-
out guidance of regulations. Consequently, in the past, laws
have not always been applied with uniformity, because the indi-
vidual states have been somewhat free to interpret them as they
please. Furthermore, in the past, competition laws have been
invoked only when convenient or acceptable to individual states,
thereby only marginally stimulating competition. 5 5 The histori-
cally inconsistent application of the competition laws was cer-
tainly adverse to one purpose of the Treaty of Rome-to
promote an economic and harmonious transport system.1 56
Moreover, a decision applying the competition laws in the air-
line industry interfered with the Council's authority to adopt of-
ficial policy for the economic harmonization of air transport.1 57
The Court did, however, render decisions of great importance
that held the competition laws of the Treaty of Rome applicable
to air transport, and that the Council has a duty under the
Treaty of Rome to formulate a coordinated transport policy for
the EU. These decisions will be examined further on in this
paper.
E. THE COMMISSION
Headquartered in Brussels, the EU Commission is a nonparti-
san body comprising of 20 commissioners (two each from
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, and
one each from the other Member States) appointed for four-
year terms by the common agreement of the Member States.
The Commission works closely with the Council, but acts inde-
pendently of the Council and Member States.15 The Commis-
sion's duties are primarily executive in nature-to oversee EU
development and to ensure that the development conforms to
the Treaty of Rome. To fulfill its role, the Commission issues
154 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 4600 (1981).
155 Letter from Knut Hammarskjold, Director-General of the LATA (source on
file with author).
156 See TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at arts. 74-84.
157 Id. at art. 84(2).
158 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4472, 4482 (1987).
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recommendations and advisory opinions to the Council for the
consideration and adoption of regulations."5 9 The Commission
has specific and critically important jurisdiction over issues sur-
rounding the infringement of the Treaty of Rome's competition
laws. 160
F. THE COUNCIL
The Council, which meets in Brussels and Luxembourg, in-
cludes one representative appointed from each of the Member
States who directly represent their State's interests.' 6' The
Council has both legislative and executive powers 62 and is re-
sponsible for carrying out the objectives of the Union and coor-
dinating the economic policies of Member States.16  The
Council can issue recommendations that are not binding on
Member States, 164 or it can issue decisions, directives, and regu-
lations that are binding. 6  The Council adopts regulations
based upon recommendations and advisory opinions from the
Commission or Parliament.16
IV. JURISDICTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO
REGULATE AIR TRANSPORTATION: DECISIONS
OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
A. INTRODUCTION
During the 1970s and 1980s, the European Court of Justice
delivered a series of decisions that mapped out the fundamental
legal underpinnings of EC/EU regulation of air transport. Un-
til these cases clarified the law, it was unclear whether the Com-
mission and Council had jurisdiction under the Treaty of Rome
to regulate air transport. As the Court delineated, the Commis-
sion and Council did indeed have such power. Through these
cases, the Court detailed the structural extent of air transport
regulatory power, and constructed a framework in which the
Commission and Council could proceed with liberalization.
159 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4472 (1987).
160 TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 89. Article 89 gives the Commission
investigatory powers.
161 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4406.02 (1978).
162 HENKEN, supra note 39, at 1078.
163 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4402.04 (1978).
164 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4902.31 (1976).
165 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4902.15, 4902.25 (1976).
16 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4402 (1987).
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B. THE FRENCH SEAMEN'S CASE
Prior to the adoption of the SEA, Article 84(2) of the Treaty
of Rome provided that "[t] he Council may, acting unanimously,
decide whether, to what extent and by what procedure appropri-
ate provisions may be laid down for sea and air transport." This
provision is one of the few from the Treaty of Rome allowing the
Council to act without a proposal from the Commission.
Before the Court's 1974 decision in the French Seamen's Case, it
was unclear whether the failure of the Council to promulgate
regulations under Article 84(2) shielded air transport from all
the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, or only those provisions
specifically dealing with transportation. 67
In this decision, the Court pronounced that the general rules
of the Treaty of Rome- such as nondiscrimination on national
grounds, right of establishment, competition, mobility of labor,
and equal pay-apply to transport, even though no regulation
had been adopted to enforce those laws.'" 8 This holding, of
course, violated the plain meaning of Article 84(2)-that the
Treaty of Rome's provisions be applicable only after the Council
has adopted rules making them so. Only Title IV was inapplica-
ble to air transport by virtue of the Council's inaction.
C. THE TRANSPORT POLICY DECISION
(EuRoPEAN PARLIAMENT V. COMMISSION)
Another important decision of the Court concerning Euro-
pean transportation was rendered in response to a complaint
brought against the Council by Parliament." 9 In January of
1983, Parliament took the unusual step of bringing an action
against the Council in the Court of Justice under Article 175,
seeking a declaration that the Council had failed to act in the
field of common transport policy. 70 Parliament also asked for a
declaration that the Council breached the Treaty of Rome by
167 TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at arts. 74-84.
168 SORENSEN, supra note 5, at 3; Case 167/73, Comm'n v. Fr., 1974 E.C.R. 359;
see also Case 156/77, Comm'n v. Belg., 1978 E.C.R. 1881.
169 European Parliament Committee on Transport, Notice to Members Con-
cerning theJudgment of the Court ofJustice of the European Communities of 22
May 1985 in Case 13/83, European Parliament v. Council of the European Com-
munities: Common Transport Policy-Obligations of the Council, June 7, 1985,
at 2 [hereinafter OBLIGATIONS OF THE COUNCIL].
170 Bombardella, Analysis of the Judgment of the Court of Justice of 22 May
1985-Common Transport Policy-Council's Obligations, June 14, 1985, at 1
[hereinafter BOMBARDELLA].
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failing to render a decision on sixteen specific proposals relating
to surface transport submitted to it by the Commission. 7' Par-
liament insisted that the establishment of a common transport
policy was a requirement flowing directly from the Treaty of
Rome. 172
In the Transport Policy Decision, the Court held that a com-
plaint brought on grounds of failure to act was admissible. 7 '
This was the first time in the history of the EU that the Court
had so held. 17 The Court concluded that the Council failed to
act with regard to freedom to provide services in the field of
international transport and the fixing of conditions under
which nonresident carriers may operate transport services
within a Member State, by not taking measures necessary for
that purpose before the expiration of the transitional period
(December 31, 1969), and that these failures constituted a
breach of the Treaty of Rome. '71
171 OBLIGATIONS OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 169, at 2.
172 European Parliament Committee on Transport, Notice to Members: Pro-
ceedings Against the Council for Failure to Act, May 31, 1985, at 8 [hereinafter
PROCEEDINGS]. Parliament argued that the Council's inaction violated articles
3(e) 61, 74, 75 and 84 of the TREAI OF ROME, supra note 34.
173 Florus Wijsenbeek, European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs and
Citizens' Rights Opinion for the Committee on Transport on the Report on the
Judgment of the Court of Justice on the Common Transport Policy and the
Council's Obligation in Relation Thereto, June 28, 1985, at 3; Case 13/83, Euro-
pean Parliament v. Council, 1985 E.C.R. 519 at 1513.
174 See REPORT, supra note 58, at 12 (first time Council found guilty of failure to
act); see also Wijsenbeek, supra note 173, at 3 (Parliament strengthened by fact
action for failure to act admissible). The Court reasoned that the institutional
position of a body, as intended by the Treaty, particularly Article 4(1), would be
prejudiced if it were restricted in the exercise of that power. The fact that the
Parliament exercised political control over the Commission, and to a certain ex-
tent the Council, "does not affect the interpretation of the provisions of the
Treaty governing the legal remedies available to the institutions." BOMBARDELLA,
supra note 170, at 2. The Court found a close connection between freedom to
provide services under Article 75(1) (a) and (b) and the adoption of a common
transport policy. Furthermore, Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty define the scope
of the Council's obligation to introduce freedom to provide services. See OBLIGA-
TIONS OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 169, at 6. The Court held that the Council
does not have discretion in applying Articles 59 and 60. Articles 59, 60, and 61,
in conjunction with 75(1) (a) and (b), clearly indicate that discretion may be exer-
cised only with regard to the details of how the objective will be attained. Id. at 7.
The Court's decision confirmed that there was not a coherent body of rules that
could be described as a common transport policy within the meaning of Articles
74 and 75 of the Treaty, but that this does not in all aspects constitute a failure to
act which is actionable under Article 175.
175 OBLIGATIONS OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 169, at 7. The Court qualified its
grant of review by holding that the failure to act must relate to measures that the
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The Court held that the Council did, however, retain the
right to determine the objectives and means of attaining a com-
mon transport policy in accordance with procedural rules laid
down in the Treaty of Rome. The Court further held that the
Council has wide discretion with regard to the substance and
organization of the common transport policy, limited only by
procedural requirements and specific time limits. 176
The significance of this decision may best be described as an
official acknowledgment that the Council failed in its duty to
provide a common transport policy, and that the other bodies of
the EU government had the right to obtain judicial review of the
Council's activities. While the decision only explicitly addressed
the Council's obligations to develop a surface transport policy,
its implications for air transport are manifest.
D. OLYMPIC AIRWAYS
The Commission took a strong position on the question of
whether the competition laws could be applied directly to sea
and air transport'7 7 in the Association des Compagnies Aerien-
nes de la Communaute Europeenne's (ACE's) complaint
against Olympic Airlines.1 78 Charges against Olympic followed
Council has not adopted but are specific enough for the judgment to be exe-
cuted under Article 176. In other words, Parliament must show that the Council
has completely failed to act where there is a specific directive requiring action.
Furthermore, the measures forming the subject matter of the dispute must be
sufficiently defined to allow the Court to appraise the legality of their adoption or
nonadoption. See BOMBARDELLA, supra note 170, at 2. But if the Parliament had
specified which measures the Council should have adopted in the common trans-
port policy, it would have risked having the case dismissed as an encroachment
on the Council's discretion. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 172 at 6. As to the objec-
tive difficulties that, according to the Council, prevent progress from being made
toward a common transport policy, the Court held that they are irrelevant in the
context of disputes under Article 175. Article 175 makes no concessions to the
degree of difficulty involved for the institution to fulfill its obligation. The Coun-
cil is obligated to make a decision despite the difficulty it may encounter.
176 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 172, at 9. Thus, as a procedural matter, if the
Council is required to adopt a certain measure by a qualified majority, as in Arti-
cle 75, it cannot justify its failure to act because of lack of unanimity. See
BOMBARDELLA, supra note 170, at 3. The Council is also required to act on the
measures specified by the Court within a "reasonable period." Id. The Court's
determination that the Council must act with a "reasonable" time is not suffi-
ciently clear. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 172, at 7. Nor has the Treaty set a time
limit as to when action must occur. But a prolonged failure to act would presum-
ably have been a further infringement of the Treaty. See BOMBARDELLA, supra
note 170, at 3.
177 T, EArY OF ROME, sup-a note 34, at art. 84(2).
178 DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 246-49.
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in the wake of charges against Sabena, which was accused of re-
ceiving illegal government loan guarantees and subsidization of
depreciation charges and interest payments. The formal com-
plaint against Olympic alleged that it received subsidies from
the Greek government in the form of an exemption from paying
landing fees at Greek airports, and it was abusing its "dominant
position" in enjoyment of a monopoly in the provision of bag-
gage handling at Greek airports. ACE claimed that allowing one
airline to avoid paying fees "distorts or threatens to distort com-
petition." 179 ACE's complaint charged that the market distor-
tion created thereby violated Article 92 (1), which mandates free
and equal trading opportunities throughout the Common Mar-
ket. ACE also alleged that the aid violated Article 7, which pro-
hibits discrimination on the basis of nationality. 18 The
Commission concluded that "[t]here is no legal basis for claim-
ing, as Olympic Airways claims, that Articles 85 and 86 do not
apply to air transport." ''  The European Court of Justice held
that while air transport might be exempt from the direct appli-
cability of Article 85, ancillary services (e.g., ground handling
and computer reservations systems) were not.18 2
E. NOUVELLES FRONTERES
Decided in April, 1986, the case of Nouvelles Frontieres involved
the issue of whether Member States have the right to regulate
the price of airline tickets sold within their borders, and the po-
tential application of exemptions and sanctions of the competi-
tion provisions of the Treaty of Rome to air transport. 8 ' The
Court answered certified questions from a French court con-
cerning applicability of the competition rules of the Treaty of
Rome to IATA price-fixing agreements made by French air-
lines.'84 Nouvelles Frontieres, a French travel agency, was sell-
179 ELC Claims Greek Airline Received Illegal Subsidies, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan.
17, 1983, at 34.
180 Id.
181 Commission Decision of Jan. 23, 1985, pmbl. 5.1, 1985 O.J. (L 46) 51, 52;
DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 104-06.
182 Commission Decision ofJan. 23, 1985, pmbl. 5.1 (1985); Olympic Airways,
1985 O.J. (L 46/51), [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 730; WOUTERS, supra note 38, at 21.
183 Michael Feazel, Liberalization Policies at Issue in Ruling in French Fare Case, Av.
WK. & SPACE TECH., July 15, 1985, at 28 [hereinafter LIBERALIZATION POLICIES].
84 See generally Prof. Henri Wassenbergh, The 'Nouvelles Frontieres' Case, 11 AIR
L. 161 (1986).
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ing tickets at fares that had not been approved by the French
Government under the French Civil Aviation Code.18 5
The Nouvelles Frontieres case answered both a procedural and
substantive question. As noted above, Council Regulation No.
17 implemented the competition rules of Articles 85 and 86 of
the Treaty of Rome and gave the Commission power to look
into cases of their infringement; by virtue of Regulation 17, the
Commission may grant an exemption under Article 85 (but not
Article 86). 186 However, air transport had been specifically ex-
cluded from the application of Regulation No. 17 in 1962.
In the absence of another Council regulation regarding im-
plementation of the competition rules, the transitional regime
contemplated under Articles 88 and 89 remains applicable. Ar-
ticle 88 gives Member States the power to rule on the lawfulness
of agreements, decisions, or concerted practices and on abuses
of dominant positions according to their national law, until the
Council (acting on a proposal of the Commission) promulgates
regulations implementing the competition rules.
Article 89 gives the Commission more limited power. The
Commission may (in cooperation with Member States) investi-
gate cases of suspected infringement of the competition rules,
and-if it finds an infringement-shall propose measures to bring
it to an end. If such conduct does not cease, the Commission
shall issue a "reasoned decision" authorizing Member States to
remedy the situation.
The Court first confirmed that, absent specific language
within the Treaty of Rome, air transport was "subject to the gen-
eral rules of the Treaty, including the competition rules. 1187
The Court then concluded that absent specific regulations gov-
erning air transport adopted by the Council under Article 87, it
was, in effect, up to the competent "authorities in Member
States" under Article 88 to apply the competition rules of the
Treaty of Rome to agreements concerning the air transport in-
dustry, or, alternatively, the Commission could issue a "reasoned
decision" under Article 89.188 Either option could open a Pan-
185 Peter Haanappel, Colloquium 'Nouvelles Frontieres,' State University of Ley-
den, the Netherlands, 11 AIR L. 181 (1986).
186 The four criteria for such an exemption under Article 85(3) are discussed
above in (11.403].
187 Ministere Public v. Asjes (Nouvelles Frontieres), 1986 E.C.R. 65, 72, [1985-
86 Transfer Binder]; Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,772, 16,778
(1986).
188 Id. at 16,778-80.
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dora's box of litigation in the national courts of Member
States.18
The substantive question addressed by Nouvelles Frontieres in-
volved the French law requiring approval of tariffs from public
authorities. The Court held that the tariff-filing procedure was
not contrary to the Treaty of Rome unless the tariffs themselves
run afoul of the competition rules. Professor Peter Haanappel
noted, "In essence, the Court ruled that it is contrary to... the
Treaty to approve air tariffs where these tariffs are the result of
an agreement, a decision of an association of undertakings
[trade association] or a concerted practice itself contrary to Arti-
cle 85."110
Nouvelles Frontieres effectively expanded the power the Com-
mission potentially could wield against anticompetitive practices
among European airlines. But while a philosophical victory for
those seeking greater liberalization, Nouvelles Frontieres was in
fact a partial defeat. Although the Court found that Articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty of Rome specifically apply to air transport,
they created a right without a remedy until either the Council
adopted regulations (under Article 87) or the Commission is-
sued a reasoned decision (under Article 89), and Member States
themselves acted to enforce the competition rules (under Arti-
cles 88 and 89)-something the Member States at the time ap-
peared particularly reluctant to do. Thus, while in theory there
was a remedy, in practice there was none.
Nonetheless, the decision intensified the pressure on the
Council to promulgate regulations to keep the Pandora's box
closed. The following year the Council did precisely that, al-
though it limited their application to intra-European interna-
tional air transportation between Community carriers.191
F. AHMED SAEED
In April 1989, the European Court of Justice handed down
the important decision of Ahmed Saeed.192 The case was brought
before the German courts by the Association for the Protection
Against Unfair Competition against two Frankfurt travel agen-
cies that were selling airline tickets to German nationals for
189 See id. at 16,780; DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 104-06, 252.
190 Haanappel, supra note 185, at 181.
191 Council Regulation 3975/87, art. 1, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 1.
192 Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Fluereisen and Silver Line Reiseburo v. Zentrale
zur Bekampfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs EV, reprinted in 38 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
LUFT-UND WELTRAUMRECHT [ZLW] 124 (1989).
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flights ostensibly beginning in Lisbon, Portugal, via Frankfurt to
points beyond. The passengers boarded in Frankfurt, discard-
ing the Lisbon-Frankfurt ticket coupon, in violation of German
law, to take advantage of airfares that were 60% less than those
approved by the German government. The High Court of the
Federal Republic of Germany submitted the case on certiorari
to the European Court of Justice asking for a preliminary ruling
as to whether: (i) airline tariff agreements are void as a violation
of Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome, even if neither a Member
State (under Article 88) nor the Commission (under Article
89(2)) had declared them incompatible with Article 85; (ii)
such tariffs constitute an abuse of a dominant position within
the meaning of Article 86; and (iii) the approval of such tariffs
by a Member State are incompatible with Articles 5 and 90 of
the Treaty of Rome, even where the Commission has not ob-
jected to such tariff approval (under Article 90(3)). After the
initial hearing of the case, but before final judgment, the Coun-
cil adopted its First Package of Liberalization and the Commis-
sion adopted its regulations in response thereto (discussed
below). The Court re-opened the case so as to assess the impact
of these developments.
The Court found that Article 85 was directly applicable to in-
ter-Community tariff agreements, even in the absence of imple-
menting legislation promulgated by the Member States (under
Article 88) or the Commission (under Article 89), a conclusion
that went beyond the holding in Nouvelles Frontieres. While tariff
"consultations" remain exempt, in order for the resulting agree-
ments to be lawful, they must comply strictly with the require-
ments for individual exemptions specified in the Commission's
regulations.1 93 The Court also found that Article 86 was directly
applicable to air transport even in the absence of implementing
regulations, and infringement thereof could be invoked by any
person.19' Thus, the fixing of scheduled air tariffs on domestic
flights, intra-Community flights, or flights to and from the EC
(now EU) would be unlawful if they constituted an abuse of a
dominant position and if trade between Member States might
be affected. The Court thus affirmed its earlier holding in the
Wood Pulp case, 95 which held the competition rules of the
193 Commission Regulation 2671/88, 1990 O.J. (L 10) 33; Council Regulation
3975/87, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 30.
194 WouTEms, supra note 38, at 20.
195 Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, A. AhIstrom
Osakeyhito and Others v. Comm'n of the EC, 1988 E.C.J. CELEX LEXIS 2898.
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Treaty of Rome applicable to agreements made outside the EC
where they are put into effect within the EC. 196
Moreover, the Court did not rule out the possibility that both
Articles 85 and 86 can apply simultaneously. Thus, even if an
airline qualifies for an individual exemption for a scheduled in-
tra-Community tariff under Article 85(3), it may nevertheless
run afoul of the law by abusing a dominant position under Arti-
cle 86. The Court in Ahmed Saeed also addressed the role of
Member States, reminding them of their obligation not to ap-
prove or encourage the consummation of tariff agreements con-
trary to Articles 85(1) or 86."'
V. EARLY EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REGULATION OF
AIR TRANSPORT: DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, COMMISSION, AND COUNCIL
A. INTRODUCTION
Until the late 1980s, the European Community had, at best, a
disjointed and inconsistent approach to deregulation and liber-
alization. Flustered by the undermining presence of bilateral
agreements and the stubborn "hands-off' approach taken by the
Council, for many years the Commission appeared to be alone
in its efforts to centrally liberalize air transport policy. As noted
above, this disarray changed with the passage of the Single Euro-
pean Act. As we will see later, some argue that a degree of this
disharmony still exists in direction of liberalization. This section
will delineate the prelude to that debate-the early liberalization
actions of the relevant institutions of the EU.
B. PARLIAMENT
The EU Parliament devoted years of effort to bring about a
comprehensive and coherent common transport policy."' Par-
liament's stated priorities are to bring the people of Europe
closer together, boost intra-Union trade, encourage economic
growth, reduce unemployment, open outlying regions, help
bridge the gap between the prosperous and impoverished re-
gions, and remove congestion from certain overcrowded urban
centers. Parliament envisions achievement of its objectives by
196 L. Weber, Effect of EEC Air Transport Policy on International Cooperation
(address before the International Congress on EEC Air Transport, Brussels, May
26, 1989).
197 TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at arts. 5 and 90(1).
198 REPORT, supra note 58, at 7.
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the construction of new major routes and infrastructure and by
the elimination of bottlenecks in existing route networks, to be
paid for with taxpayer money. 99
In 1985, Parliament approved a cautious approach to deregu-
lation to be accomplished over a period of 14 years. Its advisory
decisions would allow only limited exemptions to the competi-
tion rules for the first seven years. A parliamentary report stated
that either nation served by a route in question should unilater-
ally be able to block new low fares on that route. ° Since that
time, however, the Parliament has largely assigned itself alter-
nately the role of cheerleader or conscience of the Commission
and Council. On such matters as noise limitations and most
other environmental issues, the Parliament has been largely ap-
preciative of the Commission and Council .2 1 1 However, the Par-
liament has been extremely concerned that liberalization may
somehow have a negative "social impact," and it has frequently
called for studies showing what the effects of liberalization have
been.2  The 21st Century may see an expansion of the Parlia-
ment's involvement in air transport regulation, as the Treaty of
Amsterdam, adopted in 1997, gives the Parliament much
broader powers to shape regulation.20 3 Yet so far the Parliament
has not exerted its new powers in the field of aviation, content
to follow the lead of the Commission and Council.
C. THE COMMISSION
The Commission has been the most active and impatient body
in the EU/EC government in pursuit of a unified transport pol-
icy and liberalization of airline regulations. While the Commis-
sion asserted that it did not believe the American style of
deregulation would work in Europe, it advocated a gradual
change from existing policy, referred to as the "go-slow" ap-
proach.2"4 For instance, the Commission advocated increased
199 Id. at 21.
200 Europeans Advise Slow Deregulation Approach, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 23,
1985, at 39.
201 See Towards an International Agreement on Aircraft Noise Level, available at
http://Nvww.europarl.eu.int/dg3/sdp/newsrp/en/nOO0127.htm#3 (last visited
Aug. 14, 2000).
202 See Air Transport Liberalisation, available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/dg3/
sdp/newsrp/en/1998/n980121.htm#3 (last visited Aug. 14, 2000).
203 Roger J. Goebel, Symposium: The European Union and the Treaty of Amsterdam,
22 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 7, at 28.
204 SORENSEN, supra note 5, at 6.
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flexibility0 5 and proposed liberalization of capacity, airfares,
and conditions of competition. 2 6 Nonetheless, it grew increas-
ingly impatient with the Council's inability or unwillingness to
promulgate regulations applying the Treaty of Rome's competi-
tion articles to air transport. Beginning in 1979, the Commis-
sion issued several memoranda that put forth possible objectives
the Council could adopt.
1. The First and Second Memoranda
In 1979, the Commission issued Memorandum 1, which
pointed out several problems of the current structure, including
a tendency towards high tariffs due to governmental presence,
limited fare flexibility for holidays, and limited possibilities for
innovation.207
In March 1984, the Commission followed with Memorandum 2,
entitled "Progress Towards the Development of a Community
Air Transport Policy. ' 2 8 Memorandum 2 expanded on the ideas
promulgated in Memorandum 1.209 The aims of Memorandum 2
were to review the developments since Memorandum 1, to pro-
pose an overall framework for air transport in the Community,
to put forth legislative measures for the Council's adoption, and
to outline future work the Commission plans to pursue.21 0
The policies of Memorandum 2 focused on air transport be-
tween Member States as an important part of the creation of a
Common Market in aviation and the improvement of the Com-
mon Market in general. 21 1 However, the Commission was not
oblivious to the impact and importance of international aviation
outside of the Community. The memorandum recognized the
effects of deregulation in the United States, under the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, and the need to establish a unified
Community posture toward international organizations and
nonmember countries.21 2 At the time, the Community's major
scheduled airlines were earning 40% of their revenues in local
Europe. The remainder of their revenue was earned on routes
to other international destinations, especially on intercontinen-
205 Id.
206 Id. at 7.
207 Id. at 6.
208 See generally MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26; DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 100-02.
209 SORENSEN, supra note 5, at 5.
210 Id. at 6.
211 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at I.
212 Id. at 12-13.
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tal routes.213 The Commissioners sought to maintain the ex-
isting system of regulation and agreement while introducing
flexibility and the benefits of competition.21 4
Memorandum 2 asked the Member States to consider proposals
to increase competition by restricting the influence of govern-
ments on scheduled airline operations and by introducing
greater flexibility in their air service arrangements, particularly
in route access, designation, capacity, and fares.215 The Com-
mission asserted that all of the proposals in the memorandum
were interdependent, and, therefore, must be adopted by both
the Council and the Commission and implemented as a pack-
age.2"6 While the Commission recognized the time necessary for
discussion and implementation, it discouraged excessive delay
and expressly reserved its right of direct action against airline
practices that violated the competition articles.21 v
In Memorandum 2, the Commission addressed several specific
areas for liberalization in Europe's highly regulated scheduled
air transport industry. Capacity guarantees were to be reduced
to no more than 25%,218 although 50% had been the norm
under typical bilateral agreements. The document addressed
pooling agreements-where traffic and revenues are shared re-
gardless of which carrier generates the traffic or earns the reve-
nue. 2 19 The Commission also proposed guidelines designed to
monitor state subsidies of airlines to ensure a fair, competitive
environment. 220 Finally, in what has since become a major issue
in liberalization, the Commission sought to apply the competi-
tion rules, specifically Articles 85 through 90 of the Treaty of
Rome, to the scheduled air transport industry.21 The Commis-
sion justified this assertion, two years before Nouvelles Frontieres,
on the basis of Court ofJustice rulings in 1974 and 1978.222 Op-
ponents argued against adjustments to the European civil avia-
tion regime on the ground that such changes would result in
213 Id. at 9.
214 Id. at I.
215 Colin Thaine, The Way Ahead from Memo 2: the Need for More Competition, a
Better Deal for Europe, 10 AIR L. 90.
216 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at III.
217 Id.; TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at arts. 85-90.
218 Thaine, supra note 215, at 93.
219 Id. at 94.
220 Id. at 95.
221 Id. at 95-96.
222 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at 17. Nouvelles Frontieres was decided
April 30, 1986.
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unacceptable impacts on international aviation outside of the
Community. The Commission rejected this rationale. Rather,
the Commission insisted that such steps would contribute to a
"Community market in aviation" and the "improvement of the
internal market in its wider sense. ' 22 3 Nevertheless, it recog-
nized the repercussions of its proposals on the non-Community
states of Europe in formulating its proposals. 224 The Commis-
sion sought a qualified increase in competitiveness throughout
European civil aviation:
[R]ecent years have made it clear that although the present re-
gime has produced an extensive network of aviation services, the
rigidities of the system . . . give rise to an increasing degree of
public dissatisfaction. This criticism (not all of which is justified)
has tended to center on the civil aviation services provided within
Europe, and the Commission is confirmed in its view that within
the Community there is scope for introducing more flexibility
and competition into the existing system without destroying it or
losing the benefits that it has brought about. Flexibility is not,
however, an end in itself. It should be regarded rather as the
means to improving the services to the consumer and the profit-
ability of the efficient and enterprising airline.225
The Commission's qualifications on competition included a
recognition of strong state interests in the survival of national
airlines22' and recognition of a history of competition in services
within the industry, especially with respect to charter airlines. 227
In addition, the Commission explicitly acknowledged that the
U.S.-style deregulation would not work in Europe 22 and that di-
rect comparisons of costs and fares between European and simi-
lar U.S. routes were invalid. In particular, fuel, air traffic
control, and airport charges presented significant cost elements
that European airlines could not influence. 229 Memorandum 2
concluded that airfares in Europe were not unreasonably re-
lated to costs, owing in large part to the fact that only 40% of
total costs were controllable by the airlines. Nevertheless, the
Commission believed that changes in procedures related to the
223 Id. at 21.
224 Id. at 22.
225 Id. at 21.
226 Id. at 22.
227 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at 23. Charter traffic within Europe ac-
counts for 60% of all air travel. See AIR CARTEL, supra note 18, at 23, 26.
228 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at 26-27.
229 Id. at 24.
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fixing of airfares would result in a "wider range of fares."2 '
Moreover, the belief was expressed that competitive pressures
would ultimately lead to lower airfares.231
Memorandum 2 expressed a general preference for an "evolu-
tionary approach '23 2 to a more competitive air transport policy,
rather than the more revolutionary policy adopted earlier by the
United States.233 While comprehensive deregulation arguably
had merit in the large, unified market of the United States, con-
ditions in Europe would not justify such an approach. 34 Addi-
tionally, at the time of deregulation, the United States had
about 20 major air carriers, and the government could take "a
relaxed view on the fate of any one of them," in contrast to the
nationalized airlines and international character of European
aviation.23 '5 The issue, therefore, was whether the system could
be modified sufficiently to meet the needs of the European
Community while at the same time bringing to bear sufficient
competitive pressures for the airlines to "control costs, increase
productivity and provide efficient and attractively priced services
to the user; and to enable the efficient and enterprising airline
to benefit .. ."236 The Commission stated that the principal
measures to be taken were: (a) Community rules on certain as-
pects of bilateral agreements between Member States; (b)
changes in methods for settlement of air tariffs; and (c) action
limiting the effect of commercial and tariff agreements between
airlines.23 7
Regarding bilateral agreements, the Commission urged elimi-
nation of mandatory pooling arrangements between airlines.
Also, it suggested rigid 50/50 traffic-sharing agreements should
be relaxed to where no one party is guaranteed a traffic share of
more than 25% in agreements between Member States. 38
"This would .. .permit a greater degree of competition and
assure a Member State that its airline would have as a safety net
a level of operation below which it could not fall without the
consent of its own government. 239
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 27.
233 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at 26.
234 Id. at 26.
235 Id. at 27.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 29.
238 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at 30.
239 Id.
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The principal features of bilateral or multilateral agreements
between airlines were identified as scheduling, capacity, revenue
sharing, and tariff provisions. Even though the Commission, as
explained above, wanted to prevent capacity agreements that
were either mandatory or required a strict 50/50 sharing, it rec-
ognized that in some cases such agreements were desirable in
order to assure service in thin markets. On the other hand, the
Commission recognized that such agreements tended to inure
to the detriment of the more efficient airline. Consequently,
Memorandum 2 indicated that capacity agreements should be
permissible, but emphasized that any party should be able to
withdraw from such an agreement upon giving reasonably short
notice. 40
As with capacity sharing, the Commission also recognized that
pooling agreements could have desirable consequences in en-
couraging carriers to operate outside of profitable periods. 24,
At the same time, such agreements may also restrict competition
that otherwise might take place, contrary to Article 85(1).242
Pooling agreements between airlines were of two basic types:
open pools, which distributed revenue on the basis of the capac-
ity offered by each airline (regardless of which carrier actually
earned the revenue), and limited pools, which almost equalized
revenue. The Commission was of the opinion that revenue
pools should be permitted in certain limited circumstances,243
but that open pools should be prohibited.244 In order to be ex-
empted from the competition rules under Article 85(3), such
agreements must contribute to the improvement of air transpor-
tation with a minimum of anticompetitive effect.245 However,
the Commission's guideline in this area was more restrictive,
limiting the transfer of revenue from one airline to another to
one percent of poolable revenues. All other revenue-pooling ar-
rangements would be subject to "specific scrutiny in each case in
order to determine whether they would qualify for exemption
under Article 85(3).,246
2411 Id. at 32-33.
2'4 Id. at 33.
2.12 Id.; TREA' Or ROME, supra note 34, at art. 85(1).
241 MEMOPANDUM 2, supra note 26, at 33.
'44 Id. at 33-34; TREATry OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 85(3).
245 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at 33, 34; TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at
art. 85(3).
246 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at 34.
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The Commission also recognized that airlines should be as
free as possible to determine what tariffs best suited their com-
mercial needs and should be able to set tariffs within certain
predetermined "zones of reasonableness" without governmental
approval.247 In its "Amended Proposal for a Council Directive,"
the Commission indicated the minimum acceptable range to be
covered within the zones.248 This proposal reflected then-recent
developments in the economic and regulatory environment,
such as the agreements between the United States and certain
ECAC countries for a given number of "reference tariffs," as well
as "zones of reasonableness. ' 249 Within the zones, the following
alternatives could be agreed upon: (1) airlines would be free to
set fares without government interference; (2) proposed fares
would take effect unless both countries disapproved ("double
disapproval"); or (3) proposed fares would be subject to coun-
try-of-origin approval. While both governments in bilateral
agreements would be expected to consult and agree in setting
the zones of reasonableness, in case of a dispute between the
two governments concerning fares outside of the zone, the
country of origin would be able to determine the fare.250
The tariff-setting proposals of Memorandum 2 also extended to
agreements among airlines. The Commission observed that
most of the nations that were members of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), which includes virtually the en-
tire global aviation community, recognized such tariff consulta-
tions as an essential part of transport policy. These
consultations restricted competition, but at the same time had
resulted in a "system [which] allowed the provision of reliable,
high quality services to the consumer. ' 25' Tariff-setting arrange-
ments would be permissible if they "confer[red] an equivalent
advantage to the consumer, [were] not unduly restrictive and
... [from which] a reasonable degree of competition [was] en-
sured. ' 252 The Commission indicated that these conditions
would be met if:
247 Id. at 31.
248 The proposal called for two "zones of flexibility," each with a minimum
range of 25%. The first zone was to "extend at least 15% on either side of the
existing air fare for economy class," and the other was to "be situated below the
first and cover restricted use air fares." Id. at Annex II, art. 6(4) & (5).
2411 Id. at 31.
250 Id. at 32.
251 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at 35.
252 Id. at 35.
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airlines had an effective right of independent action, both in
terms of proposing tariffs independently of other airlines, and in
terms of freedom to implement such tariffs, subject only to the
[proposed] limited government control ....
The Member States concerned and the Commission were ena-
bled to participate as observers in tariff consultations.253
Another major aspect of competition, market access, was
given cursory treatment by the Commission.254 While recogniz-
ing the dominance throughout the EC of large, national air-
lines, and that services to the consumer would be improved with
a proliferation of smaller airlines, the Commission proposed
only that the smaller airlines be allowed to operate on bilateral
routes not presently utilized.255 The Commission believed that
such steps could be taken without "significant damage" to major
airlines and without the detailed justification or reciprocity ordi-
narily required. 25" The Commission went further and suggested
that if a Member State desired, such routes could be so utilized
only after giving national airlines a right of first refusal.257
The Commission also proposed tight control of state aid and
subsidies to encourage airlines to accept competition. Without
guarantees that other airlines would compete on the same level,
airlines would be reluctant to join an open market. 25 The Com-
mission feared that unless state aids were adequately controlled,
implementation of competition measures would result in a sub-
sidy race-competition being financed by Member States. This
was to be prevented by application of the Treaty of Rome's state
aids rules in Articles 92 and 93, for which the Commission has
responsibility. 259 Proper application of these rules would result
in advance disclosure of all proposed state aids so that the Com-
mission could take a position as to whether it opposed individ-
ual subsidies or other forms of governmental assistance.2' ° The
Commission recognized that state aids may be appropriate in
certain circumstances in order to fulfill public service obliga-
253 Id.
254 See Thaine, supra note 215, at 93; International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC), European Commission Civil Aviation Memorandum No. 2: A Response by the ICC,
10 AIR L. 99, 103 (1985) (policy declaration and response adopted by the Execu-
tive Board of the ICC on Dec. 3, 1984).
255 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at 43-44.
256 Id.
2-57 Id. at 44.
258 SORENSEN, supra note 5, at 7.
259 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at 36.
260 Id. at 37.
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tions, to compete with subsidized carriers from third countries,
to overcome "particularly precarious" but temporary financial
problems, or to assist economically underdeveloped regions.2 1
Assistance in the form of "normal commercial transactions,"
such as loans, capital or guarantees, would also be acceptable,
although cases would have to be examined individually to deter-
mine the presence of impermissible aid.2
As indicated previously, the primary concern and focus of the
Commission in Memorandum 2 was with the EC (now EU). Con-
sequently, with regard to the international implications of its
proposals, it reasserted the supremacy of Community law.
Under Article 234,263 Member States must take steps to elimi-
nate conditions in agreements with third countries inconsistent
with forthcoming Community/Union aviation provisions. Nev-
ertheless, the Commission agreed that, given the legitimate pri-
orities and programs in third countries, especially non-
Community members of ECAC, some flexibility would be re-
quired.264 Accordingly, the Commission entered into coopera-
tion agreements under Article 22926i5 with ECAC and
EUROCONTROL.
In spite of its general adherence to a phased, evolutionary im-
plementation of policies, Memorandum 2 indicated some signs of
the Commission's growing impatience with the situation. It sug-
gested that any group exemptions from the competition provi-
sions should be limited to seven years.2" Additionally, even
though the memorandum identified exceptions to the prohibi--
tions in Article 85(1), if certain objectives were manifest, such
exceptions would expire on December 31, 1991.267 The Com-
mission reminded the Council of the proposals it had submitted
to the Council in 1981 calling for directives and regulations,
upon which the Council still had not taken action. 218 Finally,
the Commission repeatedly asserted its right to take direct ac-
tion, in certain circumstances, against practices in violation of
Treaty of Rome provisions.269
261 Id. at 37-38.
262 Id. at 38.
263 TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 234.
264 MEMORANDUM 2, supra 26, at 50.
265 TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 229.
266 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at 35.
267 Id. at Annex III C.
268 Id. at 16-17.
2-i Id. at III, 36, Annex III C.2.
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Memorandum 2 also addressed a significant number of addi-
tional issues. 271 The memorandum attached six annexes, which
included detailed proposals for Council action and guidelines
related to the foregoing matters.27' Memorandum 2 was more
than a general indication of the Commission's position and
thoughts on European civil aviation. The memorandum was in-
tended to provoke action by the Council and serve as a compre-
hensive guide to achieving the policy goals contained therein.
Reaction to Memorandum 2 was mixed. IATA and AEA, while
agreeing as to the necessity of reform, published their own pro-
posals, which differed considerably from Memorandum 2.272 Per-
ceiving significant threats to their economic well-being, trade
unions and airports opposed Memorandum 2. By contrast, char-
ter airlines and consumer groups voiced strong support for the
Commission proposals, particularly in areas approached most
warily by scheduled carriers. 273 The European Parliament and
the Economic and Social Committee conducted extensive hear-
ings and published comprehensive reports that supported the
overall thrust of Memorandum 2, but proposed significantly dif-
ferent approaches to many of the issues contained therein.274
The Council instituted a high-level working group, which met
eight times before the end of 1984. The efforts of the group
culminated in a report that "can be said to build on Memoran-
dum No. 2, taking into account the views that had been ex-
pressed in the interim. '271 On December 11, 1984, the Council
endorsed the report as a guideline for further actions and ar-
ranged for additional study.276
2. Enforcement
The failure of the Council to adopt regulations implementing
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome led the Commission in
1986 to send letters to ten European airlines277 alleging that
27(0 See id. at 13, 48 (aircraft noise), 14 (search and rescue), 15 (accident investi-
gation and interrogational air services), 42 (air freight transport), 43 (access to
market), 45 (non-scheduled services), 47 (social matters as related to Community
and aviation policies), 48 (research), 49 (general aviation).
271 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at Annexes I-VI.
272 WOUTERS, supra note 38, at 52-53.
273 Id. at 53.
274 Id. at 53-54.
275 Id. at 54.
276 Id. at 55.
277 Air France, Aer Lingus, Alitalia, British Airways, British Caledonian, KLM,
Lufthansa, Olympic, Sabena, and SAS.
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they had violated the Treaty of Rome by engaging in price fix-
ing, capacity limitation, revenue pooling, and restricted market
entry.27 8 The Commission threatened that failure of the airlines
to cooperate to eliminate these anti-competitive practices would
lead it to issue a "reasoned decision" under Article 89, an alter-
native which had been explicitly approved by the European
Court of Justice earlier that year in Nouvelles Frontieres. The issu-
ance of such a "reasoned decision" by the Commission poten-
tially would open a Pandora's box of litigation by private parties
in the national courts of Member States.
Hence, the ten airlines had a strong incentive to comply. Al-
though some of the southern European airlines initially resisted
meeting with DG-4 (the Commission ministry responsible for
competition) ,279 a more strongly worded Commission letter in
early 1987 advised recalcitrant carriers that the Commission be-
lieved an apparent infringement of the Treaty of Rome existed
and that a "reasoned decision" would soon be forthcoming.
This ultimately brought all the carriers to the bargaining table.
During tense meetings in Brussels, Mr. Peter Sutherland warned
representatives of Alitalia, Lufthansa, and Olympic that unless
they agreed to join negotiations on pricing liberalization, he
would bring an action against them in the European Court of
Justice for operating an illegal cartel. The carriers
capitulated.28 °
Yet, the informal understandings ultimately entered into be-
tween the Commission and the airlines were surprisingly modest
in substance, allowing a great deal more anticompetitive activity
than would be tolerated in, for example, the United States.
With respect to pricing, the Commission allowed a continuation
of carrier discussions regarding rates and permitted carriers to
enter into voluntary rate agreements, so long as (1) such discus-
sions were not conducted in secret, (2) the results of the discus-
sions would not be binding upon any carrier participating in
them, and (3) carriers retained the right of independent action
to file a tariff deviating from the agreed rates. As to revenue
and capacity-pooling agreements, they would continue to be tol-
erated so long as they were voluntary, they involved a sharing of
278 EEC Commission Action Could Result in Suits Against 10 Large Carriers, Av. WK.
& SPACE TECH., July 14, 1986, at 35; ARGYRIS, supra note 62, at 10-11.
279 Alitalia Rejects EEC Request for Data on Operational Practices, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 17, 1986, at 39.
280 Merritt, EC Deregulation at Crossroads, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, June 15, 1987,
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revenue of no more than one percent, and the transfer of reve-
nue went to the carrier providing off-peak service. Slot alloca-
tion would be permitted so long as negotiated and concluded
publicly. And, as to computer reservations systems, there would
have to be equal and unbiased access to the systems.
Thus, the Commission effectively did an "end run" around
the Council, defining the perimeters of lawful vis-A-vis unlawful
carrier conduct when the Council had been rendered immobile
by an inability to reach a consensus on regulations implement-
ing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. Yet, the Commis-
sion's modest constriction of anti-competitive behavior by air
carriers surprised almost everyone because the Commission had
previously done so much "chestbeating."
More recently, the Commission has been less reticent to use
its enforcement power. In March of 1992, the Commission
fined Aer Lingus 750,000 Euros for abuse of its dominant posi-
tion on the Dublin-London Route because it broke an interlin-
ing agreement with British Midland Airways after it became a
competitor on the route.28' The Commission stated, "[r]efusing
to interline is not normal competition on the merits. Interlin-
ing has for many years been accepted industry practice, with
widely acknowledged benefits for both airlines and passengers.
... A refusal to interline.., is a highly unusual step and has up
to now not been considered by the European airline industry as
a normal competitive strategy. '' 282 This was the first time the
Commission imposed a fine for breaking an interline
agreement.
D. THE COUNCIL
In 1962, the Council adopted general competition rules, but
specifically exempted air and sea transport. On June 30, 1968,
the Council decided that competition laws should be made ap-
plicable to transport by rail, road, and inland waterway.283
When the Treaty of Rome was adopted in 1957, air and sea
transport were excluded because of the special attitude adopted
toward these methods of transport.214 Indeed, Council Regula-
tion No. 141 states specifically that Council Regulation No. 17,
281 Aer Lingus Fined by EC Commission for Breaking Interlining Agreement, AVIATION
EUROPE, Mar. 5, 1992, at 1; WOUTERS supra note 38, at 25.
282 British Midland v. Aer Lingus, 4 C.M.L.R. 596 para. 25 (1993).
285 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2401-2634 (various dates) (Reg. No. 17).
284 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1945.05 (1974).
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which gives the Council the direct means of investigating viola-
tions of Articles 85 and 86 in transport and imposes penalties for
failure to comply,285 does not apply to air transport and related
activities. 286 The Council did not adopt maritime competition
rules until December 1986.
Many in Europe, including northern European governments
and the Commission, implored the Council to adopt regulations
that would specify how the competition laws would be applied
and enforced. 28 7 However, the major stumbling block in the
adoption of competition regulations was the desire of each na-
tion to guarantee the success of its own airline. Because the
Council members represent the interests of their own States,
they must follow the policies of their governments, many of
which have been generally opposed to air transport
liberalization.288
Article 74 of the Treaty of Rome states that "[t] he objectives
of this Treaty shall ... be pursued by the Member States within
the framework of a common transport policy. ' 289 Article 75 di-
rects the Council to create common rules applicable to interna-
tional transport within the Member States. 29° Despite a strong
push for liberalization by the Commission in 1979 and 1984,
and an important decision by the EEC Court of Justice in 1986,
the Council pled impossibility because of the complexity of the
issues and dissent within the Council itself.2 9'
By mid-1987, the Council appeared poised to conclude a com-
prehensive agreement on defining the application of relevant
provisions of the Treaty of Rome to air transport. In particular,
it would have laid down detailed rules for the application of the
competition provisions-Articles 85 and 86. It would have also
285 MATHIJSEN, supra note 75, at 181-83.
286 Association of European Airlines, European Air Transport Policy-AEA
Proposals, Sept. 27, 1985, at 14 (paper adopted by President's Special Assembly at
Brussels).
287 DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 246; TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 84(2).
288 DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 98.
289 TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 74.
290 Id. at art. 75.
291 See BOMBARDELLA, supra note 170, at 3. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 172, at 12.
In 1978, the Council established a priority program to address the problem of air
transport. The Council's priorities include: control of nuisances, simplification
of formalities, implementation of technical standards, implementation of provi-
sions regarding aid and competition, and mutual recognition of licenses. Other
items of Council concern include: working conditions, the right of establishment,
improvements in inter-regional services, search, rescue and recovery operations,
and accident inquiries. SORENSEN, supra note 5, at 3.
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identified the group exemptions to be allowed thereunder and
included directives on scheduled airline fares, capacity, and
market access.
Specifically, the package would have eliminated secret
pricefixing, but allowed public and voluntary agreements be-
tween carriers as to fares. As to entry, instead of being restricted
to regional routes between provincial airports, the airlines
would have been permitted to compete on feeder routes be-
tween regional and hub airports. The 50-50 capacity limitation
agreements in many bilaterals would have been reduced to 45-
55 for the first two years and 40-60 thereafter. Revenue pooling
would have been limited to one percent and transferred to the
carrier providing off-peak service. Computer reservation sys-
tems were to be open to all carriers without bias. The carriers
would have been granted block exemptions from the competi-
tion rules to enable them to agree on certain joint operations,
such as scheduling.292
But the entire package, accepted in principle by all Member
States, foundered in mid-1987 on the question of the inclusion
of Gibraltar in the proposed arrangements for route develop-
ment. 2 13 Newly admitted Spain exercised its veto at the eleventh
hour on an issue having virtually nothing to do with air trans-
port. Spain contested British sovereignty over Gibraltar and ap-
parently used this platform to reassert its position.
Although the Spanish veto scuttled the mid-1987 agreement,
the ability of the Council to reach a majority resolution of such
issues was greatly facilitated by the weighted voting of Member
States permitted by the Single European Act, adopted on July 1,
1987. With implementation of the SEA and advent of the EU,
no single nation can again unilaterally thwart the Council's abil-
ity to promulgate rules by casting a veto as Spain did in the Gi-
braltar debate. As noted above, the Single European Act may
have prompted Council agreement on a conservative liberaliza-
tion package (the so-called "First Package") in December 1987.
The Council adopted a more liberal "Second Package," which
entered into force on August 11, 1990294 and a fully liberalized
"Third Package," which became effective in January 1993.295
2112 Merritt, supra note 280, at 9, 12.
29- Spain Blocks the Adoption of Air Deregulation in EC, WALL ST. J., July 2, 1987, at
15; Unfair Air Fares, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1987, at 16; Spain in Search of Europe, ECON-
OMIST, July 18, 1987, at 43.
294 1990 OJ. Nr. 217.
295 1992 OJ. (L 241) 1.
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Before proceeding, the difference between the types of ac-
tions that may be taken by the Council should be made clear. A
"regulation" has general application, and is binding in its en-
tirety and directly upon all Member States. A "directive" is bind-
ing as to its objective as to each Member State to which it is
addressed, but leaves to the Member State the means by which it
shall be implemented. A "decision" is binding in its entirety
upon all to which it is addressed."
VI. CONTEMPORARY AIR TRANSPORT POLICY OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. INTRODUCTION
The contemporary landscape of European regulation of air
transport is one of growing competitiveness and government
regulation designed to promote competition. This competitive
environment was spawned in no small part by the historic move-
ment of the European Council towards full liberalization. While
the European Commission and industry organizations such as
AEA and ECAC encouraged liberalization earlier than the
Council actually undertook the task, true liberalization was not
likely to occur until the Council became a liberalization actor.
By the mid-1980s, the European Court of Justice made it clear
that the regulation of air transport was well within the domain
of the Council. With such impetus, the Council finally began to
heed the advice of the Commission, and launched its voyage
into liberalization-in a series of three packages. As the 1990s
dawned, many commentators projected that the Council's liber-
alization plan would precipitate a competitive market-though at
the same time producing a highly contentious climate full of
merger activity and privatization difficulties. There was some
hope that an intensely competitive merger climate would weed
out poorer performing airlines297 and provide economic bene-
fits to the consumer.
The picture that emerged at the end of the 20th Century was
somewhat different. While liberalization did make some aspects
of'the European air transport industry more competitive, alli-
ances seemed to take the place of mergers. The anticipated
consolidation thus occurred, but in a manner that might be
even more potent than pure monopoly. These alliance struc-
296 TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 189.
297 Piere Sparaco, European Deregulation Still Lacks Substance, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 9, 1998, at 53.
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tures presented their own somewhat oblique uncompetitive
challenges.
In terms ofjust the number of airlines, the industry appeared
more competitive on its face. For example, in 1998, 164 sched-
uled air carriers operated in the EU, up from 132 in 1992. Of
the carriers, twelve operated 70 to 100-seat regional jets, up
from eight in 1995 and four in 1992.298 However, there was ar-
gument that such numbers were inefficient, and that the "Euro-
pean airline industry restructuring [was] lagging, and the
number of players [was] hardly evolving. 299
Privatization was reasonably difficult; yet the greater regula-
tory challenge presented itself in the form of supranational con-
flict (i.e., air transport regulatory differences between the
United States and the European Union). Prices had not fallen
as drastically as was hoped, and new value-based entrants were
not as successful as some commentators thought they would be.
Ancillary services (ground handling) were also still relatively
uncompetitive.
Regardless of the partial success of liberalization by the end of
the 20th Century, the overall state of the air transport market
was one of increasing competitiveness. Prices were falling and
smaller, value-based airlines were gaining competitive ground.
Restrictive bilateral agreements between nations were disappear-
ing, and the European Union was beginning to assert its role as
principal negotiator of air traffic rights by sweeping aside inter-
nal restrictions on air transportation. This section of the paper
delineates the landscape of applicable European Union regula-
tion of air transport-the Commission's proposals, the Council's
packages, and other relevant legislation.
In December 1987, three decades after the signing of the
Treaty of Rome, the EU Council adopted its long-awaited regu-
lations on the application of the Treaty of Rome's competition
rules to scheduled air transport,311° group exemptions thereto,""°
a directive on scheduled airfares," 12 and a decision on capacity
298 Id.
299 Id. (quoting Bernard Van Houtte, head of the Application of Community
Law unit of the EC Transportation Directorate General).
3110 Council Regulation 3975/87, 1987 0.J. (L 374) 1.
301 Council Regulation 3976/87 of 14 December 1987 Application of Article
85(3) of the Rome Treaty (Group Exemptions), 1987 0.J. (L 374) 9.
302 Council Directive 87/601 of 14 December 1987 Scheduled Air Fares, 1987
0.J. (L 374) 12.
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sharing and market access."" : The regulations applied only to
flights between EU Member States, and not to domestic flights
or flights between Member States and third countries.
Why, after so many years of wrangling, had the Council finally
achieved agreement? The political problems between Spain
and the United Kingdom surrounding the UK's possession of
Gibraltar, which had led Spain to veto the agreement earlier in
the year, were resolved in December 1987.1"4 Moreover, begin-
ning on July 1, 1987, the implementation of weighted voting
under the Single European Act had eliminated the possibility of
a single state veto. Hence, no one nation could repeat the Span-
ish impasse of summer 1987. With weighted voting, consensus
became more practical than intransigence.
Threats by the Commission to utilize the sanctions approved
by the Court of Justice in Nouvelles Frontieres had abated consid-
erably with the relatively conservative agreements it had entered
into with offending airlines. The Commission itself began to ap-
preciate the difficult political problems that international avia-
tion posed for Member States, and was willing to opt for
increased diplomacy over unilateral actions that might rip at the
very threads of the fragile European alliance.? 5
Moreover, much of air transport had already been made more
liberal, with the new bilateral air transport agreements in effect
between Britain, the Netherlands, Ireland and many of their avi-
ation partners."' ECAC had adopted modest liberalization pro-
posals. Hence, there was already much for the European
scheduled air transport industry to digest.
Charter services, which had largely been deregulated in the
1950s, dominated more than half of the air passenger market," 7
and inter-city rail services were also responsible for a sizable por-
tion of the city-pair passenger market. With increased privatiza-
3o1 Council Decision 87/602 of 14 December 1987 Capacity Sharing and Mar-
ket Access, 1987 O.J. (L 374). These regulations, directives, and decisions are set
forth in Paul Dempsey, Aerial Dogfights Over Europe: The Liberalization of ETC Air
Transport, 53J. AIR L. & CoM. 615, 687-736 (1988).
304 The Rock Stands Aside, ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 1987, at 55.
305 As Peter Sutherland, EC Commissioner for Competition, noted, "it was bet-
ter to move this way than by confrontation, which would have taken longer and
involved protracted legal battles." Susan Carey & Julie Wolf, EC Adopts Plan to
Partly Deregulate Europe's Airline Industry Starting in '88, WALL ST.J., Dec. 8, 1987, at
24.
306 See DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 102-04.
307 Id. at 99.
20011 1035
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
tion of carriers such as British Airways and KLM ,308 and
proposed mergers then in the offing (such as that between Brit-
ish Airways and British Caledonian), the market was already be-
coming increasingly competitive.
All of this made political consensus on a more conservative
package, one more palatable to the southern European govern-
ments, easier to achieve. Effective January 1, 1988, the package
provided for a three-year transition to a more liberalized air
transport regime in areas of pricing, entry and capacity, ostensi-
bly attempting to meet the Community's ambitious 1992 dead-
line for a unified internal market. 09
As noted previously, original Council regulations excluded
the transport sector from the application of the competition
rules.3 " The 1987 Regulation on the Application of the Competition
Rules" ' was the first to apply Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of
Rome to air transport.31 2 Under it, the Commission was explic-
itly conferred jurisdiction to hear complaints regarding viola-
tions of Articles 85(1) and 86 brought by member governments
or by natural or legal persons having a legitimate interest. 13 It
was given powers of investigation314 and the authority to levy
fines against enterprises found to have violated the Treaty of
Rome.3 5
308 British Airways was completely privatized by the Thatcher government.
KLM's government holdings have been reduced to 39%. P. Haanappel, A Dec-
ade of Deregulation, Address before the Aviation & Space Law Section of the
Ass'n of American Law Schools 10 (Miami, Fla., Jan 9, 1988) [hereinafter P.
HAANAPPEL].
301 See They've Designed the Future, and It Might Just Work, supra note 123, at 45.
310 Pursuant to Council Regulation 141, Regulation 17 was made inapplicable
to transportation. Subsequently, the Council adopted Regulation 1017/68 to ap-
ply the competition rules to inland transport. And more recently, it adopted
Regulation 4056/86, applying the rules to maritime services. See DEMPSEY, supra
note 3, at 245; Cotncil Regulation 4056/86, 1986 O.J. (L 378) 44.
311 Council Regulation 3975/87, 1987 0.J. (L 374) 1.
11 It was subsequently elucidated by Commission Regulation 4261/88, 1988
0J. (L 376) 10, which identifies the due process rights of parties to participate in
proceedings involving the application of competition rules to the transport sec-
tor, and amended by Council Regulation 1284/91, 1991 O.. (L 122) 2, which
allowed the Commission to take interim measures for up to nine months to deter
the jeopardizing of existing air service.
313 Council Regulation 3975/87, art. 3, 1987 0J. (L 374) 2. Exceptions for
technical agreements are set forth id. See also Council Regulation 4261/88, 1988
O.J. (L 376) 10, which establishes procedural rules for complaints.
'114 Council Regulation 3975/87, art. 11, 1987 0.J. (L 374) 4-5.
315 Id. at 5.
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Also, as noted above, Article 85(3) of the Treaty of Rome au-
thorizes the establishment of group exemptions from the com-
petition rules, and the Council adopted regulations
implementing procedures for their creation." 6 Here again, the
Commission was explicitly conferred significant powers to adopt
regulations authorizing carriers to engage in, inter alia, capacity
and revenue sharing, agreements regarding pricing, slot alloca-
tions, computer reservations systems, and ground handling., 7
Significantly, revenue pooling 8 was limited to one percent of
the revenue earned on a route, with the transfer being made to
the carrier suffering a loss because it was scheduling its flights at
less busy times."' Hence, revenue pooling was substantially cir-
cumscribed. The Commission quickly promulgated three regu-
lations that established the requirements for group exemptions
for airlines under Article 85(3).2 °
On July 26, 1987, the Commission adopted regulations imple-
menting the block exemptions on the application of Article
85(3) of the Treaty of Rome on agreements between airlines in
three areas: (1) capacity, revenue pooling, tariff consultations
and slot allocations (the airline agreements regulation)3 21 ; (2)
computer reservations systems (the CRS regulation)122; and (3)
ground handling services (the ground handling regulation).323
These rules came into force on January 1, 1988.
The Council's First Package of liberalization, while revolution-
ary at the time, stopped quite short of true full cabotage. Like-
wise, in its Second Package, the Council rejected the
Commission's proposals for the elimination of cabotage restric-
tions.3 24 It also failed to extend antitrust exemptions to domes-
316 Council Regulation 3976/87, 1987 0.J. (L 374) 9.
317 Id. at 2. These regulations were subsequently amended by Council Regula-
tion 2344/90 of 24July 24 1990, 1990 0.J. (L 217) 15, to include consultations on
cargo rates.
318 See DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 64.
319 Council Regulation 3975/87, art. 2, 1987 0.J. (L 374) 2.
320 Commission Regulations 2671/88, 2672/88 and 2673/88. These regula-
tions were effective until January 1, 1991.
321 Commission Regulation 2671/88, 1988 0.J. (L 239) 9.
322 Commission Regulation 2672/88, 1988 0.J. (L 239) 13, subsequently ex-
tended by Commission Regulation 83/91, 1991 0.J. (L 10) 9. See also Council
Regulation 3976/87, 1987 0.J. (L 374) 9 (giving the Commission power to issue
these block exemptions).
323 Commission Regulation 2673/88, 1988 0.J. (L 239) 17.
324 Werner F. Ebke & Georg W. Wenglorz, Liberalizing Scheduled Air Transport
Within the European Community: From the First Phase to the Second and Beyond, 19 DEN.
J. INT'L L. & PoL'v 493, 525 (1991). Cabotage restrictions prohibit foreign air-
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tic flights and flights to third countries, despite the holding in
Ahmed Saeed that the competition provisions of the Treaty of
Rome are applicable to such operations. 25 The 1990 regula-
tions did not apply to cargo services, for which a separate regula-
tion has been adopted.126 Neither did they apply to charter
services.327 However, the Third Package of liberalization ad-
dressed both charter and scheduled carriers.
While the early "packages" and proposals did much to change
the competitive landscape of air transport, the largest impact by
far was made by the last package of reforms put into effect by
the Council. The First Package, while revolutionary in its ap-
proach, did little to practically affect the internal competitive-
ness of the European air transport market.3 2 8 The Second
Package effectively moved forward from this position, yet failed
on major grounds to fully implement the desired level of liberal-
ization.3 29 In July 1991, the EC Commission proposed a three-
part legislative package-the Third Package-designed to rem-
edy these deficiencies and complete air transport liberalization
within the EU byJanuary 1, 1993. The Commission submitted it
to the Council for approval, and with Council modification, the
Third Package went into effect on January 1, 1993.'-"
This section focuses upon the regulatory constructs that cur-
rently affect the European air transport market-both EU-based
constructs and those from private industry organizations. Partic-
ular areas of scope and interest are analyzed separately: pricing
and tariffs, pooling of revenue, market access, (including licens-
ing, capacity limits, traffic rights, slot allocation and bilateral
agreements) computer reservation systems, ground handling,
lines from serving domestic markets, or stated differently, providing service be-
tween two domestic points within a nation in which it is not registered. DEMPSEY,
supra note 3, at 78-79, 112, 384.
325 See Ebke & Wenglorz, supra note 324, at 526.
-26 Council Regulation 294/91, 1991 OJ. (L 36) 1; E. GIEMULLA & R. SCHMID,
EUROPAN AIR LAw, § 51 (1992).
327 GIEMULLA & SCHMID, supra note 326, §§ 53-54.
321s See Dennis A. Duchene, The Third Package of Liberalization in the European Air
Transport Sector: Shying Away from Full Liberalizaton, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 119, 131 (1995)
("Although the First Package was intended to be the first step in a process of
liberalization of the air transport industry, the reforms had little overall effect on
the development of competition, especially in the area of air fares.").
3219 See id. at 137 ("The Second Package of liberalization considerably advanced
the EC air transport system towards the goal of a more competitive market in the
areas of air fare approval, route and slot access, and capacity growth. However,
many obstacles remain [ed] to free competition, especially for new entrants.").
330 1992 OJ. (L 241) 1.
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cargo services, merger regulations, stateaid, procedure, and the
power of the EU to act on the commercial aviation world stage
for Member States. Each area of analysis begins with an over-
view of the general regulatory environment for that area, fol-
lowed by a detailed chronological delineation of relevant
packages, proposals, resolutions, and regulations.
B. PRICING AND TARIFFS
Country-based tariffs are highly limited under the current
scheme of air transport regulation. The "tariff-as-weapon" con-
cept has lost effective support as a greater number of old-line
European state-owned/controlled airlines become privatized.
As such, in addition to the relaxed regulatory environment,
fewer nations have a vested interest in tariff consultations.
Granted, such analysis leads one to a question of what came
first-privatization or the relaxed regulatory climate? Actually,
it was a bit of both. Regardless, tariff consultations between na-
tions are becoming less important as the Third Package grows in
maturity and the European air transport market moves towards
an alliance structure crossing international boundaries.
1. Directive and Regulations
a. Directive on Scheduled Air Fares
Part of the First Package, the Council's 1987 Directive on
Scheduled Air Fares (Directive 87/601) "' gave to the aeronauti-
cal authorities of Member States the jurisdiction to approve car-
rier rates.3 3 2 Rates were to be approved if "they [were]
reasonably related to the long-term fully allocated costs" of the
carrier.33 They were not be denied on grounds that the pro-
posed rate "[was] lower than that offered by another air carrier
operating on the route . . .""'I' Moreover, the Directive estab-
lished two zones of pricing flexibility-a discount zone, ex-
tending from 90% to more than 65% of the referenced fare;
and a deep-discount zone, running from 65% to 45% of the ref-
erenced fare.33 - Although the conditions attached to these fares
3131 Council Directive 87/601, 1987 OJ. (L 374) 19.
-32 Id. at 14
.33 Id. at 13-14.
.14 Id.
135 Id. at 14. The "referenced fare" is the "normal economy air fare charged by
a third- or fourth-freedom air carrier on the routes in question . Id. at art.
2(c).
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were rigid (e.g., advance purchase requirements, minimum and
maximum lengths of stay, and age restrictions)336 within these
zones, carriers could set their prices freely without government
restrictions.337
b. Regulation 2671/88
Following the implementation of the First Package, the Com-
mission took action to assure that tariff consultations remained
exempt from the normal operation of Article 85 of the Treaty of
Rome. In July 1988, the Commission passed Regulation 2671/
88, which addressed multiple aspects of the air transportation
industry, including tariffs.3 Regulation 2671/88 permitted
consultations between airlines subject to seven conditions.""
The first condition was that all such consultations had to be
made with the purpose of setting tariffs within the parameters of
Directive 87/601."' Next, the consultations could not concern
tariffs that were not subject to approval by Member States, nor
could they connect tariffs with the capacity level offered. 4' The
first part of this condition was presumably designed to address
American threats to bring antitrust actions against tarifffixing
on flights into the US, while the second part seemed to prevent
revenuefixing via harmonization of tariffs and capacity. The
third condition required that agreed-upon tariffs could not dis-
criminate against passengers based on passengers' nationalities
or place of residence within the Community, 42 while the fourth
obliged carriers to make such consultations voluntary and
open.34 Following that, it was required that any tariffs reached
through such a consultation had to be voluntary.144 The sixth
condition prohibited the consultations from dealing with remu-
neration for ticketsellers 45 Finally, the air carriers which partic-
ipated in a tariff consultation had to notify the appropriate
authorities in concerned Member States of any tariffs reached as
-33 Council Directive 87/601, Annex II, 1987 0J. (L 374) 17.
537 Id. at 14.
-38 Commission Regulation 2671/88, 1988 0J. (L 239) 9.
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part of a consultation arrangement. 46 The Commission set the
regulation to expire on January 31, 1991.117
c. Regulations 2342/90 and 2343/90
In response to the Commission's proposals of September
1989 for liberalization of tariffs, capacity and market access,348 in
June 1990 the Council adopted new regulations governing
scheduled intra-Community air transportation.3 49 This primary
focus of the Second Package for pricing regulations was sim-
ple-extension of liberalized pricing structures to "conditional
Fifth Freedom rights under the condition that the Fifth Free-
dom air fares [fell] within the flexibility zones."35 Under the
Second Package, regulations fares were still to be approved by
the Member States concerned. 5 ' The EC, however, dealt with
more than just pricing concerns. For the first time in history,
with respect to tariff regulation, the EC embraced the double
disapproval system (i.e., both nations must disapprove the pro-
posed tariffs or they become effective) for tariffs that exceeded
the referenced rate by at least five percent (i.e., the proposed
rates go into effect unless both governments object), until Janu-
ary 1, 1993, when the double disapproval system was expanded
to apply to all rates.352
Under the 1990 regulations, Member States had to approve
the airfares of EC airlines if they were reasonably related to the
carrier's long-term fully allocated costs. The fact that a pro-
posed fare was lower than that offered by other airlines in the
market was not a sufficient reason for disapproval.5 3 Disagree-
ments between Member States over applicable rates in their
markets were to be submitted to arbitration. 54
A "normal class economy ticket" could be established from
105% to 95% of the reference tariff. The reference fare was the
average normal economy airfare on the route in question.355
The discount zone was narrowed from 94% to 80% (from its
346 Id.
347 Id. at 12.
348 See COM(89) 417 final (source with author).
349 Council Regulation 2342/90, 1990 0.J. (L 217) 1; Council Regulation
2343/90, 1990 0.J. (L 217) 8.
350 Duchene, supra note 328, at 133.
351 Council Regulation 2342/90 art. 4(1), 1990 0.J. (L 217) 3.
352 Id.
353 Id. at 2.
354 Id. at 4.
355 Id. at 2.
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previous 90% to 65%), while the deep-discount zone was ex-
panded from 79% to 30% (from its previous 65% to 45%) of the
reference rate. Member States had to approve any rate within
the zones.356 On the whole, this allowed significantly more rate
flexibility than was permitted under the First Package. 57 Re-
strictions, which under the First Package had limited the appli-
cability of the discount zone to Saturday night stayovers and six-
night excursions or off-peak travel, were eliminated, although
they remained in effect for the deep-discount zone.
d. Regulation 84/91
In 1990, the Commission also promulgated a new regulation
(Regulation 84/91) governing passenger and cargo tariff con-
sultation,358 although it was not to go into effect until the expira-
tion of Regulation 2671/88. 59 Regulation 84/91 provided
exemptions so long as, inter alia, participation was voluntary and
not binding, tariffs were nondiscriminatory, such discussions
were for purposes of facilitating interlining, they did not address
agent compensation, and each participant informed the Com-
mission.6  The Commission and the Member States could send
observers. 6 A Member State having a legitimate interest in the
market could request that the Commission review a tariff
outside the aforementioned flexibility zones and whether an-
other State had satisfied its obligations under the Regulations.
The Commission could review whether high tariffs were in the
best interest of consumers, or whether carriers were "dumping"
in order to drive other airlines from the market. 6 2 The new
regulations (2342/90 and 84/91) also allowed airlines to intro-
duce lower fares within the aforementioned zones not only in
Third and Fourth Freedom markets, but also in Fifth Freedom
markets. 63' Member States could also permit scheduled airlines
351 Council Regulation 2342/90, Annex II, 1990 O.J. (L 217) 6.
'157 See EBKE & WENCLORZ, supra note 324, at 519.
358 Commission Regulation 84/91, 1991 O.J. (L 10) 14.
3,9 Id. at 18.
360 Id. at 16.
'36 Id.
M"2 Council Regulation 2342/90, arts. 3(3), 5, 1990 O.J. (L 217) 2, 3.
361 Id. at 3. Third Freedom movements involve transit from an airline's nation
of registry to another nation. Fourth Freedom involves flights from another
country to an airline's nation of registry. Fifth Freedom involves the right to
carry traffic between two nations other than its nation of registry, so long as the
flight originates or terminates in its own nation of registry. DEMPSEY, supra note
3, at 11, 49-50.
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to meet the prices offered by competing charter airlines offering
equivalent services. This accelerated the blurring of the distinc-
tion between the two classes of carriers. 364
e. Regulation 2409/92
The Council's efforts at achieving a uniform regulation for
pricing culminated in Regulation 2409/92, the third regulation
of the Third Package.36 Regulation 2409/92 is broad in scope,
applying to all Union carriers and all routes except for those
under a public service obligation.3 6 However, it is still limited
to flights that originate and terminate within the Union.367
Charter fares and cargo rates are to be based on "free agree-
ment" between the carrier and its clients. 368 Carriers are obli-
gated to make all their fares and cargo rates available upon
request. 69 This provision would appear to be designed to avoid
the market capacity problems American consumers face when
searching for fares.
The more substantive portion of Regulation 2409/92 com-
mences in Article 5. The first paragraph of Article 5 establishes
that the Union's default position will be to allow carriers to set
prices at will. "7 Member States may (but are not obligated to)
require carriers to file tariffs with them for review up to 24 hours
before the tariffs are scheduled to go into effect, provided that
the filing process is nondiscriminatory. 71 Until April 1, 1997,
an exception existed for domestic routes that were served by
only one carrier or multiple carriers jointly operating a single
route. 72 In such an instance, the Member State concerned
could require that tariffs be filed for such routes up to one
month before they were scheduled to go into effect;3 73 however,
this provision has been allowed to lapse.
Despite the Council's seeming endorsement of free-market
principles in pricing, the regulation also granted broad powers
to the Member States to withdraw fares. Article 6 gives the
3 GIEMULLA & SCHMID, supra note 326, § 44.
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Member States two situations in which their power can be exer-
cised. The first is where a fare is so "excessively high" that it
results in a "disadvantage [to] users. '31 74 A fare is determined to
be excessively high by examining the entire fare structure for
the route and the "competitive market situation," along with
comparing the fare to the long-term, fully allocated costs of the
carrier.3 75 A fare might also be withdrawn when it represents
part of a "sustained downward development" of fares that is not
an ordinary seasonal phenomenon and is resulting in "wide-
spread losses" among the carriers on the route.376 As with exces-
sively high fares, an excessively low fare is determined by
considering the long-term, fully allocated costs of the carrier.3
77
A Member State invoking this power must notify the Commis-
sion, other Member States concerned, and the affected carriers
to provide an explanation for its actions.378 Other Member
States have 14 days to object to the withdrawal of the fare; if
none objects, the fare is automatically withdrawn. 79 Carriers
and other parties do not have the right to contest the withdrawal
of a fare, although any party with a "legitimate interest" may file
a complaint asking the Commission to investigate whether a fare
violates Article 6's provisions. 8 If the Commission determines
that a fare violates Article 6, the relevant Member State must
withdraw the fare, barring a successful appeal to the Council to
reverse the Commission's decision.3 ' The contested fare re-
mains in effect pending the final decision of the Commission or
the Council (in the event of an appeal), unless a similar or lower
fare on the same route was found to be excessively high within
the previous six months. 8 2 This entire process effectively termi-
nates the double disapproval regime that had previously existed.
Regulation 2409/92 went into effect on January 1, 1993,383 of-
ficially repealing Regulation 2342/90 in the process.3 8 4 Regula-
tion 2409/92 remains the pinnacle of direct tariff regulation, as
374 Id.
375 Council Regulation 2409/92, art. 6(1)(a), 1992 OJ. (L 240) 15.




380 Council Regulation 2409/92, art. 7(2), 1992 OJ. (L 240) 15, 17.
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it has not been amended since its implementation, nor is there
any proposed measure to amend or replace it.3 5
f. Regulation 1617/93
Although the EU's regulatory regime for pricing itself has re-
mained unchanged since the implementation of Regulation
2409/92, the Commission has revisited the subject of tariff con-
sultations several times. In 1993, the Commission adopted Reg-
ulation (EEC) 1617/93, which effectively replaced Regulation
84/91.86 Regulation 1617/93 was substantially similar to Regu-
lation 84/91, but it did have some noticeable changes. The new
regulation broadened the exemption for tariff consultations
concerning interlining by permitting consultations for the pur-
pose of being able to provide users with a single travel docu-
ment reflecting all stages of their journey8 7 and by making it
possible for a user to change their flight to a different air car-
rier. 8 Regulation 1617/93, however, imposed one notable re-
striction: when a carrier participates in a tariff consultation, it
must individually file with the appropriate authorities of the
Member States concerned all tariffs that were not the subject of
the consultation. 389 Apparently this provision is intended to de-
ter carriers from publicly consulting each other about a small
number of tariffs and then using those consultations as the basis
to covertly restructure the remainder of their tariffs. The regu-
lation was scheduled to expire on June 30, 1998.390
g. Regulation 1523/96
Regulation 1617/93 has been amended twice since its imple-
mentation, first in 1996 and again in 1999. In July 1996, the
Commission promulgated Regulation (EC) 1523/96,39' which
made a substantial change to the Union's policy toward tariff
consultations. While earlier regulations concerning tariff con-
sultations had governed all types of air carriage, Regulation
1523/96 specifically eliminated the exemption for consultations
on cargo tariffs by removing all references to cargo or freight
385 As of July 15, 2000.
386 Commission Regulation 1617/93, 1993 0J. (L 155) 18.
3H7 Id. at 20.
388 Id. at 21.
389 Id.
3110 Id. at 22.
391 Commission Regulation 1523/96, 1996 0.J. (L 190) 11.
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services from the text of Regulation 1617/93.92 The Commis-
sion explained that the exemption for consultations had been
granted to help carriers adjust to the introduction of competi-
tion and because it was believed that consultations were neces-
sary for interlining agreements which would lower costs to
users.,' " However, enough time had passed that carriers should
have acclimated themselves to the more competitive environ-
ment.394 Furthermore, evidence had shown that tariff consulta-
tions for the purpose of interlining did not actually result in
lower costs. 3 95 Therefore, the Commission felt that cargo tariff
consultations should no longer be protected from evaluation for
anti-competitiveness-"9' and gave carriers until June 30, 1997 to
bring themselves into compliance with the regulation's dic-
tates.3 97 The Commission did not offer an explanation as to why
consultations on passenger tariffs should be permitted to con-
tinue. The 1999 regulation, Regulation (EC) 1083/1999,"9'
merely extended the conditions of Regulation 1523/96 to June
30, 2001.299 At that time, the Commission will reconsider the
exemption on passenger tariff consultations ....
2. ECAC Contributions
Outside the EU proper, ECAC has also contributed to the lib-
eralization of pricing. On a quasi-diplomatic level, despite inter-
nal disagreement, ECAC has engaged in a modicum of airfare
policy negotiations with the United States. In October 1984, the
United States and ECAC signed a Memorandum of Understand-
ing that liberalized regulation of North Atlantic fares. The pact
set "zones of reasonableness" for North Atlantic fares through
April 30, 1987.401 A two-year memorandum with even more lib-
eral provisions was signed in February 1987. The agreement es-
tablished deep-discount fare zones of an average of ten percent,
392 Id. at 12.
393 Id. at 11.
394 Id.
395 Id.
9fi Commission Regulation 1523/96, prnbl. (7), 1996 OJ. (L 190) 11, 12.
397 Id. at 12.
. Commission Regulation 1083/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 131) 27.
I d. at 28.
400 Id. at 27.
401 U.S. European Carriers Extend Agreement on North Atlantic Fares, Av. WK. &
SPACE TECH., Apr. 8, 1985, at 31.
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and allowed such fares to be offered with fewer restrictions.4 0 2
Under this arrangement, airlines enjoyed freedom to set transat-
lantic fares without government intervention so long as they fell
within an agreed-upon percentage above or below a reference
price. 403
Liberalization in the areas of rates and capacity took an im-
portant step forward in December 1986, when ECAC concluded
two Memoranda of Understanding regarding intra-European
scheduled air tariffs and capacity.40 4 The former was the first
effort by a significant number of European states to embrace a
tariff scheme whereby rates falling within a specific range would
be automatically approved by the involved governments. The
tariff Memorandum of Understanding established a Discount
Zone of 90% to 65% and a Deep-Discount Zone of 65% to 45%
of the reference price, provided that the passengers using them
satisfied certain conditions.?°  The Memorandum of Under-
standing on capacity sharing allowed either participating nation
to provide up to 55% of the market's capacity, as opposed to the
previous 50/50 sharing standard. Thus, for the then twenty-two
ECAC member nations (which included all EU members at the
time), liberalization in the areas of rates and capacity took an
important first step forward in December 1986.46
3. Commission Investigations
Interestingly, since the implementation of the Third Package
pricing regulation, the Commission has issued no decisions con-
cerning tariff levels or tariff consultations.? 7 In 1996, EasyJet, a
value carrier operating on the London-Amsterdam route, filed a
complaint against KLM, alleging predatory pricing.40 8 The
Commission spent over a year investigating the allegations, by
402 ECAC, U.S. Renew North Atlantic Pact, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 23, 1987,
at 32. The agreement was effective for a two-year period, beginning April 1,
1987. The following 16 ECAC Member States are affected by it: Belgium, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.
403 U.S., ECAC Sign Atlantic Fare Pact, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 22, 1984, at
33.
404 ECA C Approves Liberalizing Fare, Capacity Regulations, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Jan. 12, 1987, at 36.
40, Id.
406 i.
407 Lois Jones, When the Going Gets Tough..., AIRLINE Bus., May 1998, at 26.
408 John Dodgson & Jose Jorge, Law of the Jungle?, AIRLINE Bus., May 1997, at
70, 72-73.
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the end of which Easyjet had withdrawn its complaint.4"' An-
other value carrier, World Airlines, filed a pricing complaint in
1996 against Air UK.410 But World Airlines went bankrupt
before the Commission could take action on its complaint."
Finally, VLM, a Flemish regional carrier, filed a pricing com-
plaint against Cityflyer Express in 1996,412 but it apparently also
withdrew its complaint. Virgin Express has publicly expressed
concern over the pricing policies of SAS, but it has not formally
filed a complaint. 413 EU Competition Commissioner Karel Van
Miert said in 1998, "[Predatory pricing] is a real problem but a
very difficult problem to tackle. But if there is a good case then
we eventually will rule on it.
4 14
C. POOLING OF REVENUE
Revenue pooling is a much smaller concern of the European
Union now that full-scale liberalization of prices and cabotage
has occurred. The EU last directly addressed revenue pooling
as part of Regulation 2671/88, granting block exemptions for
airline agreements from Article 85 regulations.4"5 In order to
avail themselves of the block exemption for revenue pooling,
the economic transfer must go to the carrier offering the less
favorable schedule (service at less busy times of day and less busy
periods of the travel season), and must be determined prior to
the offering of the service, on the basis of the schedule of the
pool participants.4 16 The regulation imposes a one-percent ceil-
ing on the transfer of revenue (exclusive of shared costs).4 17
Moreover, each carrier is guaranteed flexibility as to capacity of-
fered. '8 Since the implementation of Regulation 2671/88, the
Council and Commission have left the subject of revenue pool-
ing undisturbed, either through further regulations or
decisions.
409. Jones, supra note 407, at 31.
410 Lois Jones, 96 at a Glance, AIRLINE Bus., Mar. 1997, at 30 [hereinafter 96 AT
A GLANCE].
411 Dodgson &Jorge, supra note 408, at 72.
412 96 AT A GLANCE, supra note 410, at 30.
41-3 Jackie Gallacher et al., Holding the Pieces Together, AIRLINE Bus.,Jan. 1998, at
28.
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D. MARKET ACCESS
A keystone element of liberalization, market access provisions
have been a primary focus of the Council and Commission for
many years. Historically, market access was predicated on bilat-
eral agreements ("bilaterals") between individual states" (i.e.,
nations would independently negotiate terms of market access
for each other's air carriers).4 20 But bilaterals go against one of
the central purposes of the EC/EU: establishing uniform laws
and regulations among Member States to advance commerce,
including transportation.4 2' Thus, the Council and Commission
have worked to establish a body of regulations governing intra-
Union market access4 22 and have increasingly sought to replace
the bilaterals that exist between Member States and non-mem-
bers with EU-negotiated multilateral agreements.4 23 The EC/
EU's internal efforts at improving market access have been pri-
marily directed at four areas: standardizing licensing of air carri-
ers, eliminating capacity limits on routes, making full cabotage
available, and regularizing slot allocation.
1. Licensing of Air Carriers
Processes for licensing for air carriers had been left undis-
turbed by the first two Packages, presumably because the Coun-
cil was hesitant to touch a subject so closely bound to cherished
notions of national identity. However, as part of the Second
Package the Council ordered itself to adopt for implementation
no later than July 1, 1992, a regulation governing the licensing
of air carriers within the Community.4 24 Although it missed its
self-imposed deadline by six months, the Council did ultimately
pass a regulation concerning the licensing of Community air
carriers as part of the Third Package.42' The Council may be
forgiven for its tardiness, however, for its Regulation 2407/92
was of grand scope.
4'9 EEC Transport Ministers Expected to Approve Compromise Liberalization, Av. WK.
& SPACE TECH., Oct. 20, 1986, at 45
420 Daniel C. Hedlund, Toward Open Skies: Liberalizing Trade In International Air-
line Services, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 259, 267-69 (1994).
421 Id. at 288.
422 Council Regulation 2408/92, pmbl., 1992 O.J. (L 240) 8, 9.
423 Chris Thornton & Chris Lyle, Freedom's Paths, AIRLINE Bus., Mar. 2000, at 74.
424 Council Regulation 2343/90, art. 3(2), 1990 O.J. (L 217) 8, 10.
425 Council Regulation 2407/92, 1992 OJ. (L 240) 1.
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a. Regulation 2407/92
The regulation begins by stipulating that it does not cover the
carriage of passengers, mail, or cargo by "non-power-driven" or
ultra-light aircraft, nor does it cover flights take take-off from
and land at a single airport."2 ' These types of aviation will re-
main subject to relevant national laws. 27 Therefore, all com-
mercial aviation (other than certain types of sightseeing flights)
is placed under the EU's jurisdiction. The regulation proceeds
to establish that an air carrier meeting the requirements that
follow is "entitled" to be granted an operating license, but li-
censing does not itself give an air carrier rights to specific routes
or markets. 2 A Member State may confer an operating license
when the undertaking applying has its principal place of busi-
ness located in that Member State and its primary purpose is to
conduct air transportation. 29 The air carrier must also be ma-
jority owned by Member States or their nationals, unless there is
a preexisting agreement between a Member State and a non-EU
member concerning ownership requirements."' A further ex-
ception to the general rule concerning the ownership require-
ment is that certain airlines are recognized as being
grandfathered out of it,"' although if their ownership shifts to
another non-EU state or national, they will than become subject
to the general rule. 32 Air carriers must be able to show on de-
mand by a Member State that they are in compliance with the
ownership requirements. 411
The regulation also imposes a number of financial obligations
on an air carrier seeking a license. The carrier must show that it
can meet "at any time" its "actual and potential obligations" and
both its fixed and operational costs, premised on realistic as-
sumptions, for three months from its start of operations without
any income from its operations. 4"s To establish that it meets the
previous requirements, the carrier has to provide a business
plan for its first two years of operation to the appropriate licens-




430 Council Regulation 2407/92, art. 4(2), 1992 OJ. (L 240) 1, 2.
431 [d. at 2. The excepted airlines are Scandinavian Airlines System, Britannia
Airways, and Monarch Airlines.
432 Id.
4311 Id. at 3.
434 [d.
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ing authority in the relevant Member State."' The carrier must
give advance notice of any changes in its operations to the li-
censing authority, along with notice of planned mergers or ac-
quisitions, or any change in ownership of a block of shares that
represents ten percent or more of the company's total share-
holding.43 6 If the licensing authority decides that the above sort
of activities have "a significant bearing on the finances" of the
carrier, it can require that the carrier provide a new business
plan covering at least the following twelve months.437 Further-
more, if a licensing authority determines that "financial
problems" exist with a carrier under license by it, the authority
may examine the carrier's financial situation and suspend or re-
voke its license if it decides that the carrier cannot meet its ac-
tual and potential obligations for the next twelve months.4 8 All
air carriers must provide financial statements for each fiscal year
to their licensing authorities and must also be able to provide
such statements on demand by the licensing authorities.4 " Ad-
ditionally, all air carriers must carry liability insurance.""
At their own discretion, Member States may require proof
that the managers of the air carrier seeking a license are people
of "good repute." '441 The managers may also be required to
show that they have not declared bankruptcy, nor have they had
a previous operating license suspended or revoked for "serious
professional misconduct" or a criminal offense.4" 2
An air carrier seeking a license need not own any aircraft, but
it must have at least one aircraft under lease."43 Other than in
exceptional circumstances, all aircraft operated by a carrier
must be registered in a Member State."4 ' If a carrier wishes to
register in one Member State an aircraft that was previously reg-
435 Council Regulation 2407/92, art. 5(2), 1992 O.J. (L 240) 1, 3.
416 Id. at 3.
437 Id.
438 Id. However, none of these aforementioned provisions apply to air carriers
that exclusively operate light aircraft, provided that they do not operate sched-
uled services or have a turnover greater than three million Euros per year. Id.
439 Id.
440 Council Regulation 2407/92, art. 7, 1992 OJ. (L 240) 1, 4.
441 Id. at 7.
442 Id. Proof of qualification can be made with appropriate official documents
from the Member State or the manager's home Member State (if different from
the Member State issuing the license), or may be made by swearing an oath or
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istered in another Member State, the State that will receive the
new registration cannot apply any discriminatory fee to the re-
gistration and must process the registration without delay.44 5 In-
terestingly, the regulation specifically prohibits only
discriminatory fees and delays on the transfer of registration of
aircraft within the Community. This would suggest that it is ac-
ceptable for a Member State to apply additional fees and to re-
fuse to promptly handle transfers of registrations for aircraft
belonging to non-Community carriers, perhaps indicating a pro-
tectionist impulse on the part of the Council.
The regulation also grants Member States broad powers to in-
tervene in the operations of carriers after they have been li-
censed. Any carrier that wishes to lease an aircraft from or to
another carrier must receive prior approval from the appropri-
ate licensing authorities.4 46 Member States may review a car-
rier's operating license one year after it is granted and every five
years thereafter or if a carrier has ceased operations for six
months.447 If there is a change in "one or more elements affect-
ing the legal situation" of a carrier, then the Member States that
license it may, at their discretion, require the carrier to reapply
for an operating license.44 Furthermore, a carrier that applies
for bankruptcy shall be stripped of its license if the appropriate
licensing authorities believe that there is not a realistic possibil-
ity of the carrier recovering within a reasonable time.449
The remainder of the regulation is primarily procedural in
nature. It requires that the Member States' processes for grant-
ing licenses be made public.450 Member States must render de-
cisions on whether to grant a license within three months of the
carrier's application for one and, if the application has been re-
fused, the Member State must provide an explanation for the
refusal.45 ' A carrier may appeal a license rejection to the Com-
mission.45 2 Failure by a licensed carrier to comply with the re-
quirements of the regulation can result in its market-access
rights being suspended until it brings itself into compliance.455
445 Council Regulation 2407/92, art. 8(4), 1992 O.J. (L 240) 1, 7.
4'6 Id.
447 Id. at 8.
448 Id.
4'19 Id.





COMPETITION IN THE AIR
Finally, carriers that were already licensed at the time the regula-
tion entered into effect had one year to bring themselves into
compliance with the terms of the regulation unless otherwise
provided for.454
b. The Savena Decision
Although licensing might appear to be a potentially conten-
tious issue, most of the Commission's work on the subject has
been without particular rancor. An exemplary decision con-
cerned the ownership restructuring of the Belgian national air
carrier Sabena.45 5 In May 1995, the Belgian government noti-
fied the Commission of an agreement it had reached earlier that
month to sell Swissair a considerable minority share in
Sabena.456 While Switzerland was a member of the European
Free Trade Area, it was not a Union member, so Swissair was
treated as a non-Union carrier, necessitating the review.4 57 At
the time the agreement was reached, the Belgian government or
its national holding company owned a 61.6% share in Sabena,
37.49% was owned by a subsidiary of Air France, and the
residual 0.9% was owned by other Belgian nationals (primarily
institutional investors and Sabena employees).458 The agree-
ment gave Swissair a 49.5% share of Sabena by transferring all of
Air France's shares to Swissair and by increasing Sabena's capi-
talization, with Swissair being given the opportunity to purchase
the new issue first.4 59 Swissair was also sold a block of "special
participation certificates," which appear to be similar to pre-
ferred shares, in that they did not confer voting rights on the
holders.46
Before the Commission began its analysis of the agreement, it
laid out what it considered the four key elements of Regulation
2407/92: (i) the carrier's principal place of business must be
located in the licensing Member State,461 (ii) the carrier's main
occupation has to be air transport or air transport in conjunc-
454 Id.
455 Commission Decision 95/404/EC, 1995 0J. (L 239) 19.
456 Id. The Belgian government also submitted an addendum a month later,
but the Commission treated the two documents as one for the purpose of its
analysis.
457 Id. at 23.
45 Id. at 20.
459 Id.
4CO Commission Decision 95/404/EC, 1995 0.J. (L 239) 19, 23.
461 Id.
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tion with some other aspect of aviation (maintenance, repair,
etc.),462 (iii)) the carrier must be majority owned by Member
States and/or nationals of Member States, 463 and (iv) the carrier
is required to be at all times "effectively controlled" by Member
States and/or their nationals.464
The Commission first noted that the agreement would leave
Sabena's headquarters in Belgium and Sabena's primary busi-
ness would remain air transportation; so the agreement was in
compliance with the first two elements of the regulation.465
With respect to the third element, majority ownership, the Com-
mission stated that it is satisfied if Member States or their nation-
als own even just 50% plus one share of the carrier's capital.4 6
The Commission defined capital for these purposes as equity
capital, (i.e., it confers voting rights on the holders and entitles
the holders to dividends and a share of the corporation's assets
if it is liquidated).467 The issue of how capital is defined was
relevant because of the "special participation certificates,"
which, if considered part of Sabena's capital, would have con-
ferred a majority share to Swissair, thereby preventing Sabena
from receiving a license as a Union carrier. However, since the
certificates did not carry voting rights, Swissair would remain a
minority shareholder under the Commission's definition."' Fi-
nally, while the agreement also contained a provision awarding
Swissair warrants for the future purchase of additional Sabena
shares, the agreement prohibited the warrants from being exer-
cised without a change in EU regulation to permit majority own-
ership by non-EU states or nationals.46 ' Thus, the Commission
decided that the agreement was in compliance with the third
element of Regulation 2407/92 as well.47 °
Finally, the Commission addressed the element of "effective
control." The Commission stated that "effective control" means
that Member States or their nationals must, either individually
or jointly with other Member States or their nationals, have the




40 Commission Decision 95/404/EC, VIII, 1995 0J. (L 239) 19, 23.
466 i. at 24.
,468 1(d
469 Id. at 25.
470 Commission Decision 95/404/EC, 1995 0.1. (L 239) 19, 25.
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ment.47 1 This means that they must be able to, directly or indi-
rectly, make final determinations about the carrier's business
plan, annual budget, or any major investments or cooperation
projects.47 2 However, the Commission claimed that there was
no per se rule that could govern a determination about whether
"effective control" exists; thus, each instance must be analyzed
on the basis of its own merits.47 3 In the case of the Sabena/
Swissair agreement, the Commission noted that the structure of
the company's board of directors, combined with Belgian major-
ity ownership of voting shares, was such that the Belgian owners
would retain the ability to effectively veto any unilateral action
by Swissair.474 Concluding its analysis of the effective control re-
quirement, the Commission stated that, "Article 4(2) [of Regu-
lation 2407/92] is not designed to prevent Community air
carriers from cooperating with carriers from third countries...
The provision must not be read as prohibiting a Community car-
rier from limiting its commercial freedom in the context of such
long-term strategic cooperation. 4 75  The Commission con-
cluded that the Sabena/Swissair agreement would not result in
Sabena forfeiting its EU carrier status.476
2. Capacity Limits
Capacity issues were initially addressed under the Council's
First Package, in its 1987 Decision on Capacity Sharing and Market
Access.4 77 Under this proposal, the traditional 50-50% split of ca-
pacity between European carriers was abandoned in favor of an
immediate 55-45% rule (fromJanuary 1, 1988, to September 30,
1989), and then a 60-40% split (after October 1, 1989).478 How-
ever, the Decision included an escape clause, enabling any
Member State to petition the Commission to postpone or cancel
the 60-40% rule on grounds that its flag carriers had suffered




474 Id. at 25-26. Swissair was also given veto powers but only in regards to
amending Sabena's articles of incorporation, its capitalization, or whether to liq-
uidate, merge, or split up the company. The Commission considered this to be
ordinary protections for a minority shareholder.
475 Commission Decision 95/404/EC, XII, art. 1, 1995 0.J. (L 239) 19, 27.
476 Id. at 28.
477 Council Decision 87/602, 1987 0.J. (L 374) 19.
478 Id. at 21.
479 Id.
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new entry opportunities of multiple designation over routes hav-
ing more than 250,000 passengers, with this threshold of passen-
gers being reduced in the second and third year to 200,000 (or
1,200 return flights), and 180,000 (or 1,000 return flights), re-
spectively.4"' Significant new opportunities for entry were cre-
ated between hub and regional airports,4"' and for Fifth
Freedom rights.
Under the Commission's airline-agreement block-exemption
(from Article 85) regulations, capacity-limitation agreements be-
tween airlines had to have as their objective a satisfactory spread
of regular and reliable service over less busy periods as opposed
to anticompetitive market segmentation. Under the block ex-
emption, airlines were also free to withdraw without penalty
from such arrangements on short notice.48 2
Via the Second Package, in 1990, the Commission adopted
another set of exemptions for the planning and coordination of
capacity.48 3 In order to qualify, any capacity agreements had to
refrain from binding the carriers to the results, had to have as
their purpose relief of airport congestion, and could not be de-
signed to limit capacity.4 8 4 The agreements also could not have
the effect of preventing carriers from changing their allocated
capacities and schedules,48 nor could they be designed to influ-
ence the capacity or scheduling of a nonparticipating carrier.48 6
In conjunction with the revised Article 85 exemptions, the
Council promulgated a new regulation governing capacity allo-
cation, Council Regulation 2343/90.487 The terms of the regula-
tion only applied to scheduled air carriers4"8 and Member States
were left free to impose other restrictions on domestically li-
censed air carriers.48" Member States were obliged to allow
other Community airlines the use of Third and Fourth Freedom
routes on a reciprocal basis.40 ° With the approval of any other
EC/EU nation concerned and the Commission, however, a
Member State was allowed to impose capacity limitations on
481, Jd. at 22.
481 Id.
'182 ARGVRIS, supra note 62, at 24-25.
483 Commission Regulation 84/91, 1990 OJ. (L 10) 14.
484 Id. at 15.
485 Id.
486 I(.
487 Council Regulation 2343/90, 1990 O.J. (L 217) 1, 8.
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routes that it had declared to be under a "public service obliga-
tion," provided that the route has 30,000 or fewer seats allocated
to it already." 1 The 1990 regulations allowed multiple carrier
designation on dense routes, defined as more than 140,000
(previously 180,000) passengers, or more than 800 (previously
1,000) round-trip flights during the preceding year.492 On Janu-
ary 1, 1992, these thresholds were lowered to only 100,000 pas-
sengers or 600 round trip flights. 43 The 1990 regulations also
permitted airlines to dedicate up to 50% of their seating capac-
ity to Fifth Freedom routes (up from 30% allowed under Phase
One) .41 The Member States were permitted to regulate, "with-
out discrimination on grounds of nationality," the division of
flights between the constituent airports of an airport system4 15
(i.e., multiple airports that serve the same metropolitan area).
As to capacity limitations, the 60-40% ratio approved under
the First Package (after October 1989) was extended beginning
November 1, 1990, by 7.5%.496 Thus, as of November 1, 1990,
the capacity of a Member State's airlines could reach as high as
67.5%, and the regulation specifically called for the Council
to abolish capacity limitations by January 1, 1993.4' 8 But the
Commission reserved the right to limit capacity growth for "a
limited period" if it caused "serious financial damage" to an air-
line. 9 Member States were also granted the power to manipu-
late capacity limitations for the purpose of shielding certain new
routes from competition. 50 0 This power is granted where a
Member State has approved a new route for a carrier that will
operate between regional airports using aircraft with 80 seats or
less.511 The Member State may prevent other carriers from op-
erating on the route for up to two years unless they agree to
limit their service to no more than 80 seats per flight (either by
using aircraft with 80 seats or less, or by selling no more than 80
seats on a larger aircraft) between the two regional airports.5112
491 Id. at 10-11.
492 Council Regulation 2343, art. 6(2), 1990 O.J. (L 217) 1, 11.
493 ld.
494 Id. at 12.
495 1(.
496 Id.
497 Council Regulation 2343/90, art. 11(1), 1990 OJ. (L 217) 8, 12.
4911 Id. at 12-13.
499 Id. at 13.
500 Id. at 11.
501 Id.
502 Council Regulation 2343/90, art. 5(4), 1990 O.J. (L 217) 8, 11.
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3. Traffic Rights
The Third Package is broad in its scope and effect on the is-
sue of traffic rights, its primary focus. On June 22, 1992, the
Council adopted this third phase of regulations for scheduled
and charter airlines. 5°13 The Third Package consists of three sep-
arate regulations, two of which directly address traffic rights: 1)
licensing of Community air carriers (discussed above) ,50 and 2)
access to intra-Community routes for licensed Community air
carriers. °5
Key to understanding the current air transport market, and in
turn, the EU's broader goal of full liberalization, is understand-
ing the concept of Fifth Freedom rights. As defined by the Chi-
cago Aviation Convention of 1944, a Fifth Freedom right is:
The right to transport passengers, cargo and mail between two
other States as a continuation of, or a preliminary to, the opera-
tion of the 3rd or 4th freedom ....
3rd Freedom: The right to transport passengers, cargo and
mail from the State of registration of the aircraft to another con-
tracting State, and to set them down there.
4th Freedom: The right to take on board passengers, cargo and
mail in another contracting State, and to transport them to the
State of registration of the aircraft.""
The attainment of Fifth Freedom rights is the backbone of a
competitive European air transport market. Prior to liberaliza-
tion, full Fifth Freedom rights were the exception, rather than
the norm, in the European air transport market. With Fifth
Freedom rights come the practical ability to compete in a variety
of national markets, an ability that in and of itself fosters compe-
tition. Around the concept of Fifth Freedom rights, the EU pro-
ceeded to build a superstructure of liberalization.
a. Regulation 2408/92
Regulation 2408/92 was designed to specifically address the
issue of access to intra-Community routes for Community air
carriers, particularly Fifth Freedom routes.117 Unlike prior regu-
lations, which had applied only to scheduled carriers, Regula-
50-1 See Carol A. Shifrin, EC Ministers Approve Liberalization, But 'Safeguards" May
Slow Competition, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., June 29, 1992, at 21.
504 Council Regulation 2407/92, 1992 OJ. (L 240) 1.
505 Council Regulation 2408/92, 1992 OJ. (L 240) 8.
506 GIEMULLA & SCHMID, supra note 326, at 5.
1,7 Council Regulation 2408/92, pmbl., 1992 O.J. (L 240) 1, 8.
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tion 2408/92 was directed at both scheduled and chartered
carriers. 58 The central premise of the regulation is expressed in
the first paragraph of Article 3, which reads, "Subject to this
Regulation, Community air carriers shall be permitted by the
Member State(s) concerned to exercise traffic rights on routes
within the Community. ' 5 '9 Thus, the Council established that
the EC/EU's default position on internal air traffic would be to
permit air carriers to exercise traffic routes.
Article 10 (1) of Regulation 2408/92 abolished capacity limita-
tions, with four notable exceptions.5 "' The first exception,
found in Article 6(1), was not noted in Article 10(1); but for
Article 6(1) to have meaning, it must be considered an excep-
tion to Article 10(1)'s elimination of capacity restrictions. Arti-
cle 6(1) is effectively a modification of the new route protection
clause found in Regulation 2343/90, in that Member States may
limit capacity on new routes between regional airports to 80
seats per flight for two years.5 ' However, the regulation further
circumscribes the application of this provision by limiting its ap-
plicability to routes with a capacity of 30,000 seats or less per
year.512 The second exception is found in Article 8(1), which
states that the regulation does not affect the right of a Member
State to control the distribution of traffic among the component
parts of an airport system, provided it is done in a nondiscrimi-
natory manner.5 ' The regulation does not state what the rela-
tionship between traffic distribution and capacity limits are, but
it can be inferred. Since many airports are incapable of han-
dling all sizes of aircraft, the selection of which airport a carrier
is permitted to use may effectively limit the maximum number
of seats it can offer per flight. Article 9(1) provides the third
exception, in that it permits Member States to "impose condi-
tions on, limit or refuse" traffic rights because of serious envi-
ronmental problems or congestion.5 14  These conditions or
limitations, however, must be nondiscriminatory (on the basis of
nationality or identity of carriers), must not "unduly" affect com-
petition among carriers, must not be more stringent than is re-
quired to alleviate the problem, and must not be imposed for a
508 Id. at 9.
509 Id. at 10.
510 Id. at 13.
511 Id. at 11.
512 Council Regulation 2408/92, art. 6(1), 1992 OJ. (L 240) 1, 11.
513 Id.
514 Id. at 12.
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period of more than three years.' The Member State seeking
to impose the conditions must notify other Member States and
the Commission of its decision and provide a justification for its
actions. 51" Finally, the fourth exception mirrors another provi-
sion of the earlier regulation. Article 10(2) permits the Com-
mission to, after conducting a review of the circumstances, limit
capacity in situations where a Community air carrier has suf-
fered "serious financial damage. 51 7
b. The Viva Air Decision
Regulation 2408/92 had been in effect for less than a month
when the first traffic rights case came before the Commission.51 8
On January 25, 1993, Viva Air, a value carrier based in Spain
requested that the Commission investigate the decision of the
French aviation authorities to deny it access to the Madrid-Paris
(Charles De Gaulle) route.51 9 Viva Air submitted an application
to the French air authorities on October 28, 1992, asking to be
granted traffic rights and slots to begin on January 2, 1993.520
This application was followed by two messages from Spanish avi-
ation authorities and another from Viva Air, none of which were
acknowledged by the French authorities. 521 Finally, on Decem-
ber 18, following a third letter from Viva Air, the French author-
ities replied, denying Viva Air access on the grounds that it had
not complied with a French regulation specifically governing
the application process for non-French carriers.522 Viva Air re-
sponded that Community regulations superseded such national
regulations. This led the French authorities to clarify their
position by offering traffic rights to Paris (Orly) instead, based
on Article 8(1) of Regulation 2408/92 which permits regulation
of traffic distribution within an airport system. 524 Furthermore,
the French authorities explained that they considered Viva Air
to be a subdivision of Iberia, which already was operating on the
Madrid-Paris (Orly) route, and duplication of routes was not
515 Id.
51i, Id.
517 Council Regulation 2408/92, art. 10(2), 1992 O.J. (L 240) 1, 13.
518 Commission Decision 93/347/EEC, 1993 Oj. (L 140) 51.




52- Commission Decision 93/347/EEC, 1(1), 1993 O.J. (L 140) 51, 51-52.
5' Id. at 52.
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permissible.52 5 Following this response, Viva Air filed its com-
plaint with the Commission.
In its complaint, Viva Air identified three principal areas for
consideration by the Commission: (i) the conditions of the au-
thorization procedure, (ii) the implementation of the traffic dis-
tribution rules under Article 8(1), and (iii) Viva Air's status as
an independent carrier.5 26 With respect to the first area, the
Commission said that the "general principle [is] freedom of ac-
cess for all Community air carriers to all intra-Community
routes. 52 7 Member States still have the right to impose authori-
zation procedures in conjunction with the conditions laid out in
Article 3(2), 3(4) and/or Articles 4 through 10; although if
none of those restrictions apply then traffic rights should be au-
tomatically granted.5 28 However, even where the above restric-
tions apply, the authorization procedures "must be kept to the
minimum necessary" and the Member State must respond to an
application within a standard deadline.52 9 Furthermore, "the
right to exercise the freedom is now the rule and refusal the
exception," so where a Member State does not reply by the man-
dated deadline, authorization of traffic rights is assumed.' Any
refusal of traffic rights should clearly explain why the rights are
being denied and what remedies are available to the carrier."'
Yet the Commission hastened to point out that this prefer-
ence for granting traffic rights does not mean that carriers can
rely on being able to immediately implement service. The pro-
cess of slot allocation is considered to be separate from traffic
rights, as reflected by it being governed by a different regula-
tion.532 Therefore, a carrier may receive traffic rights but not
receive slots, or receive slots but not receive traffic rights. 3
Nevertheless, Member States may not deny traffic rights to a car-
rier merely because it lacks sufficient slots. 53 4
Finally, in regard to authorization procedures, the Commis-
sion took the French authorities to task over the applicability of
its traffic rights regulation. The Commission stated that Mem-
525 Id.
526 Id. at 52-53.
527 Id. at 54.
528 Commission Decision 93/347/EEC, II(VI), 1993 0.J. (L 140) 51, 54-55.
529 Id. at 55.
530 Id.
531 Id.
532- Id. See next section for further analysis of Regulation 95/93.
533 Commission Decision 93/347/EEC, II(VI), 1993 0.J. (L 140) 51, 55.
534 Id.
20011 1061
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ber States could not have different authorization procedures for
domestic carriers than for carriers from other Member States. 5
Next, the Commission examined the Paris traffic distribution
rules in the light of Article 8(1) of Regulation 2408/92. The
Commission admitted that Article 8(1) could produce restric-
tions on access to routes; so it is necessary to consider whether
such restrictions are discriminatory or arbitrary. 536 The burden
of proof is on the Member State under review to justify any re-
strictions that result from its traffic distribution rules 7.5 " Traffic
distribution rules must be transparent and cannot have the ef-
fect of targeting individual carriers. Additionally, to be enforce-
able, any such rules must be published so carriers may have the
opportunity to read them and make plans accordingly. 538 The
traffic distribution rules for Paris were not published, so the
Commission ruled they were inapplicable. 5
Despite having determined that the traffic distribution rules
for Paris were per se inapplicable because they were unpublished,
the Commission still addressed the remainder of France's argu-
ment on the subject. French aviation authorities claimed that
they had a rule that did not permit air carriers to run services on
the same medium-haul international route from both Paris
(Orly) and Paris (Charles De Gaulle). 540 As the French authori-
ties considered Viva Air to be part of Iberia, which already oper-
ated on the Paris (Orly)-Madrid route, it would have
contravened this rule to permit Viva Air to fly from Paris
(Charles De Gaulle). The Commission viewed this argument
with a strong degree of skepticism, stating, "[we] cannot accept
at face value the explanations provided by the French authori-
ties. ' 541' There was no clear rationale for why only medium-haul
international routes should be subject to such a rule when, ap-
plying the French authorities' own criteria, there were other cat-
egories of routes which might justifiably be more subject to the
rule. 54 2 Moreover, the Commission observed that Euralair, a




-538 Commission Decision 93/347/EEC, II(VII), 1993 O.J. (L 140) 51, 56.
531 Id. The Commission also noted that French law prohibits the enforcement
of unpublished regulations, so the French aviation authorities violated national
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Madrid route while Air France was operating a Paris (Charles De
Gaulle)-Madrid route, which clearly violated the supposed traf-
fic distribution rule.543 Thus, while this discussion was not essen-
tial to its decision, the Commission clearly established that it
would take a sharply critical view of traffic distribution rules that
appear capricious.
While the Commission had found by this point that Viva Air
was wrongfully denied traffic rights for the Madrid-Paris
(Charles De Gaulle) route, it chose to continue its analysis and
address the final issue, whether Viva Air was part of Iberia. The
Commission concluded that Viva Air should be considered a
separate carrier from Iberia, noting that Article 2(b) of Regula-
tion 2408/92 only defines a Community carrier as one that
holds a valid operating license issued by a Member State, and
imposes no other restrictions.544 Viva Air held an operating li-
cense in its name and, furthermore, it had a separate staff,
"commercial image," and air fleet.54 5 Thus, the Commission de-
termined that the French aviation authorities were obliged to
withdraw their refusal of Viva Air's application.546
4. Slot Allocation
a. Regulation 84/91
The Commission promulgated a new set of regulations in
1990 addressing slot allocation and airport scheduling.547 The
exemptions apply only if, inter alia, consultations on slot alloca-
tion and airport scheduling are open to all carriers, rules of pri-
ority are neutral and nondiscriminatory, new entrants receive
not less than 50% of newly created or unused slots, and air carri-
ers participating in the consultations have full information. 48
b. Regulation 95/93
The Council next broached the subject of slot allocation in
January 1993, with Regulation 95/93.549 The regulation was en-
acted to remedy increasing levels of congestion at Community




5,17 Commission Regulation 84/91, 1990 O.J. (L 10) 14.
548 Id. at 16.
549 Council Regulation 95/93, 1993 O.J. (L 14) 1.
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airports, while encouraging the entrance of new competitors. 5"
It directly defined two categories of airports, and indirectly de-
fined a third. The first category is that of "coordinated air-
ports," those where a coordinator has been appointed to direct
the operations of carriers in regards to slot availability. 55' The
second category is that of "fully coordinated airports," those
where a coordinator has been appointed to actively allocate slots
to carriers desiring to land or take off.55 2 The implied third cat-
egory would be "uncoordinated" or "non-coordinated" airports,
where there is no planning for slot allocation, presumably be-
cause demand for space is so low.
Under Article 3 of the regulation, Member States are not obli-
gated to designate any airport as coordinated or fully coordi-
nated unless specifically directed by the terms of the
regulation. 5 3 A Member State must designate an airport as be-
ing coordinated in some manner when either: (i) the airport
authority and carriers representing the majority of the traffic at
the airport consider that capacity at the airport is inadequate,554
or (ii) new entrants encounter "serious problems" in obtaining
slots, 555 and, in either instance, a "thorough" capacity analysis
determines there is a genuine lack of capacity. 556 If the analysis
indicates that the lack of capacity cannot be quickly remedied by
other measures, then the airport must be declared fully coordi-
nated during those times when there is a shortage of capacity. 557
Once it has been determined that an airport must be coordi-
nated in some manner, the Member State shall appoint a party
with "detailed knowledge of air carrier scheduling coordina-
tion" as the airport's coordinator..55  The same party may be ap-
pointed as coordinator at multiple airports. 5 9 The coordinator
must carry out its duties in an independent, neutral, nondis-
criminatory, and transparent fashion, and make its information
on slot history, requests, availability, and criteria for allocations
available on request to interested parties.5 16 ° The coordinator
554) Id. at 1.
551 Id. at 2.
552 Id.
553 Id.
554 Council Regulation 95/93, art. 3(3) (i), 1993 0J. (L 14) 1, 2.
555 Id. at 2.
55I hi.
557 Id. at 3.
58 Id.
5519 Council Regulation 95/93, art. 4(1), 1993 0J. (L 14) 1, 3.
5,10 Id.
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must be assisted in its duties by a "coordination committee,"
composed of air carriers (or a representative organization), the
airport authorities, and air traffic control authorities concerned
with the operation of the airport.561 The coordinator, the coor-
dination committee, and other concerned parties (including
customs and immigration authorities) must reevaluate the ca-
pacity available for slot allocation twice a year, using objective
criteria, and the feasibility of accommodating additional
traffic.562
Articles 8 through 10 provide the means by which slots are to
be allocated. A carrier that has used a particular slot previously
should be allowed to obtain the same slot in the future,563 pro-
vided that it has made use of that slot at least 80% of the time
over the previous scheduling period.564 In other words, the
Council's regulation embraces the notion of "grandfather
rights," whereby a carrier already holding and flying specified
slots may continue to retain them, provided that they are not
deemed dormant. Where all slot requests cannot be fulfilled,
the coordinator should give preference to commercial carriers
in general, and scheduled and "programmed non-scheduled"
carriers in particular. 6 5 After following those criteria, the coor-
dinator must also consider any other priority rules established
by the airline industry and the coordination committee, pro-
vided those rules comply with EU law.5 66 The coordinator must
explain any refusals for slots and offer the nearest alternative
slot in its place.567 Carriers may exchange slots, subject to the
coordinator's approval that the exchange would not violate any
other parts of the regulation.5 68 New entrants may not ex-
change their slots for service between two Member State airports
for a period of two years. 569 Member States may reserve slots for
carriers operating routes subject to public service obligations.570
At fully coordinated airports, a slot pool must be formed from
unused slots, forfeited slots, and newly created slots. 571 Slots are
561 Id.
562 Id. at 3-4.
56s id. at 4.
564 Council Regulation 95/93, art. 10(3), 1993 OJ. (L 14) 1, 5.
565 Id. at 4.
566 Id.
515 Council Regulation 95/93, at art. 8(2), 4.
568 Id.
5691 Council Regulation 95/93, art. 8(5), 1993 O.J. (L 14) 1, 4.
570 Id. at 4, 5.
571 Id. at 5.
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forfeited when the carrier that had been assigned them fails to
adequately use them and cannot offer evidence of mitigating
circumstances.572 As under the previous slot allocation regula-
tion, 50% of slots in the slot pool must be reserved for new en-
trants, unless applications by new entrants total less than 50%.
If a new entrant refuses offers of reasonable alternative slots to
those it has requested, it can be stripped of its new-entrant
status.574
The regulation also contains a safeguard provision to prevent
carriers in a dominant position from "running up the score" on
weaker carriers.575 If two or more carriers operate on the same
route between EU airports, and at least one of those airports is
fully coordinated, the carrier with a greater number of frequen-
cies may not acquire additional slots at the fully coordinated air-
port if the carrier with fewer frequencies has been denied slots
at the same airport.57 6 In such a situation, the Member States
concerned should make an effort to facilitate an agreement that
would permit the parties to acquire the slots as they desire.577
Finally, the regulation provides for reciprocity in regard to slot
allocation at non-Member State airports: a non-Member State
which does not provide equal access to slots at its airports will
find its carriers subject to refusal for slots at Member State
airports.578
c. The Guernsey Transporatation Board Case
Slot allocation has been the subject of a number of legal ac-
tions. One interesting case was litigated in a British national
court,579 rather than before the Commission; but it offers a clear
example of the application of Regulation 95/93. In 1998, the
States of Guernsey Transportation Board ("the Board") brought
a suit against Airport Co-ordination Ltd. ("ACL"), the desig-
572 Id.
573 Id.
574 Council Regulation 95/93, art. 10(8), 1993 OJ. (L 14) 1, 5. Complaints
about the allocation of slots should be directed first to the coordination commit-
tee, then to the Member State. Id. at 4.
575 Id. at 5, 6.
576 Id. at 5.
577 Id. at 5, 6.
578 Id. at 6.
579 R. v. Airport Co-ordination Ltd., ex parte States of Guernsey Transp. Board,
CO/0722/98 (Q.B. 1999).
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nated airport coordinator for Heathrow Airport in London.58 °
The Board filed suit in an effort to frustrate an exchange of slots
at Heathrow between Air UK and British Airways.581 The ex-
change of slots was the result of a decision by Air UK to termi-
nate its London/Guernsey service, but which also had the
secondary effect of depriving Guernsey of any access to
Heathrow,58 the preferred airport for London flights. Aside
from providing Air UK with an equivalent number of other
Heathrow slots, British Airways also gave Air UK a sum of
money.583 The Board alleged that this violated Articles 8 and 10
of Regulation 95/93, which permit only the "free exchange" or
"transfer" of slots between carriers, and that ACL was obligated
to block Air UK and British Airways from carrying out the ex-
change .58 The Board also alleged that the decision of ACL to
reallocate the same slots to Air UK during the following schedul-
ing period was illegal.5 85
The Board raised four possible issues for consideration. The
first was that the transactions between Air UK and British Air-
ways "were not permissible exchanges" of slots. 586 The Board
grounded its argument on the fact that the slots British Airways
provided were unsuitable for Air UK's use and that Air UK never
used the slots, instead returning them to the Heathrow slot
pool.587 To support this argument, the Board cited an informal
statement by a member of the Commission's Directorate Gen-
eral VII (Transportation) that an exchange of money for slots,
or an exchange of slots which results in only one party using its
slots, is an illegal transfer of slots rather than an exchange.58 8
The court rejected any such an interpretation, however, based
on the plain meaning of the regulation. Article 8(4) of Regula-
tion 95/93, the court observed, provides for the free exchange
of slots, placing no limitations or restrictions on how slots may
580 Id. Air UK, British Airways, and IATA were also represented in the suit,
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be exchanged. 5s9 The court also stated that the presence of an
accompanying payment of money does not convert an exchange
of slots into a sale.59 Therefore, the initial exchange of slots was
legal, despite Air UK's failure to use the slots it received and
British Airways' payment of money. This decision on the first
issue also obviated the need for a decision on the second issue,
which concerned the question of whether Air UK and British
Airways effected a "transfer" rather than an exchange. 9' The
court noted that this was an odd linguistic issue, but it was
founded on the opening sentence of Article 8(4), which states
that slots may be "exchanged" or "transferred," without distin-
guishing between the two. 59 2 An explanation of the distinction
between the two terms would be left for a court that had reason
to define them.593
The third issue the Board presented was whether ACL, as air-
port coordinator, had a duty to investigate the circumstances
surrounding exchanges of slots. 594 The Board based its argu-
ment on the second sentence of Article 8(4), which makes ex-
changes of slots "subject to confirmation" by the airport
coordinator that they comply with the terms of the regulation.59 5
The Board argued that it was "obvious" that Air UK had no in-
tention to use the slots it obtained from British Airways and that
ACL should have disallowed the transfer.59 6 However, the court
found that Regulation 95/93 did not grant airport coordinators
investigative powers to examine slot exchanges in depth.597 In-
deed, as the court pointed out, such investigations would frus-
trate the quick, efficient slot allocation method that the
regulation was intended to create.5 98 Judicial review is available
to correct abuses or serious oversights by coordinators.5 99












599 R. v. Airport Co-ordination Ltd., ex parte States of Guernsey Transp. Board,
CO/0722/98 (Q.B. 1999).
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Therefore, the court concluded that airport coordinators did
not have a duty to investigate the terms of slot exchanges.60 0
The final issue was whether the decision of ACL to allocate
the same slots to Air UK during the next scheduling period was
legal. The Board argued that Regulation 95/93 was intended to
assure that slots were allocated in a manner which would make
the best possible use of them, and particularly that they would
be allocated to air carriers which would use them.60 1 The court
rejected this argument, pointing out that Article 10 of the regu-
lation specifically gave rights to the previous holders of slots,
subject only to the condition that the holders had met the oper-
ating requirement for the previous scheduling period.60 2 The
regulation places no duty on the airport coordinator to deter-
mine what carriers will do with the slots they are given and, in-
deed, to impose such a duty "would be highly damaging to the
scheduling process. '60 3 Thus, the court determined that there
was no duty for coordinators to investigate the plans of recipi-
ents of "grandfathered" slots, and consequently ACL had not vi-
olated the regulation when it reallocated the slots despite Air
UK and British Airways' agreement.61 4
The court's final determination was that ACL had not violated
the plain meaning of the terms of Regulation 95/93.605 Al-
though the court did not specifically address the terms of the
agreement between Air UK and British Airways in its final deci-
sion, its analysis clearly implied that the agreement was in com-
pliance with the regulation. While the court's decision is
obviously not binding on the whole EU, the fact that the Board
could not present any Commission rulings to support its posi-
tion strongly suggests that the court's decision was not too far
removed from the official Union view on the subject. It would
thus appear that the exchange of slots, provided it is done on a
one-for-one basis, is permitted regardless of what the exchang-
ing parties plan to do with the slots or if the exchange is "sweet-
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5. Bilateral Agreements
As noted above, transglobal aviation has historically been gov-
erned by bilateral agreements (bilaterals) between nations lay-
ing out the terms of market access for the respective states' air
carriers. 6 6 The states of the European Union were no different
and, by 1993, they had amassed over 800 separate bilaterals.'O°7
However, heady in the wake of the formation of the common
aviation market by the Third Package, the Commission began a
campaign to take over the negotiation and implementation of
such agreements on behalf of the Member States.""1 Thus be-
gan a battle between the Commission and the Member States
that has continued into the 21st Century without resolution.
a. Commission Efforts to Deal With Bilaterals
In March 1993, the Member States' transport ministers re-
jected a proposal to pool their bilaterals and vest negotiating
powers for future agreements in the Commission.60 9 One trans-
port minister even went so far as to characterize bilaterals as
"sacrosanct. 6" Although frustrated by the recalcitrance of the
Member States, the Commission denied allegations that they
would bring legal action against them.61 1 However, the Commis-
sion's attitude would not always be so forgiving.
Eleven months later, the subject of bilaterals was once more
brought to the fore of the Union's attention by the Comit6 des
Sages (Comit6)6 12 in a report on many facets of the European
aviation industry. The Comit6 stated that bilaterals "ignore the
new realities" of the unified European aviation market and
should be replaced by a multilateral regime directed by the EU
rather than the member states.61 3 The report recommended
that the Commission be given such powers by mid-1995.61 4
606 David Mazzarella, The Integration of Aviation Law in the EC: Teleological Juris-
prudence and the European Court of Justice, 20 TRANSP. L. J. 353, 354 (1992).
607 Bruce Barnard, EC Ministers Reject Pooling of Air Traffic Agreements, J. COM.,
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The Commission apparently took the recommendation to
heart, as in March 1995 it issued a "strong . . .warning" that
individual Member States would be haled before the European
Court of Justice if they continued to negotiate bilaterals with
other nations (particularly the United States).615 The then-
Transport Commissioner, Neil Kinnock, denounced bilaterals as
"the most serious obstacle to competition,""'6 while a senior aide
to the Commission stated that the Commission is "duty bound
under European law to carry out infringement proceedings"
against Member States engaging in such behavior.'1 7 However,
most of the Member States did not share the Commission's con-
cerns, or at least not to the same degree, and the assembled
transport ministers rejected the Commission's proposals." 8
Following that defeat in 1995, Kinnock and the Commission
decided to apply some pressure to the Member States, filing a
complaint against six Member States that had completed bilater-
als with the United States after the implementation of the Third
Package."' It was in this less-than-friendly atmosphere that the
transport ministers met the following year, although Kinnock
chose to present the situation more positively by claiming that
there had been "considerable progress" on the subject of con-
ferring negotiating powers to the Commission.6 20 The transport
ministers agreed to give negotiating powers to the Commission,
but the powers were wrenched from them at high cost. The
Member States required the Commission to conduct any such
negotiations in two phases-the first phase was to give the Com-
mission the power to negotiate "soft issues," such as computer
reservation systems, slot allocation, ground handling, and air
carrier ownership, while the second phase would give the rights
to "hard issues," such as traffic rights and pricing.6 21 The Com-
mission would not receive the rights to negotiate agreements on
615 EC Goal: All-Or-Nothing Bilaterals with U.S., AVIATION DAILY, Mar. 6, 1995, at
26.
616 Julian Moxon, EC Sets Open-Skies Schedule, FLIGHT INT'L, June 14, 1995.
617 Id.
618 Bruce Barnard & Lisa Burgess, Germany Faces EU Suit if it Signs US Air Pact, J.
COM., Feb. 16, 1996, at 1A.
619 Bruce Barnard, Kinnock Perseveres in Fight for EU-Wide Air Talks With US, J.
COM., June 20, 1995, at 2B. The targeted Member States were Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, and Sweden.
620 France Rejects Traffic Rights as Issue in Multilateral Talks, AVIATION DAILY, Mar.
14, 1996, at 1, 2.
621 Commission's Multilateralism Mandate Comes in Phases, May be Too Late, AVIA-
TION DAILY, June 20, 1996, at 1.
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the "hard issues," unless it could show that it had achieved "sub-
stantial results in the first phase. ' 622 Furthermore, the Member
States retained the right to negotiate their own bilateral agree-
ments with other nations.62 3
While the Commission declared that the transport ministers'
concessions constituted a "true victory," the U.S. government
said that it would refuse to participate in any sort of limited ne-
gotiations.6 24 However, even with that rejection, Kinnock felt
confident enough of his new powers to be generous with the
Member States, stating there would be "no roll-back on any bi-
lateral agreement in existence or under negotiation" and that
the complaint against the Member States who had signed bi-
laterals would be dropped.6 25
By 1997 though, the Commission's patience with the Member
States was wearing thin once more, as Member States continued
their independent negotiations. 2 6 At the October meeting of
transport ministers, Kinnock pledged that there would be a role
for the Member States in any negotiations, but also floated the
possibility of reinitiating legal action against Members who had
already signed bilaterals. 627 Yet the transport ministers were
moved by neither the velvet glove nor the iron fist of the Com-
mission and once more rejected granting it full powers to nego-
tiate agreements.1 28 This prompted Kinnock to acknowledge
that the Member States were "resistant" to turning over negotia-
tions to the Commission, and to promise that he would "return
to this issue" at the next transport ministers' meeting. 121
Kinnock was not to have to carry on alone in the struggle to
win negotiating authority for the Commission, however. Com-
petition Commissioner Karel van Miert, long viewed as one of
the most charismatic and influential members of the Commis-
sion,6:  increasingly brought the weight of his powerful office to





626 ChrisJohnstone, Brussels Cajoles and Threatens in Bid for United EU Air Front, J.
COM., Oct. 8, 1997, at 20A.
627 Id.
628 European Union Denies Kinnock Authority to Negotiate 'Hard Issues' With U.S.,
AVIATION DAILY, Oct. 10, 1997, at 63.
629 Id.
630 Karel van Miert, When the Going Gets Tough .., AIRLINE Bus., May 1, 1998, at
26, 26-27.
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(or were in the process of negotiating) bilateral agreements."'
Van Miert stated in February 1998, "I consider that bilateral
open skies agreements do not constitute the right answer. 6 32
He continued by explaining" [I]f we want to establish fair com-
petition conditions between European and North American
[a]irlines, the best solution is to conclude a global agreement
between the Community and the United States. We must de-
velop a common policy giving Community carriers the possibil-
ity to compete on fair and equitable terms .... 633
But even testimony from such a powerful member of the
Commission was insufficient to convince the Member States to
desist from their activities, so in March the Commission an-
nounced that it had reopened legal proceedings against Mem-
ber States that had signed bilateral agreements with the United
States.634 In its announcement, the Commission said that it was
"not motivated simply by the legal breach of EU rules," but be-
cause the bilaterals "do not safeguard the long-term interests of
the European air transport industry."6 5 By giving access to na-
tional markets on different terms, the Commission concluded
that bilaterals "not only distort the competition between airlines
but also between airports. "636 In spite of the Commission's care-
ful couching of its language, its frustration with the Member
States still showed through: "Member States are not only failing
to comply with EU law, but are also not co-operating to adopt,
within a reasonable time, an EU approach making it possible to
remedy the legal infringements and ensure equivalent regula-
tory conditions .. -63' A spokesperson for Kinnock's office was
more blunt: "The cozy negotiations are over and the gloves have
63, G. Porter Elliott, Antitrust at 35,000 Feet: The Extraterritorial Application of
United States and European Community Competition Law in the Air Transport Sector, 31
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 185, 208-09 (1997).
632 Commissioner Karel van Miert, The Transatlantic and Global Implications
of European Competition Policy, Address to North Atlantic Assembly Meeting
(Feb. 16, 1998).
633 Id.
634 Commission Takes Further Legal Action against Member States' "Open Skies" Agree-
ments with the United States, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/en/comm/
dg07/press/ip98231en.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2001). The Members named
were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, and the UK,
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now been taken off.... If this does rattle some governments-so
be it. ' 63
8
The Member States reacted poorly to the Commission's
threats, with Britain and France declaring the following day that
they would continue their negotiations regardless.6' 9 The Ger-
man transport minister called the threat "unacceptable" and
warned that it would "endanger European jobs," while others
referred to it as "counterproductive.""'" Portugal and Italy an-
nounced their plans to proceed with their talks with the United
States, 64' seemingly undeterred by Kinnock's statement that
such behavior was "a shortsighted policy based on national-
ity."' 6 4 2 But even following the Member States' virtual dismissal
of Kinnock's increasingly heavy-handed tactics, the Transport
Commissioner still offered that they had a "final chance" at the
October 1998 transport ministers' meeting to give the Commis-
sion full negotiating powers. 64
The transport ministers, however, were not impressed by Kin-
nock's pleas or threats, and again rejected the Commission's
bid.644 This led the Commission to take its legal action to the
next level by filing a full complaint with the Court of Justice.645
In a speech announcing the move, Kinnock admitted that the
Member States had given the Commission negotiating powers,
"but its scope is not broad enough to make meaningful negotia-
tion possible and until that changes the Commission... has no
option but to pursue legal action." '646 He continued to explain
that the Commission "sees no other option but to pursue the
procedure under [the Treaty of Rome] to the finish." '47 Yet
even as Kinnock delivered this blow to the Member States, he
continued to hold out the hand of partnership, stating that the
6-98 Chris Johnstone, Kinnock Challenges Open-Skies Pact; EU Transport Chief Files
Court Actions Against Member States that have Forged Deals with U.S., J. COm., Mar. 12,
1998, at 12A.
639 Id.
640 Kevin O'Toole, The EC Wants Individual US Open Skies Deals to be Torn Up,
FLIGHT INT'L, Mar. 25, 1998, at 28, 29.
641 Id.
642 Pierre Sparaco, European Deregulation Still Lacks Substance, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 9, 1998, at 53.
643 Bruce Barnard, Virgin Set to Challenge US Carriers in US Skies, J. COM., Sept.
24, 1998, at 11A.
644 Chris Kjelgaard, Commission Takes Eight EU Nations to Court Over US Bilaterals,
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Commission was "willing and available to constructively build a
common approach as regards air transport relations . ..and
hopes that substantial progress ... will be made in the coming
months."648
While the Commission may have been willing to construct a
"common approach" towards external European aviation policy,
the Member States still were not. The UK continued its negotia-
tions with the United States, albeit at a significantly reduced
rate, 649 while just weeks after the Commission announced its
complaint against eight Member States, Italy declared that it
had completed a bilateral with the United States that would
phase in Italian "open skies."""5 The Commission retaliated by
commencing legal proceedings against the Netherlands over its
bilateral with the United States."5 ' This came as a particular
shock to the Union's membership, as the Commission had pre-
viously indicated that the Netherlands/U.S. bilateral would be
allowed to stand since it predated the Third Package.652
Ironically, throughout the recriminations and complaints,
most Member States voiced support for giving the Commission
negotiating powers for external aviation agreements. As early as
1993, the Danish ambassador to the EU stated, "We can get bet-
ter results by negotiating in common .... In 1996, the trans-
port minister of Germany expressed hope for "a U.S.-European
agreement in the long term." '654 That same year, at the trans-
port ministers' meeting, the Italian minister said that no one in
the EU needed to be convinced of the value of multilateral ne-
gotiations, while the representative from the Netherlands was
characterized as being "enthusiastic" about the prospects for the
Commission being given full negotiating powers.655 Portugal
has also stated that it "firmly supports" the Commission's posi-
648 Id.
649 John D. Morrocco, Open Skies Impasse Shifts Alliance Plans, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 9, 1998, at 45.
650 U.S., Italy Agree to Open Skies, Pending Alitalia-Northwest Immunity, AVIATION
DAILY, Nov. 13, 1998 at 275.
651 Netherlands/US Bilateral Agreement Focus of EC Proceedings, AIRLINE INDUSTRY
INFO., Feb. 8, 1999.
652 Id.
653 BARNARD, supra note 619, at 3B.
654 Germany - U.S. Open Skies 'Megadeal' May Boost Multilateral Negotiations, AVIA-
TION DAILY, Feb. 8, 1996, at 1.
655 France Rejects Traffic Rights as Issues in Multilateral Talks, AVIATION DAILY, Mar.
14, 1996, at 1.
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tion on the subject. 56 Indeed, the only Member States that
have been particularly intransigent about the possibility of giv-
ing the Commission full negotiating powers have been the un-
likely duo of France and the UK,657 which have managed to
repeatedly sway enough of the Member States at any given time
to prevent a full transfer of powers. However, in 1999 the Com-
mission introduced a new approach to the matter-the Com-
mon Transatlantic Aviation Area-which appears calculated to
finally end the nearly decade-long struggle between itself and
the Member States.
b. Proposed common Transatlantic Aviation Area
On May 12, 1999, Neil Kinnock gave a speech to the Euro-
pean Aviation Club entitled European Air Transport Policy: All Our
Tomorrows or "All Our Yesterdays" Replayed ?58 Kinnock admitted
air transportation in Europe "is shaping up to the future," but
he warned "that restructuring in [the] industry will only be truly
successful if it is accompanied and strengthened by an effective
and proactive external strategy. ' '61 9 He then proceeded to lam-
baste the Member States that had insisted on continuing to pur-
sue bilaterals, referring to the "magical attraction" of bilaterals
and stating, "nostalgia . . . still has a big future.""66 " However,
what initially seemed to have been little more than an occasion
for Kinnock to criticize his opponents quickly became some-
thing more substantial. Kinnock raised the concept of a Com-
mon Transatlantic Aviation Area (CTAA, alternatively referred
to as the Transatlantic Common Aviation Area, TCAA, or simply
the Common Aviation Area, CAA), a plan that he had initially
floated shortly after becoming Transport Commissioner but that
had been put aside during the lengthy struggles with the Mem-
ber States.661 The CTAA would not merely be an EU-wide bilat-
656 Frances Fiorino, More Open Skies, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., June 12, 2000, at
19.
57 Commission' Multilateralism Mandate Comes in Phases, May be 7oo Late, AVIA-
TION DAILY, June 20, 1996, at 1. Spain, Ireland, and Germany have also been
among the Member States to resist the Commission, but their positions have
been more flexible.
658 Commissioner Neil Kinnock, European Air Transport Policy: All Our
Tomorrows or "All Our Yesterdays" Replayed, Address at the European Aviation
Club (May 12, 1999). The title is a reference to a line in Shakespeare's Macbeth,
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eral, but would be qualitatively different, encompassing many
subjects normally outside the scope of bilaterals, such as con-
sumer rights and environmental protection, as well as tradi-
tional subjects like traffic rights and code-sharing.66 2 Whether
the CTAA is truly something other than a "mega-bilateral" is
open to debate, but the Commission apparently felt strongly
enough about its potential to circumvent the deadlock on the
grant of negotiating powers that the legal proceedings against
Member States were put on indefinite hold."63
Paradoxically, once Kinnock and the Commission had finally
devised a seemingly feasible method of achieving their goals in
the arena of external aviation policy, the entire Commission was
reorganized and Kinnock was removed from the office of Trans-
port Commissioner.664  The new Transport Commissioner,
Loyola de Palacio, has since shown much less interest in the sub-
ject of bilaterals and the CTAA,665 with leadership on the subject
of the CTAA passing largely into the hands of the AEA and its
member companies.666 Thus, at a U.S.-sponsored 1999 meeting
of 90 transport ministers, while de Palacio presented the con-
cept of the CTAA, it was the heads of several European air carri-
ers who spoke most forcefully on its behalf.66 The chairman of
British Midland Airways expressed dismay that the U.S. and the
UK, both of which had been long-time champions of deregula-
tion, were now so opposed to even the idea of the CTAA.66 8 Luf-
thansa's CEO stated that the CTAA was "the only way to make
some progress" on the subject of international aviation.669 The
president of KLM declared that bilateralism was dead and that
the air transport industry was doomed to follow in the path of
the silent movies if the CTAA, or at least some form of multi-
lateralism, were not adopted.670 While the latter address may
662 Id.
613 Simon Warburton, Kinnock Calls Again for Common Transatlantic Pact, AIR
TRANSP. INTELLIGENCE, May 13, 1999.
664 De Palacio is Proposed to Take Over As European Transport Commissioner, ATC
MKT. REP., July 22, 1999 at 8.
665 De Palacio's focus is centered on internal European air transportation is-
sues, particularly air traffic control. New EU Transport Commissioner Pledges to Fight
for 'Single Sky', AVIATION DAILY, Aug. 31, 1999, at 1.
666 James Ott, Aviation Summit Yields EU Plan for Open Market: European CEOs
Endorse a Transatlantic Common Aviation Area as a Trailblazing Alternative to Bilateral
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have been hyperbolic, it did serve to illustrate the increasing de-
sire of the air carriers themselves to move beyond the bilateral
system.
Despite these strong testimonials, the CTAA did not gain
many supporters from among the world transport ministers and
no reference to it was included in the final statement released
by the conference.171 Furthermore, while de Palacio suggested
at the conference that the EU and the U.S. could meet every six
months thereafter to lay the groundwork for an initial confer-
ence on the CTAA,67 2 the first period for such discussions
passed without action on either side of the Atlantic. By mid-
2000 there were still no plans to even schedule discussions on
the subject, making it unlikely that de Palacio's stated goal of a
CTAA conference by 2002 would be met.6 73 Indeed, on approxi-
mately the date the first discussion session would have met, it
was announced that Portugal had signed a new bilateral with the
U.S., giving the U.S. enhanced "open skies" access to the Portu-
guese market.6 74 Thus, it appears that the final word on the
Commission's long struggle has yet to be said.
E. COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEMS
1. Regulation 2672/88
The Commission's first foray into Computer Reservations Sys-
tem (CRS) regulation was made in July 1988. They required
that the CRS neutrally display the flights of all airlines seeking
access, make available their services to all participating airlines,
and not discriminate in the fees charged or services provided
(including display bias).675 Unlike U.S. computer reservations
systems, European CRSs may not penalize travel agents who ter-
minate their contracts. Travel agents may freely end their con-
tracts on short notice, and may subscribe to more than a single
CRS.6 7 6 Commissions paid to them may not be linked to the
volume of bookings made in the system in which the airline has
671 Chris Thornton & Chris Lyle, Freedom's Paths, AIRLINE BUS., Mar. 2000, at 74,
75.
672 Graeme Osborn & Karen Walker-Was, Sans Frontiers?, AIRLINE Bus., Feb. 1,
2000, at 34, 35.
673 Id.
674 Frances Fiorino, More Open Skies, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH.,June 12, 2000, at
19.
675 Commission Regulation 2672/88, arts. 3, 4, 1988 OJ. (L 239) 13.
676 Id. at 13.
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an economic interest.6 77 No CRS may engage in practices de-
signed to partition the market.
78
2. CRS Code of Conduct
The following year, the Council promulgated regulations pro-
viding for a Code of Conduct for Computerized Reservations
Systems (CRS Code of Conduct) .17 The CRS Code of Conduct
requires that a CRS vendor offering facilities for scheduled air
passenger services allow all carriers "the opportunity to partici-
pate, on an equal and non-discriminatory basis" in the computer
reservations system, subject to capacity and technical limita-
tions.680 A CRS vendor cannot require a carrier to accept "sup-
plementary conditions which . . . have no connection with
participation in its CRS."" 1 This would suggest that a vendor
could not, for example, require a carrier to purchase its own
line of office productivity software as part of an agreement for
access to the vendor's CRS. Data displayed therein shall be pro-
vided "in a clear and comprehensive manner and without dis-
crimination or bias . . . ." particularly with regard to carrier
identity.682 A CRS vendor may not require travel agents to ac-
cept an exclusive contract,"83 and agents may terminate their
contract on three months notice.684 Fees charged shall be "non-
discriminatory and reasonable related to the cost of the service
provided... "685 Carriers may belong to more than one system,
and shall be free to leave a system upon six months prior
6861notice.
The CRS Code of Conduct also places specific limitations on
the manner in which a vendor can provide information, statisti-
cal or otherwise, to parties using its system.687 Information con-
cerning individual bookings must be made available on an equal
basis to each carrier involved in the booking.6 8 Aggregate statis-
677 Id. at 14.
678 ARGYRIS, supra note 62, at 29-31; Commission Regulation 2672/88, art. 10,
1998 0J. (L 239) 13.
679 Council Regulation 2299/89, 1989 0J. (L 220) 1.
0so Id. at 2.
681 Id. at 2.
682 Id. at 3.
-3 Id. at 4.
684 Council Regulation 2299/89, art. 9(4), 1989 0.J. (L 220) 1, 4.
685 Id. at 4.
686 Id. at 2.
687 Id. at 3.
688 Id.
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tics requested by one carrier must be offered to all participating
carriers,69 while statistics regarding a particular carrier can only
be released to a requesting party with the permission of the car-
rier concerned."9 " Personal information regarding a particular
consumer generated by a travel agent may only be made availa-
ble to parties not involved in the transaction with the consent of
the consumer.691 Interestingly, given that the CRS Code of Con-
duct explicitly placed restrictions only on the dissemination of
personal information about consumers as input by travel agents,
the CRS was free to distribute a consumer's personal informa-
tion if it had been input by another party.
Aggrieved persons, natural or legal, or Member States may file
a complaint with the Commission seeking relief,692 or the Com-
mission may act on its own motion.69" The Commission may
conduct investigations and hearings, make findings, and impose
fines on vendors, parent carriers, participating carriers, and/or
subscribers.6 94 Fines may be reviewed on appeal to the Euro-
pean Court ofJustice.691 5 In 1990, the Commission promulgated
implementing regulations.696
The rights and obligations under the Commission's block ex-
emptions and the Council's Code of Conduct are essentially the
same. It is only the sanction that differs. If parties infringe the
Commission's Regulation, the Commission may withdraw the
benefit of the block exemption, thereby making transactions
otherwise shielded from the competition rules of the Treaty of
Rome effectively illegal.69 v Computer reservations systems could
not exist since they are co-owned by air carriers and/or other
service providers and need the block exemption to shield them
from the application from Articles 85(1) and (2). In contrast,
the punishment contemplated for violation of the Code of Con-
duct is the less draconian alternative to a fine.6 98
'' Council Regulation 2299/89, art. 6(b), 1989 OJ. (L 220) 1, 3.
690 Id. at 3.
("n' Id.
692 Id. at 4.
693 Id.
694 Council Regulation 2299/89, arts. 13, 16, 19, 1989 OJ. (L 220) 1, 5.
695 Id.
696 Commission Regulation 83/91, 1991 OJ. (L 10) 9. By their own terms,
these regulations expired on December 31, 1992.
697 Commission Regulation 2672/88, 1988 O.J. (L 239) 13.
6' Commission Regulation 2299/89, art. 16 (1),(2), 1989 OJ. (L 220) 1.
1080
COMPETITION IN THE AIR
In 1993, the Council amended its existing regulations signifi-
cantly, described above,699 involving a code of conduct for com-
puter reservations systems.7"' The new regulations recognize
that "competitive neutrality of computer reservation systems for
air carriers must be ensured in respect to equal functionality
and data security, in particular through equal access to func-
tions, information/data and interfaces and a clear separation
between private airline facilities and distribution facilities. "701
The revisions to the CRS Code of Conduct were also made with
an eye toward developments in the U.S. CRS regulatory environ-
ment.70 2 The Council made this effort at harmonization of the
Code of Conduct as part of an attempt to lay the foundation for
uniform worldwide regulation of CRSs.7 °3
3. Goals of the Regulations
The regulations have five principal goals-nondiscrimination,
accuracy, contractual freedom, system separation, and privacy.
a. Nondiscrimination
Nondiscrimination is a dominant theme of the regulations.
For example, booking and sales data shall be made available to
participating carriers on a non-discriminatory basis with equal
timeliness.7"4 A system vendor7°  must allow air carriers to par-
ticipate "on an equal and non-discriminatory basis" in its CRS.70 6
No discrimination is allowed in CRS displays on the basis of
flight schedules, fare types,70 7 seat availability of participating
carriers, 7 8 or on the basis of airports serving the same city.7 09
,99 Id. at 1.
700 Commission Regulation 3089/93, 1993 Oj. (L 278) 1. These regulations
had to be revised by December 31, 1997, by a Commission proposal submitted by
March 31, 1997. Id. at 18.
701 Id. at 2.
702 Competition Commissioner Karel van Miert, EU Competition Policy, The
USA and the Air Transport Sector, Address at the SABRE World Conference '95
(July 9, 1995).
703 Id.
704 Commission Regulation 3089/93, pmbl., art. 6(1)(a)(b), 1993 O.J. (L 278)
1.
705 System vendors are defined as those firms responsible for operating or mar-
keting a CRS. Id. at 3.
706 Id. ("... within the available capacity of the system concerned and subject
to any technical constraints outside the control of the system vendor.").
707 Id. at 5.
708 Id. Information on bundled products shall not be included in the principal
display. ld.
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Fees charged must be "nondiscriminatory, reasonably structured
and reasonably related to the cost of the service provided and
used and shall, in particular, be the same for the same level of
service."7 " " However, these nondiscrimination provisions apply
unconditionally only to Member State air carriers. If a non-
Member State carrier operates a CRS outside of the EU, it must
provide treatment to Member State carriers in the nondiscrimi-
natory manner prescribed by the Code of Conduct in order to
reciprocally receive nondiscriminatory treatment by CRSs within
the EU.7 11 If a CRS outside of the EU provides information bi-
ased against Member State carriers, then the parent carrier of
the alien CRS will be considered to have forfeited its privilege to
receive equitable treatment in Union-based CRSs. v12
Parent carriers of CRSs must provide information to other
CRSs "with equal timeliness, with the same information on
schedules, fares and availability relating to its own air carriers as
that which it provides to its own CRS... ",71 The parent carriers
also cannot refuse the distribution of their "air transport prod-
ucts" through a rival CRS, nor can they refuse to confirm or
accept a reservation for their "air transport products" made
through a rival CRS, provided that it complies with the parent
carrier's stipulated fares and conditions.71 4
b. Accuracy
Accuracy is also an important goal of the regulations. All car-
riers must ensure that the data they provide to CRSs are accu-
rate and not misleading.7"5 Presumably this might prohibit
"bait-and-switch" advertising of a promotional fare for which
there were insufficient seats to meet market demand. System
vendors are also obliged not to manipulate the information re-
ceived, nor to negligently or intentionally disseminate "inaccu-
rate, misleading or discriminatory information."716 They must
also load data received from carriers into their CRSs with "equal
care and timeliness. ' 71 7 System vendors must include data pro-
709 Commission Regulation 3089/93, art. 5(2)(c), 1993 O.J. (L 278) 1.
710 Id. at 7.
711 Id. at 6.
712 Id.
713 Id. at 4.
714 Commission Regulation 3089/93, art. 3a(1)(a), 1993 O.J. (L 278) 1.
715 Id. at 4.
716 Id. at 4, 5.
717 Id. at 4.
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vided involving "flight schedules, fare types and seat availability
in a clear and comprehensive manner and without discrimina-
tion or bias, in particular as regards the order in which informa-
tion is presented.171 8 The specific order in which they are to
display flights are (1) nonstop flights between the city-pairs in-
volved, (2) direct single-plane flights, and (3) connectingfligh ts.719
c. Contractual Freedom
Certain restrictions imposed upon the contractual freedom of
system vendors are designed to enhance the contractual free-
dom of participating airlines and subscribers. Vendors may not
attach "unreasonable conditions" to their contracts with air car-
riers, require them to accept conditions which are irrelevant to
720CRS services, or require carriers to abstain from participating
in other CRSs.7 21 After the end of the first year, carriers are free
to terminate their contracts with system vendors on not more
than six months notice, with the vendor limited to damages di-
rectly related to the costs of termination. 22 In regard to sub-
scribers, no system vendor may attach unreasonable conditions
to its subscribers' contracts and, after the first year, such sub-
scribers may terminate their contracts with three months no-
tice.7 23 A parent carrier also may not "link the use of any
specific CRS by a subscriber with the receipt of any commission
or other incentive or disincentive for the sale of air transport
products .. 724
d. System Separation
One interesting provision requires that CRSs be separated
from a carrier's "private inventory and management and mar-
keting facilities. '725 This separation may be accomplished either
by means of distinct software systems or by physically partition-
718 Id. at 5.
719 Commission Regulation 3089/93, Annex 1, 1993 O.J. (L 278) 1. Unless
otherwise requested by a consumer, nonstop flights shall be listed on the basis of
departure time, while the second two categories shall be listed on the basis of
elapsed journey time. Id. at 2.
720 Id. at 3, 4.
721 Id. at 4.
722 Id.
723 Id. at 6.
724 Commission Regulation 3089/93, art. 8(1), 1993 O.J. (L 278) 1.
725 Id. at 5.
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ing the respective components of the business. 26 This provision
apparently affects only one CRS-American Airlines' SABRE-
which complained vigorously of the enormous cost of technical
and legal dehosting required to separate its internal database
from its CRS.72 7
e. Right of Privacy
Several provisions of the new regulations ensure the right of
privacy of passengers. The regulations set as a goal that "identi-
fication or personal information on a passenger or a corporate
user must remain private .... ,,72' Data provided shall not iden-
tify passengers without their consent.72 9 This closed the "travel
agents only" loophole that the Code of Conduct originally
created.
4. Broadening the Codes Applicability
Aside from the five principal goals, the 1993 amendments to
the Code of Conduct also greatly broadened the application of
the Code of Conduct. As initially written, the Code of Conduct
applied only to matters involving scheduled air carriers. 730 Yet,
charter carriers transport 50 to 55% of all passengers in Eu-
rope 7 and make up approximately 80% of all licensed air carri-
ers.732 The Council rectified this considerable omission, noting
that "non-scheduled air services are of major importance in the
territory of the Community, ' 733 by removing the term "sched-
uled" from the Code of Conduct's definition of air transport
products.73 1
726 Id.
727 AMR persuaded U.S. Secretary of Transportation Federico Pena to inter-
vene with the EEC Commission on its behalf, to no avail.
728 Id. at 2.
729 Commission Regulation 3089/93, arts. 6(1) (b) (ii), 6(2), 1993 OJ. (L 278)
1.
730 Council Regulation 2299/89, pmbl., 1989 OJ. (L 220) 1.
731 EC Finds Progress under Liberalisation But Weighs Probe of 'Excessive'Fares, 6 Avi-
ATION EUROPE 41, Oct. 24, 1996, at 1.
732 Michael Niejahr & Giuseppe Abbamonte, Liberalization Policy and StateAid in
the Air Transport Sector, 2 EC COMPETITION POLICy NEWSLETrER 2, Summer 1996, at
4.
733 Council Regulation 3089/93, pmbl., 1993 O.L. (L 278) 1.
7'4 Id. at 2.
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a. 1999 Amendments
In 1999, the Council again amended the CRS Code of Con-
duct.73 15 Its purpose in doing so was twofold: first, to broaden
the Code of Conduct to include rail carriers and second, to im-
prove consumer protections. In regard to the first purpose, the
Council stated, that "the integration of rail services into the CRS
principal display can improve the quality of information availa-
ble to consumers and provide consumers with the best options
for their travel arrangements. ' v36 The inclusion of rail carriers
in the Code of Conduct resulted in few significant structural
changes, primarily the changes were linguistic.737 However, one
of the few structural changes points to a deeper motive on the
Council's part. The system vendors must adjust the ranking
principles for the main display screen "in order to take due ac-
count of the needs of consumers to be adequately informed of
rail services that represent a competitive alternative to the air
services. ''7 3" The Council goes on to provide the example that
rail services with a few brief stops can be ranked with nonstop air
services. 739 This would seem to suggest that the Council is hop-
ing to offset the consolidation occurring among air carriers by
promoting rail services as a substitute means of transportation,
with CRSs as the means by which to do so unobtrusively.
The Council's second purpose, improving consumer protec-
tions, required more changes to the regulation's structure. The
first major change was made in Article 6 of the Code of Con-
duct.740 The change required that information concerning indi-
vidual bookings be archived offline within seventy-two hours of
the completion of the last element in the book and ultimately
be destroyed within three years.74' Furthermore, access to the
information after it is taken offline will be permitted only for the
resolution of billing disputes.742 The amendment also adds a
new article, Article 9a, which provides, among other things, that
the subscriber must inform the consumer of en route changes of
equipment, the actual identity of the air carrier operating the
flight (presumably to guard against misleading code-sharing),
735 Council Regulation 323/1999, 1999 OJ. (L 040) 1.
736 Id. at 2.
737 Id. at 2, 5.
738 Id. at 5.
739 Id.
740 Council Regulation 323/1999, art. 1(6), 1999 O.J. (L 040) 1.
741 Id. at 3.
742 Id.
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and which airports the flight will pass through. 743 The sub-
scriber must also tell the consumer the name and address of the
system vendor, the duration his/her individual information will
be retained, and the means of exercising his/her access
rights.74 4 The consumer also is given the right to receive a
printout of the CRS display or to be provided with access to a
parallel CRS display that shows the same information as dis-
played on the subscriber's terminal.745 Finally, the consumer
must be given access to his/her own information free of
charge7 46 and is also entitled to receive, at no cost, details of the
CRS's current procedures, fees, system facilities, and informa-
tion on interfaces and display criteria.747
b. The SABRE-Lufthansa Dispute
Since the implementation of the 1993 amendments to the
CRS Code of Conduct, there appears to have been only one ma-
jor Commission decision regarding it. In January 1997, the sys-
tem vendor SABRE Travel Information Network (SABRE) filed
a complaint against Deutsche Lufthansa AG (Lufthansa) for an
alleged infringement of the Code of Conduct. 74  SABRE
claimed that Lufthansa had offered incentives to corporate cli-
ents using electronic ticketing for its flights, but that electronic
ticketing for Lufthansa was only available through the START
Amadeus CRS, which was partly owned by Lufthansa.749 SABRE
also alleged that Lufthansa had refused to provide it with the
means to issue electronic tickets, thereby subverting SABRE's
market position in Germany.750
Lufthansa replied to SABRE's allegations with three different
theories as to why it was not in violation of the Code of Conduct.
The first theory Lufthansa offered was that the purpose of the
incentive was to encourage consumers and subscribers to make
use of the new electronic tickets, rather than to encourage them
to use a particular CRS.75 1 Lufthansa's second theory was pre-
mised on the grounds that there is a certain amount of lag time
743 Id. at 3-4.
744 Id.
745 Council Regulation 323/1999, art. 1(9), 1999 OJ. (L 040) 1.
746 Id.
747 Id. at 4.
748 Commission Decision 99/618/EC, comp. (1), 1999 O.J. (L 244) 56.
749 Id.
750 Id. at 56.
751 Id.
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in the introduction of any new technology, and that it had a
plan for eventually making electronic ticketing available to all
CRSs. v52 Finally, Lufthansa attempted to play on the semantics
of the Code of Conduct by arguing that a ticket was not an "air
transport product" under Article 8(1).753
The Commission first replied to Lufthansa's semantic argu-
ment. While the Commission agreed that the Code of Conduct
did not specifically use the term "ticket," it pointed out that Arti-
cle 8(1) made reference to the sale of an air transport product,
i.e., a contract is formed between the carrier and the cus-
tomer. 71 4 The Commission observed that the conclusion of such
a contract is usually manifested by the issuance of a ticket, re-
gardless of its format.7 55 This led the Commission to determine
that the issuance of a ticket is "an integral part of the act of
selling [air] transport service" and thus Article 8(1) was applica-
ble.756 The Commission also found that if the term "air trans-
port product" were not understood to include tickets, it would
contravene the spirit, if not the letter, of the Code of
Conduct.75
7
Next, the Commission rejected Lufthansa's first theory. The
Commission stated that "Lufthansa was fully aware that its an-
nouncement to offer incentives to subscribers to issue electronic
tickets could only have been taken up by subscribers to the sys-
tem of which it was a parent carrier. 7 51 It then proceeded to
note that not all CRSs could have benefited from the incentive
program and, therefore, the program was improper.75 9
The Commission did not directly address Lufthansa's claim
that it had a plan to phase in electronic ticketing among other
CRSs. However, the Commission determined that the period of
the infringement of the Code of Conduct extended from Janu-
ary 1, 1997, (when the incentives were first offered) toJune 30,
1998, (when Lufthansa first made electronic tickets available to
a CRS besides START Amadeus) .760 This would seem to indi-
cate that phased development of CRS technology is not permit-
752 Id. at 57.
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ted if it would have the effect of favoring one CRS above others.
Therefore, a carrier planning on starting new procedures or ser-
vices would probably do well to make such a procedure or ser-
vice universally available at the time it is introduced. Ultimately,
Lufthansa was obliged to pay a fine of 10,000 euros.76 1
5. Industry Responses
In addition to EU actions, the private industry organization
ECAC plays a direct role in the regulation of computer reserva-
tion systems. In 1994, ECAC passed the Revised ECAC Code of
Conduct for Computer Reservation Systems. 762 As ECAC noted, the
Code "[d]eveloped in close co-operation with the European
Commission... and EU legislation (Council Regulations 2299/
89 and 3089/93) . . .to provide a common European code of
conduct [for the use of CRSs]."763 Substantively, the Code man-
dated clear and nondiscriminatory displays, fees, and carrier
links/agreements in the operation of CRSs. 64 In its regulation
of code sharing, ECAC in essence broadened the application of
the Code. In 1996, ECAC passed a recommendation to its Mem-
ber States on the regulation of code sharing. The Recommenda-
tion on Consumer Information/Protection Needs in Connection with
Code-Shared Air Services76 set out to insure full disclosure of code-
share information at every stage of the air travel process, particu-
larly with respect to CRSs. The recommendation noted ECAC's
concern that "[t] he display of code-shared flights in CRSs does
not in all cases comply with the criteria set down in the ECAC
and EU codes of conduct. "766 In 1997 the ECAC Task Force
on Code-Sharing issued a report detailing the code-sharing envi-
ronment a year after the implementation of the recommenda-
tion. In particular, the report noted that consumer complaints
with respect to adequacy of code-share information had de-
creased since the passage of the recommendation. The Task
Force concluded that while significant improvements had been
761 Id. at art. 2.
762 EUROPEAN CIVIL AVIATION CONFERENCE, REVISED ECAC CODE OF CONDUCT
FOR COMPUTERIZED RESERVATION SYSTEMS, ECAC/16 (1994) [hereinafter EURO-
PEAN CIVIL AVIATION CONFERENCE].
763 ECAC, activities-economic, available at http://www.eac-ceac.org/uk/activi-
ties/activities-economic.htm (last visted Feb. 27, 1999).
764 EUROPEAN CIVIL AVIATION CONFERENCE, supra note 762.
765 Report of the 21st ECAC Plenary Meeting (ECAC/21), Attachment to Ap-
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made in the disclosure of code-share information, continued




The Commission's initial ground handling regulation, Regu-
lation 2673/88, ensured that a purchaser of such services may
switch to another supplier on short notice and is free to deal
with more than a single supplier.76" The regulation also en-
sured the absence of discrimination between airlines.769 Prices
charged were to be reasonable and bear a reasonable relation-
ship to the cost of services provided.77 °
2. Regulation 82/91
In 1990, the Commission adopted a second regulation on
ground handling (Commission Regulation 82/91), providing an
exemption so long (i) as the ground handler imposes no exclu-
sivity requirements, (ii) the agreement is not tied to the require-
ment for the purchase of other goods and services, (iii) prices
reflect costs, (iv) conditions are nondiscriminatory, and (v) the
carrier is free to withdraw from the agreement upon three
months notice.771
3. Post-82/91 Discussion of Ground Handling Regulation
After the expiration of Commission Regulation 82/91 on De-
cember 31, 1992, the EC's governing bodies entered into a pe-
riod of reflection on the subject of ground handling. The
Commission did not take any further action on the matter until
December 14, 1993, when it adopted a Consultation Paper pre-
pared by the Competition and Transportation Directorates Gen-
eral.772 It subsequently submitted the Consultation Paper to the
Economic and Social Committee (ESC) under Article 198 of the
767 Id.
768 ARGYRiS, supra note 62, at 31-32; Commission Regulation 2673/88 of July
26, 1988, at arts. 3(3), 16.
769 Smeathers, European Liberalization-Turbulence En Route, IATA REv. (Jan.-
Mar. 1989) at 3, 4.
770 Commission Regulation 2673/88 of July 26, 1988, at art. 3(4).
771 Commission Regulation 82/91 of December 5, 1990, art. 3.
772 Opinion of the Economic & Social Committee on the Commission Consul-
tation Paper on Ground Handling Services, 94/C 393/21, 1994 OJ. (C 393) 110.
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Treaty of Rome.77 The ESC discussed the Consultation Paper
and ultimately issued an Opinion Paper on September 14, 1994.
Although the Commission had declared its intention to "take an
initiative before the end of 1994 in order to achieve market ac-
cess for ground handling [sic] services at Community airports,"
it did not issue a proposal on new ground handling regulations
until April 10, 1995. TM Shortly after issuing the new proposal,
the Commission decided to submit it to the ESC, which released
its opinion on the proposal on September 13, 1995.775 Ulti-
mately, the Council enacted new regulations governing ground
handling in October 1996.776
4. Directive 96/67/EC
Council Directive 96/67/EC is one of the less liberal air trans-
port regulations introduced in the wake of the Third Package.
Its divided nature is reflected in its own Preamble, which states
that "it is essential that access to the ground handling [sic] mar-
ket should take place within a Community framework, while al-
lowing Member States the possibility of taking into
consideration the specific nature of the sector. ' 777 Although its
purpose was to create conforming Union-wide ground handling
regulations, its net effect was simply to "normalize" ground han-
dling procedures within a certain range.
The greatest degree of liberalization took place in the area of
self-handling. Article 1 of the directive permits air carriers, as of
January 1, 1998, to self-handle passengers, aircraft maintenance,
surface transportation if necessary, and catering services. 778 Car-
riers are also allowed, as of January 1, 1998, to self-handle bag-
gage, ramp services (i.e., docking the aircraft, loading and
unloading the aircraft), refueling, and freight and mail trans-
port provided that the airport meets certain minimum traffic
volume requirements. 779 The volume requirements are not less
than one million passenger movements or 25,000 tonnes (met-
773 Id.
774 Opinion of the Economic & Social Committee on the Proposal for a Coun-
cil Directive on Access to the Groundhandling Market at Community Airports,
95/C 142/09, 1995 O.J. (C 142) 7.
775 Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive on Access to the Ground
Handling Market at Community Airports, 95/C 301/10, 1995 O.J. (C 301) 28.
776 Council Directive 96/67/EC, 1996 O.J. (L 272) 36.
777 Id. at 36.
778 Id. at 37.
779 Id.
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ric) of freight annually, although if an airport reaches the
freight threshold without meeting the passenger threshold then
only freight services will be subject to self-handling.78 The di-
rective only stipulates what will happen if the freight threshold is
met while the passenger threshold is not, and not the reverse.
Presumably, if the passenger threshold is met then both passen-
ger and freight traffic will be subject to self-handling.
Article 1 also permits third-party ground handling (i.e.,
ground handlers who are employed by a company other than
the airport itself or the carriers) from January 1, 1999, at air-
ports with at least three million passenger movements or 75,000
tonnes (metric) of freight traffic annually. 7 1' Alternatively, it is
also permitted at airports that have had not less than two million
passenger movements or 50,000 tonnes of freight traffic during
the six-month period prior to April 1 or October 1 of the pre-
ceding year.782 This second provision would appear to be de-
signed to address the issue of certain airports that are subject to
high seasonal fluctuations in traffic, such as Mediterranean re-
sort areas.783
Article 4 of the directive requires that any party that provides
ground handling services and also provides some other variety
of service must keep separate accounts of their ground handling
and other services. 8 The separation of accounts is to be
checked by an independent auditor that has been appointed by
the Member State where the airport is located.785 This separa-
tion and auditing process are, at least in the case of Airport
Managing Bodies (AMBs), intended to prevent cross-subsidiza-
tion of ground handling operations by other services.786 Inter-
estingly, Article 4 explicitly mentions the prohibition of cross-
subsidization only in regard to AMBs, although it specifically
states that the separation of accounts applies to AMBs, carriers,
and third-party providers.787 This seems to suggest that cross-
780 Id.
781 Council Directive 96/67/EC, art. 1(1)(c), 1996 0.J. (L 272) 36, 37.
782 Id. at 37.
783 It should be noted that Article 1 (2) states that the provisions of the direc-
tive apply to all commercial EU airports with at least two million passenger move-
ments or 50,000 tonnes (metric) of freight traffic annually if the Article 1(1)
requirements do not otherwise apply to them.
784 Id. at 39.
785 Id.
786 See Council Directive 96/67/EC, 1996 0.J. (L 272) 36, 39.
787 Id. at 39.
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subsidization would be permissible for carriers and third-party
providers if they openly report it.
The directive in Article 5 also requires the creation of "Air-
port Users' Committees" (Users' Committee) within 12 months
of the time the directive enters into force.788 The Users' Com-
mittee is formed from all carriers who fly to a particular airport.
Carriers may, if they so desire, appoint an organization to re-
present some, or all, of their interests jointly.7 9 The Users'
Committees do not hold great power under the directive, but
they are given a consultative role in determining which third-
party providers are allowed to render ground handling services
if the airport is subject to limitations on the number of provid-
ers who may have access to it.790 Logically, the Users' Commit-
tees could serve as the basis for further liberalization in the
future.
The remainder of the directive is largely a ratification of state
power over ground handling. Article 6 gives Member States the
right to bar non-EU-based ground handling providers from
competing for access.79' Member States may also limit the num-
ber of providers authorized to supply baggage handling, ramp
services, refueling, and freight and mail transport, although they
must permit at least two providers to offer these services.792 As
of January 1, 2001, at least one of the providers cannot be con-
trolled either directly or indirectly by (i) the AMB, (ii) a carrier
that has transported more than 25% of the airport's passenger
or freight traffic in the preceding year, or (iii) a holding com-
pany that controls the AMB or such a carrier.7 93 However, on
July 1, 2000, a Member State may request from the Commission
a delay until December 31, 2002, in meeting the two provider
minimum.79 4 Article 7 permits Member States to restrict the
number of carriers who may self-handle items in the constrained
categories (baggage handling, ramp services, refueling, freight
and mail transport) to as few as two, provided that the Member
States do so on the basis of relevant, objective, transparent, and
nondiscriminatory criteria.795 Article 8 allows Member States to
788 Id.
789 See id.
790 See id. at 41.
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reserve for the AMB, or "another body," the "centralized infra-
structures used for the supply of ground handling [sic] services
whose complexity, cost or environmental impact does not allow
of division or duplication." ''  Member States may also make it
compulsory that self-handling carriers and third-party providers
use central infrastructures.797 The only limitation on Member
States' powers in this area is that management of the central
infrastructures must be "transparent, objective and non-discrimi-
natory" and must not "hinder the access" of self-handling carri-
ers or third-party providers "within the limits provided for in this
Directive. "798
Article 9 provides Member States further means by which to
restrict liberalization of the ground handling services at their
airports. If it is "impossible to open up the market" due to "spe-
cific constraints of available space or capacity," the Member
State may (i) limit the number of third-party providers to as few
as one or ban self-handling altogether or restrict it to as few as
one carrier, either in general or in particular categories of
ground handling.799 If a Member State chooses to impose these
restrictions, it must specify the categories of services that are
subject to these restrictions along with an explanation of the
limitations that justify it and a plan for measures to overcome
the limitations.s00 The restrictions also should not "unduly
prejudice the aims of this Directive," create inequities between
self-handlers and/or third-party providers, or "extend further
than necessary."801 A Member State must submit a proposal for
such restrictions to the Commission, which will make a determi-
nation about whether or not to permit the restrictions, or if it
should be amended s°2 The Commission may permit a duration
of up to three years for most restrictions, the exception being a
decision to only allow one third-party provider to render services
in the constrained service categories, which can only be granted
for two years.8 03 A Member State may also request a single ex-
tension of two years." 4
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Member States are also permitted, under Article 11, to estab-
lish a selection procedure for third-party providers if their num-
bers are to be limited under the terms of Article 6(2) or Article
9.805 Where a Member State has decided to establish such a se-
lection procedure, it must consult with the Users' Committee at
the relevant airport to establish "objective, transparent and non-
discriminatory" criteria.""6 The AMB and the Users' Committee
will select the third-party provider from the pool established
under the selection criteria, provided that the AMB has no con-
nection to the providing of ground handling services."' v If the
AMB does have a connection to the providing of ground han-
dling service, then the "competent authorities" of the Member
State, in consultation with the Users' Committee, will select the
third-party provider.8 " A third-party provider will be selected
for a period of no more than seven years.8 °'9 An AMB that also
provides ground handling services may automatically provide
those services, even if the airport in question is subject to restric-
tions under Article 6(2) or Article 9.s""
The directive goes on to state that Member States may "ex-
tend the obligation of public service" to an airport if it is located
on an island, has 100,000 or more passenger movements annu-
ally, and the Commission approves the extension.8 1' The Mem-
ber States must also organize a mandatory annual meeting
between each airport's AMB, carriers, and any third-party prov-
iders of ground handling services.8 '1 2 A Member State can also
make the ground handling activity of third-party providers or
self-handlers contingent upon receiving the approval of a public
authority independent of the AMB. s l3 This approval may be
contingent on the financial condition or insurance coverage of
the party seeking to render such services.814 The Member State
may also apply such conditions as relate to the safety of installa-
tions, aircraft, equipment, or personnel, along with environ-
mental protection and "compliance with relevant social
s15 Id. at 41.





81, Council Directive 96/67/EC, art. 12, 1996 OJ. (L 272) 36, 41.
812 Id.
813 Id. at 42.
s14 See id.
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legislation,"'815 provided that the criteria are applied in a "non-
discriminatory manner, ' 6 "relate to the intended objective, '
and do not have the effect of reducing market access below the
level provided for in the directive.8"8 The directive also reserves
to the Members States the power to prohibit a third-party pro-
vider or carrier from operating ground handling services based
on the recommendation of the AMB if they have failed to com-
ply with the operational rules imposed by the AMB. 19
Article 16 requires that Member States take necessary mea-
sures to ensure that self-handling carriers and third-party provid-
ers have access to airport installations as necessary to carry out
their activities . 2° However, this and other provisions of the di-
rective "in no way affect the rights and obligations of Member
States in respect of law and order, safety and security in air-
ports. '8 2 ' Furthermore, Member States can use "necessary mea-
sures" to assure "protection of the rights of workers and respect
for the environment, "822 as well as requiring suppliers of ground
handling service to conform with national laws which are "com-
patible" with EU law. 21
Finally, the principle of reciprocity is codified by the direc-
tive.8 24 A Member State may suspend its obligations under the
directive in respect to suppliers of ground handling services
from non-EU states if it "appears" that non-EU state does not
grant Member State suppliers of ground handling services the
same rights that suppliers from that country are granted at the
Member State's airports,82 5 or does not grant Member State sup-
pliers the same rights as its national suppliers are granted, 2 6 or
grants suppliers from other nations more favorable treatment
than Member State suppliers. 2 7  However, this article is
"[w]ithout prejudice to the international commitments of the
815 Id.





821 Council Directive 96/67/EC, art. 17, 1996 0.J. (L 272) 36, 42.
822 Id.
823 Id. at 43.
824 Id.
825 Id.
826 Council Directive 96/67/EC, art. 20(1)(b), 1996 O.J. (L 272) 36, 43.
827 Id.
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Community,"8 28 which suggests that it does not supersede ex-
isting bilateral agreements between Member States and non-EU
states that may allow for a different level of access for ground
handling suppliers.
5. The Charles de Gualle Airport Decision
There have been a number of Commission decisions pertain-
ing to ground handling since the implementation of Directive
96/67/EC, but a particularly representative decision was
reached in April 1999.'29 The decision was issued in response to
a request by French authorities in January of that year for the
Commission to grant three exemptions for ground handling at
the Roissy-Charles De Gaulle airport. The first exemption
sought was for the Charles De Gaulle 2 (CDG 2) terminal to ban
self-handling and permit the AMB to control the use of third-
party providers concerning ramp services, particularly the trans-
portation of passengers and baggage between aircraft and the
terminal."" The proposed exemption was to be in effect until
December 31, 2000.3' The second exemption was for the AMB
to control the use of third-party providers at the T9 terminal
and concerned all ramp services other than catering and bag-
gage handling inside the terminal itself.8 32 The AMB would also
have been granted the right to permit only two parties (either
self-handlers or third-party providers) to engage in passenger
handling 3 (i.e., any kind of assistance to passengers, including
check-in for tickets and baggage) .134 This exemption was to be
in effect until April 1, 2000.83 The last exemption was to re-
strict, indefinitely, self-handling at all terminals (CDG 1, CDG 2,
and T9) to three self-handlers in the categories of baggage han-
dling, freight and mail handling, and most ramp services. 83 6
The request for the exemption cited five factors that necessi-
tated the restrictions for CDG 2: (i) the organization of the fleet
of buses used to transport passengers between satellite terminals
828 Id.
829 Commission Decision 1999/326/EC, 1999 OJ. (L 124) 14.




834 Council Directive 96/67/EC, Annex (2), 1996 OJ. (L 272) 36, 44.
83 ' Commission Decision 1999/326/EC, I(1)(1), 1999 OJ. (L 124) 14.
816 Id. at 15.
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and the main terminal building, 37 (ii) lack of adequate parking
for the bus fleet, 3 ' (iii) the current structure of the terminal
and its "halls" (i.e., concourses),839 (iv) saturation of the
aprons, 4 ° and (v) congestion on the service roads around the
terminal.8 4 1 For T9, the request only offered one justification,
namely the lack of sufficient space in the terminal and on the
"air-side" to "meet all the needs of the operators.8 42
In response to the request for the exemption, the Commis-
sion performed a study of the conditions at CDG, with particular
emphasis on the CDG 2 and T9 terminals. Traffic at CDG 2 rose
from 28.4 million passengers in 1995 to 38.5 million in 1998.43
CDG 2 has five halls (A, B, C, D, and Fl) and was originally
designed to handle 24.5 million passengers annually. 44 Because
CDG 2 is obliged to handle considerably more passenger traffic
than it was built to, satellite terminals have been built some dis-
tance from the main terminal. It was the transport of passen-
gers between these satellite terminals and the main terminal
that was the primary focus of the proposed exemption for CDG
2.845 Two different types of buses are used for this type of opera-
tion, conventional buses and specially designed "aerobuses. "846
The aerobuses must be operated by personnel particularly
trained in their use.847 Because of the number and variety of
buses in use, there was too little space (a 1665 square meters
shortfall) for the buses to be parked at the terminal and they
were instead forced to park some distance away. 48 The Com-
mission took particular note that because of the design of hall
C, only aerobuses could serve that part of the terminal. 49
The conditions at T9 were somewhat different, for T9 was es-
pecially designed to handle charter flights.8 5° This results in the
terminal having an uneven traffic distribution, with one-third of
837 Id. at 16.
938 Id.
839 Id.




944 Id. at 17.




848 Id. at 18.
84) Id.
850 Commission Decision 1999/326/EC, 11(B) (36), 1999 O.J. (L 124) 14, 19.
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its annual traffic passing through in July and August, and half
the weekly traffic volume coming on weekends."' The terminal
has also seen a surge in traffic, with annual flow increasing from
1.2 million passengers in 1995 to 1.9 million in 1998.52 Because
of its unusual traffic distribution, the terminal was partially con-
structed of prefabricated building units . 53 Ground handling at
T9 was provided by several third-party providers and one air car-
rier was self-handling for purposes of ramp services and refuel-
ing at the time the exemption was proposed.854 Due to these
factors, the terminal would reach "saturation" during peak peri-
ods, resulting in flights having to be diverted to other terminals
with available space.55 The AMB requested the exemption for
T9 so it could expand the terminal to accommodate the addi-
tional traffic and continue to allow competition for ground han-
dling. 56 The exemption was intended to permit the AMB to
close part of the terminal for the expansion project.8 5 7
The Commission first addressed the third exemption re-
quested, the limitation to three self-handlers. It was found by
the Commission that it did not even need to grant an exemp-
tion for this action, as Article 7(2) of the ground handling direc-
tive permitted such an action without Commission approval
provided that it was done nondiscriminatorily 5 8 In regard to
the other exemptions, the Commission stated that "where spe-
cific space or capacity constraints ... make it impossible to ad-
mit a new supplier and/or authorise selfhandling . . . . the
Member State in question may ... restrict or even reserve the
provision of services .. .and/or ban or limit self-handling
. . . 99859 However, the Commission also noted that "the main
purpose of the Directive is to liberalise ground handling [sic]
services .... measures which are liable to exclude or prohibit
the activities of [parties wishing to ground handle] must 'be
such as to guarantee the achievement of the intended aim and
must not go beyond that which is necessary in order to achieve
851 Id.
852 Id. at 16.
853 Id. at 19.
854 Id.
855 Commission Decision 1999/326/EC, II(B.1)(41),(42), 1999 O.J. (L 124)
14, 19.
856 Id. at 20.
857 Id.
858 Id. at 15.
859 Id. at 20.
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that objective."' 86 0 The Commission therefore determined that
its standard of judgment would be whether the exemptions con-
tained "restrictions on freedom to provide services and, if so,
whether those restrictions are justified by overriding reasons re-
lating to the public interest.""' The Commission proceeded to
state a three-part test for evaluating ground handling
exemptions:
* The existence and extent of the space and capacity constraints
used to justify the exemption and the impossibility of opening
up the market to the degree provided for in the Directive; only
the space an/or capacity constraints can be taken into account,
* The plan of appropriate measures to overcome the constraints;
this plan must be credible and unconditional and have a time-
table for the implementation of those measures,
* Conformity with the principles referred to [in] Article 9(2) [of
Directive 96/67/EC] concerning compliance with the objec-
tive of the Directive, no distortion of competition and the ex-
tent of the measure. 62
Furthermore, exemptions must be strictly interpreted and the
scope of an exemption must be determined in relation to the
aims of the proposed measures. 6
Addressing the planned exemption for CDG 2, the Commis-
sion noted that while ground handling equipment "ideally"
should be located near the terminals, that was "only as a matter
of priority." '64 The Commission explained that the Directive re-
quired a petitioning party to "demonstrate that it is impossibl'
(emphasis added) to liberalize its ground handling operations
to the extent required.865 Thus, in this instance French authori-
ties would have had to show there was no manner in which they
could accommodate additional buses. It was stated by the Com-
mission that Member States could not use self-defined quality
criteria to demonstrate such "impossibilities."866 Specifically fo-
cusing on CDG 2 itself, the Commission stated that, other than
at hall C, it was physically possible to permit more buses to oper-
ate from the halls because the AMB was planning on phasing
860 Commission Decision 1999/326/EC, IV(1.1(56), 1999 OJ. (L 124) 14, 21
(quoting Commission Decisions 98/387/EC and 98/388/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 173)
32 & 45).
861 Id. at 21.
862 Id.
863 Id.
864 Id. at 22.
865 Commission Decision 1999/326/EC, IV(2) (63), 1999 OJ. (L 124) 14, 22.
866 Id.
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out the aerobuses, which required significantly more space than
conventional buses.8" 7 The Commission conceded that there
was inadequate parking at the terminals, but argued that the
buses could be parked farther away from the terminals, such as
on the open space reserved for future terminal construction. 6
However, the Commission admitted that it would not be possi-
ble to allow parties other than the AMB to serve hall C, because
hall C's design could only accommodate aerobuses which, for a
variety of reasons, are solely operated by the AMB's staff.8" 9 The
Commission therefore refused the requested exemption for all
the CDG 2 halls other than hall C, pending a demonstration
that there were other constraints on ground handling opera-
tions."" The Commission granted the exemption for hall C, be-
cause of the circumstances at the hall and because the AMB
complied with Article 9(2) of the Directive by providing a plan
to remedy the factors restricting operations.87' The plan was to
redesign hall C to eliminate the need for aerobuses by adding
stairways and/or escalators at the gates to permit conventional
buses to load/unload passengers and baggage at them.7 2
Turning to the T9 terminal, the Commission observed that
while there were significant constraints on ground handling op-
erations, the proposed exemption was too broad in scope.873
The space limitations previously identified concerned baggage
handling and passenger services within the terminal, but the ex-
emption would have encompassed many aspects of ramp ser-
vices where there was no demonstrable shortage of space.874
The Commission may have been particularly skeptical about the
requested exemption for ramp services because the AMB sub-
mitted a compliance plan that would have addressed only the
space problems within the terminal.8 75 Therefore, the Commis-
sion permitted only that part of the exemption that concerned
the ground handling services within the terminal, while denying
the part concerning ramp services.87
8617 Id.
868 Id. at 23.
8 ; Id. at 22.
870 Commission Decision 1999/326/EC, IV(3) (81), 1999 Oj. (L 124) 14, 25.
871 M.
872 Id.
873 Id. at 26.
874 Id.
875 Commission Decision 1999/326/EC, IV(3) (82), 1999 O.J. (L 124) 14, 25-
26.
876 Id. at 27.
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Reflecting upon Directive 96/67/EC, the Commission re-
marked that while its primary purpose was to improve market
access, such access "should be real. ' a77 The Commission ex-
plained that this means access provisions that will improve the
quality of service and reduce costs to the consumer.878 Thus,
the Commission appears to be attempting to balance the gener-
ous powers the Council granted to the Member States and their
AMBs to restrict competition in the ground handling market.
This is the logical conclusion to be drawn from the Commis-
sion's statement about "real" market access and its earlier decla-
ration above that it must be physically impossible for additional
parties to be admitted to the ground handling market for an
exemption to be granted. Given the apparent antagonism be-
tween the Council's writing and the Commission's interpreta-
tion, Directive 96/67/EC may not be the final piece of EU
legislation on the subject of ground handling.
G. CARGO SERVICES
Council Regulations 294/91 applied to combined scheduled
and charter services, but cargo services were unaffected.179 The
Council met in December 1990 to consider regulations on the
intra-Community operation of air cargo carriers. Two months
later, the Council passed Regulation (EEC) 294/91, which came
into force on February 4, 1991.880 The Council announced its
intention to adopt rules for licensing and routes for such carri-
ers by July 1, 1992.881 Third, Fourth, and Fifth Freedom rights
were conferred. 8 2 Capacity limitation provisions were similar to
those adopted in the Second Phase of Liberalization, discussed
above, providing that, except for safety reasons, "there shall be
no restrictions on frequency of service, aircraft type and/or the
amount of cargo and mail which may be carried." 88  Cargo rates
were deregulated. 8 4
Ultimately, Regulation 294/91 was not long lived, being in ef-
fect less than two years. Article 15 of Regulation 2408/92 re-
pealed all the provisions of Regulation 294/91 except for Article
877 Id. at 26.
878 Id.
879 GIEUMULLA & SCHMID, supra note 326, at § 57.
880 Council Regulation 294/91, 1991 0J. (L 36) 1.
881 Id. at arts. 3(2) 2.
882 Id. at arts. 4, 5, 2-3.
883 Id. at arts. 6, 3.
884 Id. at art. 9(1); see GIEMULLA & SCHMID, supra note 326, at § 58.
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2(b) and the regulation's annex.8 5 Article 2(b) of 294/91
merely defines the term "Community air cargo carrier," which is
an air cargo carrier whose principal place of business is located
in a Member State and where Member States or their nationals
own a majority of its shares.88 6 The annex identified carriers
that, while not in compliance with the definition of Article 2(b),
were to be considered Community air cargo carriers on a
"grandfather" basis.887 Since January 1993, for the purposes of
tariffs and licensing, cargo services have been treated the same
as passenger services.
H. THE COMPETITION RULES AND MERGER REGULATION
1. Introduction
Competitiveness in the EU's air transportation sector is gov-
erned by two principal mechanisms, the competition rules (Reg-
ulations 3975/87 and 3976/87), which arise from Articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, and the merger regulation (Regu-
lation 4064/89), which is derived from Articles 87 and 235 of
the Treaty of Rome.8 8 The competition rules are also supple-
mented by Articles 88 and 89 of the Treaty of Rome when a
competition infraction lies beyond their scope."" ) The competi-
tion rules were promulgated in the wake of the Nouvelles
Frontieres case to forestall the Member States from seizing au-
thority over air transportation regulation, while the merger reg-
ulation was created in the late 1980s as part of a surge in
Community regulatory powers in anticipation of the coming for-
mation of the EU. Unlike the antitrust regulations of the
United States, these various regulations and treaty provisions are
intended not so much to prevent the formation, or force the
dissolution, of monopolies, but rather to prevent an undertak-
ing, or group of undertakings, from achieving a market position
885 Council Regulation 2408/92, art. 15, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 8.
886 Council Regulation 294/91, art. 2(b)(i), 1991 O.J. (L 36) 1.
887 Id. at Annex 4. (The "grandfathered" carriers are SAS, Britannia Airways,
and Monarch Airlines.).
881 Air Transport: Procedure for Application of Competition Rules, available at http://
www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/124079.htm (last visited 7/13/2000);
Air Transport: Application of Competition Rules, available at http://www.europa.eu.
int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/124077.htm (last visited 6/13/2001).
889 Director of DG TV (Competition) Humbert Drabbe, Address to European
Air Law Association 10th Annual Conference (Nov. 6, 1998).
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that makes competition impossible or injures the consumer. 89
As detailed below, both categories of competitive measures have
played key roles in the shaping of the EU air transport industry.
Before proceeding with the analysis of the competition rules
and the merger regulation, however, there is a broader issue,
which includes both of them and is especially noteworthy in the
realm of international air transportation.
In 1991, the EU and the U.S. reached an understanding in
regard to the implementation of their respective competition
laws. 89' Called an Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Commission of the European Communities
Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws (the Agree-
ment), the unimaginative title cloaked a radical step forward in
international cooperation. The Agreement was intended to pro-
mote coordination between the EU and U.S. (referred to as the
"parties" in the document) to reduce the danger of differences
in their respective competition rulings concerning transatlantic
mergers and acquisitions.9 2 The "competition laws" included in
the Agreement were Articles 85, 86, 89, and 90 of the Treaty of
Rome, Regulations 3975/87 and 3976/87 as "implementing reg-
ulations," and the merger regulation (Regulation 4064/89),
along with the U.S. Sherman Act, Clayton Act, Wilson Tariff Act,
and the Federal Trade Commission Act.893
The basic premise of the Agreement was that each party
should notify the other whenever its competition authorities
(the Commission for the EU, the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission for the U.S.) realize their enforce-
ment activities may affect "important interests" of the other
party.8 4 This notice must be given in a timely manner so that
the other party has an opportunity to voice its opinions on the
matter. 95 Beyond this principle, the parties must also provide
each other with "any significant information" their respective
890 See generally G. Porter Elliott, Antitrust at 35, 000 Feet: The Extraterritorial Appli-
cation of United States and European Community Competition Law in the Air Transport
Sector, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 185 (1998).
891 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of
Their Competition Laws, 1995 OJ. (L 95) 47 (publication was delayed for four
years as the Court of Justice initially blocked its implementation) [hereinafter
AGREEMENT].
892 Id. at art. 1 (1).
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competition authorities uncover which may be relevant to the
enforcement activities of the other party.' 6 Under the Agree-
ment, the parties also affirm their intentions to cooperate with
each other in investigating anticompetitive activities that take
place in the territory of one party, but whose effects are felt in
the other." 7 However, the Agreement does not limit the discre-
tion of the party in whose territory the anticompetitive activities
are transpiring to decide not to intervene 81
The parties undertake "at all stages in [their] enforcement
activities, to take into account the important interests of the
other Party. . . "899 If it appears that a party's enforcement activ-
ities would have a negative impact on the other party's "impor-
tant interests," the enforcing party must consider several factors
before proceeding with enforcement.' ° Among these factors
are the relative significance of the anticompetitive activities, the
purpose behind the anticompetitive activities, and the extent to
which enforcement activities by the other party with respect to
the undertaking may be affected.9 1' Neither party is obligated
to provide information to the other if such disclosure is forbid-
den by the law of the party holding the information, nor is a
party required to provide information if doing so would be in-
compatible with its "important interests. "902 Furthermore, the
parties must maintain, "to the fullest extent possible," the confi-
dentiality of any information provided by the other in confi-
dence. ° '3 Finally, no terms of the Agreement may be
interpreted in a manner inconsistent with the existing laws of
the parties." 4
In 1998, the EU and U.S. entered into a supplemental ar-
rangement on the subject of their competition laws.905 Entitled
an Agreement Between the European Communities and the Government
89' AGREEMENT, supra 891, at 48.
897 Id. at 48-49.
8,8 Id, at 49.
899 Id.
900 Id.
901 AGREEMENT, supra note 891, at 49.
9 Id. at 50.
903 Id.
904 Id. There is a brief reference to the Agreement in the context of the Boe-
ing - MDC decision, see Commission Decision 97/816/EC, 1997 OJ. (L 336) 16,
at art. VI(ll)-(12), 17-18.
905 Agreement Between the European Communities and the Government of
the United States of America on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in
the Enforcement of their Competition Laws, 1998 OJ. (L 173) 28.
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of the United States of America on the Application of Positive Comity
Principles in the Enforcement of Their Competition Laws (the Comity
Agreement), it was intended to further clarify the principles
under which the parties cooperate to eliminate anticompetitive
activities in each other's respective territories. °6 As such, the
Comity Agreement covers little new ground, and it is explicitly
designed to refine the Agreement, rather than supersede it." 7
There is one significant change, however, in that the Comity
Agreement specifically removes proceedings under the merger
regulation, Regulation 4064/89, from the scope of the Agree-
ment.908 The rationale for removing such an important piece of
EU regulatory work from the Agreement is uncertain. It may
have been a further response by the EU to its difficulties dealing
with the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger discussed below.
2. Competition Rules
The EU competition rules are a complex mdlange of Articles
of the Treaty of Rome and their enforcing regulations. The rel-
evant treaty provisions are discussed in Sections IV.C and VL.E
and F above, along with Regulation 3976/87 discussed in Sec-
tion IV.C; therefore, this analysis will be principally focused on
the substantive portions of Regulation 3975/87. 909
a. Regulation 3975/87
Regulation 3975/87 was intended to provide detailed rules
for the application of Articles 85 and 86 to the air transport in-
dustry, encompassing all air transport between Union air-
ports."' ° The prohibitions prescribed by Article 85(1) of the
Treaty of Rome are held not to apply to certain agreements and
concerted practices provided that their sole object or effect was
to achieve technical improvements or cooperation." ' The in-
vestigative procedures established by the regulation may be
started by the Commission on its own initiative, or in response
906 Id. at 28
q07 Id. at 30.
908 Id. at 29.
909 Council Regulation 3975/87, 1987 0J. (L 374) 1. Regulation 3975/87 has
been twice amended, first by Council Regulation 1284/91, 1991 0J. (L 122) 2,
and again by Council Regulation 2410/92, 1992 0J. (L 240) 18. As both amend-
ments predate the Third Package and did not radically alter the character of the
regulation, the regulation as discussed here is its final amended form.
910 Council Regulation 3975/87, art. 1(1) - (2), 1987 0J. (L 374) 1, 2.
91, Id. at 2.
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to a complaint from either a Member State or a person, natural
or legal, who claims a legitimate interest in the matter." 2
Once the Commission has completed its investigation, and
has determined that there is an infringement of Articles 85(1)
or 86 of the Treaty of Rome, it may issue a decision requiring
the undertaking(s) to cease such activities. 913 However, at its
discretion the Commission may issue recommendations for ac-
tions that would bring the undertaking(s) into compliance with
the terms of the treaty provisions.9 14 If the activities of the un-
dertaking(s) are in compliance with the terms of Article 85(1)
and 86, or if an exemption under Article 85(3) is applicable, the
Commission shall issue a decision declaring the activity to be
within the bounds of the Treaty of Rome.915 Where the Com-
mission has reason to believe that certain activities are immi-
nently threatening the existence of air service or an air carrier, it
may issue an order halting the activities until such time as it is
able to render a final decision, although the order may not be
for an initial period greater than six months.9 16
Undertakings that desire to have the Article 85(3) exemptions
applied to their activities may submit an application to the Com-
mission for such approval rather than wait for a complaint to be
brought against them.9 17 Once such an application has been
made and the Commission has taken comments from interested
parties, it may issue a decision granting or denying the exemp-
tion, alternatively, it may simply let the matter pass, in which
case after 90 days the exemption becomes effective for a period
of six years.9"' Any decision granting an Article 85(3) exemp-
tion must state the length of time for which it is valid, although
normally it would not be for a period less than six years.9 9 The
exemption may be extended if the undertaking(s) involved still
comply with the necessary terms of the decision and the Treaty
of Rome. 920 Equally, the exemption may be terminated earlier if
there has been a change in the basic facts of the matter, or if the




915 Council Regulation 3975/87, art. 4(2) - (3), 1987 O.J. (L 374) 1, 2.
916 Id. at 2.
917 Id. at 3.
918 Id.
919 Id.
920 Council Regulation 3975/87, art. 6(2), 1987 O.J. (L 374) 1, 3.
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gaged in other malfeasance. 921 The Member States have the
power to apply Articles 85 (1) and 86, provided that the Commis-
sion has not initiated an investigation, but only the Commission
may grant the Article 85 (3) exemptions, subject to review by the
Court of Justice.9 2
Regulation 3975/87 grants the Commission the power to con-
duct "all necessary investigations" into undertakings that are be-
ing examined.923 Alternatively, the Commission may request the
Member State in whose territory the investigation is being con-
ducted to use its resources to carry out the investigation.9 24 An
obligation of professional secrecy exists for examinations under
the regulation. 2 5 Where an undertaking fails to provide re-
quested information to the Commission, or otherwise does not
cooperate with an investigation, the Commission may impose
fines up to 5,000 Euros. t2 6 If an undertaking is found to have
breached the terms of Articles 85(1) or 86 and/or failed to com-
ply with a condition the Commission imposed in an earlier deci-
sion, the Commission may impose a fine from 1,000 to 1,000,000
Euros, or a fine in excess of 1,000,000 Euros but not exceeding
10% of the preceding year's turnover . 1 2 7 The implications of
Regulation 3975/87 are particularly relevant to alliances be-
tween air carriers, as most such agreements include provisions
that would violate Article 85(1)'s ban on anticompetitive activi-
ties. Thus, the air transport industry watched the first applica-
tion of the regulation to an alliance with particular interest.
b. The Lufthansa - SAS Decision
On May 11, 1995, Deutsche Lufthansa AG (Lufthansa) and
Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) notified the Commission of
a newly concluded cooperation agreement that would lead to
the formation of "an integrated air transport system," (i.e., an
alliance) .928 The carriers contacted the Commission about their
proposed alliance in an effort to obtain an exemption under
Article 85(3).929 However, the Commission did not respond
921 Id.
922 Id.
923 Id. at 4.
924 Id. at 5.
925 Council Regulation 3975/87, art. 17(1)-(2), 1987 OJ. (L 374) 1, 6.
926 Id. at 5.
927 Id.
928 Commission Decision 96/180/EC, I(A)(1), 1996 O.J. (L 54) 28, 28.
929 Id.
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positively to the initial application, stating that there were "seri-
ous doubts" about the compatibility of the agreement with the
Treaty of Rome, thus necessitating a full investigation. 0
In 1994, Lufthansa had the second largest amount of passen-
ger-kilometers in Europe and the second largest amount of pas-
senger-kilometers in worldwide traffic of any European air
carrier."' Lufthansa also had the second largest fleet among
European air carriers and it was the leading European cargo car-
rier.91 2 SAS, on the other hand, was third in passenger-kilome-
ters within Europe, but was the seventh-ranked European
carrier in worldwide traffic.9 3 SAS was the eighth largest Euro-
pean carrier in cargo traffic, both within Europe and worldwide,
and had the third largest fleet of European carriers."34 The
agreement would establish a regional joint venture to handle all
of their traffic between Germany and the Scandinavian na-
tions35 The joint venture would be equally owned by the two
carriers and its management would have the authority to deter-
mine such items as capacity, frequencies, and fares, but it would
not constitute an independent company.9 6 On a global level,
the parties would pool their sales and marketing efforts, estab-
lish joint network and price planning, offer reciprocal access to
their frequent-flyer programs, and integrate their cargo trans-
port activities as much as possible. 937 Lufthansa and SAS would
also establish a joint hub system, although each party would still
handle its own domestic traffic independently.93
i. The Relevant Market
The Commission began its analysis by determining the rele-
vant market, which in this instance would be the market for
scheduled air transport of passengers and cargo on each of the
routes joining Germany and Scandinavia." 3" The Commission
concluded that chartered air transport could not be a viable al-
ternative, as the principal part of traffic on the routes was com-
9301 Id.
93 1 [d. at 29.
902 1(1.
113 Commission Decision 96/180/EC, I(B)(19), 1996 O.J. (L 54) 28, 30.
934 Id. at 29-30.
935 Id. at 30.
9,3 Id.
937 Id. at 30-31.
938 Commission Decision 96/180/EC, I(C) (26) - (27), 1996 OJ. (L 54) 28, 30 -
31.
.39 Id. at 31.
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posed of business travelers, who generally prefer to travel on
scheduled flights. 940 High-speed trains may serve as an alterna-
tive to passenger air travel but, due to geography, that was not
an option. Cargo transport by rail would not be a feasible alter-
native either.14' Furthermore, the geography of the region
would make it difficult for travelers to take alternatives to the
direct Germany-to-Scandinavia routes because of the considera-
ble extra time such routing would add to the trip.942
ii. Potential Anticompetitive Effects
Having established the nature of the relevant market, the
Commission next turned to considering the potential anticom-
petitive effects of the agreement. Lufthansa and SAS claimed
that there was significant competition between their proposed
hubs (Copenhagen, Stockholm, Oslo, Frankfurt, and Munich)
and other major European airports.943 The Commission con-
ceded that this was true, but it also pointed out that the "hub
competition" was more important to intercontinental travelers
than intra-European travelers.944 Therefore, the anticompetitive
effects needed to be determined on a route-by-route basis. 45
There were 25 routes between Germany and Scandinavia, eight
of which were operated exclusively by the two parties (with the
exception of one daily frequency by Singapore Airlines). 46
These eight routes alone accounted for 66% of all traffic be-
tween Scandinavia and Germany, and at least one of the parties
operated on 12 of the other routes.'947 Thus, the proposed joint
venture would "appreciably restrict actual and potential compe-
tition" in regards to those routes.148 The carriers' economic
power would also be substantially increased as a result of their
operational consolidation on the German-Scandinavian routes,
while their pooled frequent-flyer programs would serve to at-
tract even more traffic. 949 The combined integrated cargo ser-
vice the parties planned to create also had "the object and effect
940 Id.
941 Id.
942 Id. at 32.
943 Commission Decision 96/180/EC, II(C.1)(44), 1996 O.J. (L 54) 28, 32.




948 Commission Decision 96/180/EC, II(C.1)(50), 1996 O.J. (L 54) 28, 33.
,949 Id. at 34.
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of restricting competition" in the European air cargo market.95
Turning its attention to the global implications of the alliance,
the Commission was less concerned than it had been about the
effects of the joint venture. It was admitted that the agreement
would lead to competitive restrictions, but the effect of these
restrictions would be significantly weaker given the level of com-
petition both Lufthansa and SAS face on the world market.95 1
iii. Grounds for an Exemption
For the reasons above, the Commission concluded that the
agreement did in fact violate the terms of Article 85(1) of the
Treaty of Rome.952 This conclusion was reached with little fan-
fare, however, for Lufthansa and SAS had clearly anticipated
such a finding; hence their filing for an Article 85(3) exemp-
tion. The Commission therefore moved briskly to discuss possi-
ble grounds for an exemption. As part of its analysis, the
Commission identified four major considerations for granting
an exemption: (i) the agreement must contribute to the eco-
nomic progress of the Union, (ii) the agreement must benefit
consumers, (iii) the restrictions must be indispensable in na-
ture, and (iv) there must not be an elimination of
competition.953
With respect to the agreement's contribution to the economic
progress of the EU, the Commission considered two factors: the
effects of the agreement on the European air transportation net-
work, and its effects on the costs of the two parties. The Com-
mission observed that SAS's network was predominantly
regional, while Lufthansa's was more balanced between regional
and pan-European routes.9 54 The alliance would therefore have
a beneficial effect on the overall European air transportation
network, particularly by improving service to Scandinavia, whose
geographically peripheral location has left its populations feel-
ing marginalized in the EU. 95 The Commission also stated that
the reduction of European air carriers' costs is "an important
factor" to consider in granting such an exemption given the
considerably higher costs associated with European aviation.9 6
950 Id.
9.51 Id.
92 [i. at 35.
953 Commision Decision 96/180/EC, II(E)(a), 1996 O.J. (L 54) 28, 35 - 37.
954 Id. at 35.
955 Id. at 36.
956 Id.
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The precise savings that the agreement was estimated to pro-
duce were excised from the decision; however, the Commission
did appear to be impressed with the carriers' cost reduction
plan.9"7 The Commission therefore concluded that the alliance
would "likely ... contribute to economic progress. 9 58
The Commission briefly addressed the other three considera-
tions for exemption. First, it determined that consumers would
benefit from improved access to the European air network and
the lower fares the cost reductions were likely to generate. 59
The restrictions imposed by the agreement on the parties were
indispensable, as neither Lufthansa nor SAS could achieve the
same level of service operating independently.9 60 Finally, al-
though competition would initially be reduced on the German-
Scandinavian routes, there were other carriers operating in the
market which could expand their service, particularly once all
the Third Package measures came into effect.96" ' Despite this
streamlined analysis, the Commission repeatedly expressed its
opinion that restrictions on the parties would be necessary to
bring the agreement into full compliance with Article 85(3).962
The Commission approved a ten-year exemption to the Arti-
cle 85(1) prohibitions for the Lufthansa-SAS alliance, but ap-
proval came with a heavy price.96"  Eight routes exclusively
operated by Lufthansa and SAS were singled out for the Com-
mission's conditions under the decision (hereinafter the "Arti-
cle 2(2) routes"). 964  To describe the conditions, the
Commission coined the phrase "Lufthansa/SAS entity." The
Lufthansa/SAS entity would be composed of Lufthansa, SAS,
any carrier in which either of the parties held more than 10 per-
cent of the shares, any carrier with which either of the parties
had completed a structural agreement, and any carrier with
which the parties had concluded a code-sharing agreement on
routes between Germany and Scandinavia.965 Through October
31, 2002, on the Article 2(2) routes, if a carrier established in
957 Id.
958 Commission Decision 96/180/EC, 11(E) (a.2) (73), 1996 O.J. (L 54) 28, 36.
959 Id.
960 Id. at (76)-(78).
961 Id.
962 Id. at 36-7.
963 Commission Decision 96/180/EC, art. 1, 1996 OJ. (L 54) 28, 40.
9 Id. The eight routes were Dusseldorf-Copenhagen, Dusseldorf-Stockholm,
Frankfurt-Copenhagen, Frankfurt-Gothenburg, Frankfurt-Oslo, Frankfurt-Stock-
holm, Hamburg-Stockholm, and Munich-Copenhagen.
965 Id.
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the EEA9 66 provides three months notice to the Lufthansa/SAS
entity of its intention to start service, the Lufthansa/SAS entity
must freeze its daily frequencies on the affected routes until the
new entrant starts its service.967 The Lufthansa/SAS entity may
subsequently increase its number of daily frequencies by one or
by as many as is necessary to equal the new entrant's frequencies
if it chooses to operate more than the Lufthansa/SAS entity al-
ready does.9 68 If an EEA-based carrier wishes to enter into an
interlining agreement with the Lufthansa/SAS entity, the entity
must permit it to do so on terms comparable to the industry's
norms for a period of seven years or until December 31, 2005,
whichever comes first.969 Furthermore, the Lufthansa/SAS en-
tity must admit any EEA-based carrier into its frequent-flyer pro-
gram if the new entrant is not already part of a frequent-flyer
program and it plans on operating a service on an Article 2(2)
route.9 70
The Commission also expressed concern about the fact that
Lufthansa and SAS already participated in frequent-flyer pro-
grams with other carriers. To resolve that issue, the Commission
obligated both parties to terminate those arrangements byJanu-
ary 1, 1997.9 71 As noted above, the shortage of slots at most Eu-
ropean airports is a chronic problem, so the Commission
imposed elaborate slot allocation conditions on the Lufthansa/
SAS entity.9 72 Basically, the entity was obligated to give up a lim-
ited number of slots on demand to a new entrant on the Article
2(2) routes, provided that the new entrant had not otherwise
been able to obtain the slots. Through October 31, 2002, the
Lufthansa/SAS entity must provide annual reports to the Com-
mission, detailing its number of frequencies on the Article 2(2)
routes, any agreements on interlining or frequent-flyer pro-
grams, and a list of slots rendered to other carriers.97 3 Finally,
through December 31, 2005, the entity must provide the Com-
!)(;( The EEA is the European Economic Area. It is composed of the Member
States of the EU and the members of the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA), which are Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland. There is a
close relationship between the EU and the EFTA. See European Free Trade Associa-
tion, IP7A, available at http://secretariat.efta.int/euroeco.




971 Id. at 41.
972 Commission Decision 96/180/EC, art. 3(8)(a), 1996 O.J. (L 54) 28, 41.
973 Id. at 42.
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mission with annual reports on ticket prices, total monthly ca-
pacity supplied, and data regarding the extent of cost-reduction
achieved.974
c. Weakness of Regulation 3975/87
While the Commission's decision in the Lufthansa/SAS case
has been hailed as a model for examining air-carrier alliances,975
it also served to illustrate an inherent weakness of Regulation
3975/87. As written, Regulation 3975/87 (along with Regula-
tion 3976/87) is limited in its applicability, pertaining only to air
traffic within the EU.9 76 Therefore, agreements between EU-
based carriers and carriers from other countries must be as-
sessed by the individual Member States under Articles 88 and 89
of the Treaty of Rome, thus creating a danger of different na-
tional competition authorities reaching divergent opinions
about the compatibility of such an agreement with the Treaty of
Rome.977 This situation is particularly anomalous because it ex-
ists for no other industry and because the merger regulation
does not differentiate between intra-EU and extra-EU agree-
ments.9 78 To resolve this potential minefield of jurisdictional
controls, in 1997 the Commission proposed an amendment to
Regulation 3975/87 and 3976/87 that would extend the EU's
authority to extra-EU agreements. 9 79 Despite Parliament ap-
proval of the proposal, by mid-2000 no further progress on the
implementation of the amendments had been made.98 So for




Shortly after the implementation of the regulations for the
competition rules, it became apparent to the EC's governing
974 Id.
1475 Deputy Head of Unit DG Competition Joos Straiger, Presentation to the
11th Annual Conference of the European Air Law Association (Nov. 5, 1999).
976 Director of DG IV (Competition) Humbert Drabbe, Presentation to the
10th Annual Conference of the European Air Law Association (Nov. 6, 1998).
977 Id.
978 Id.
979 Application of the Competition Rules in Certain Sectors: 1997 Proposal, available at
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bodies that the regulations were not sufficient to cover all possi-
ble exigencies."S' It was therefore determined that a new regula-
tion permitting effective monitoring of all concentrations, with
an eye toward determining their impact on the structure of com-
petition within the EC, was necessary.9 2 To that end, in Decem-
ber 1989, the Council passed Regulation 4064/89, commonly
referred to as the "merger regulation." Much of the merger reg-
ulation is purely procedural. For example, it explains the pro-
cess for empanelling an advisory committee in regard to certain
Commission actions; 98 3 however, several portions are highly rele-
vant to the substantive subject of air transportation.
The regulation applies to all concentrations, i.e., where two
undertakings merge or where an undertaking acquires partial or
whole ownership of another undertaking,98 4 thus creating a
"Community dimension".985 A concentration has a "Community
dimension" when the aggregate worldwide turnover98 6 of all the
undertakings concerned is more than 5 billion Euros and the
aggregate Union-wide turnover of each of at least two of the un-
dertakings is more than 250 million Euros, unless more than
two-thirds of each undertaking's Union-wide turnover takes
place in one Member State.9 7 Obviously, a merger between two
or more major air carriers would almost certainly meet the
worldwide turnover requirement, and if a European-based car-
rier were involved the Union-wide requirement would be ful-
filled as well.
When the Commission examines such a concentration it must
take into account a number of disparate factors. It must con-
sider the necessity of preserving or developing effective competi-
tion within the Union in light of the relevant markets involved
and the existence of actual or potential competitors.' 8 The
Commission should also consider the economic and financial
power of the undertakings, access to supplies or markets, barri-
98, Council Regulation 4064/89, pmbl., 1989 OJ. (L 395) 1, 1 - 3.
982 Id.
983 Id. at 10 - 11.
984 Id. at 4.
1185 Id. at 3.
98 "Turnover" is a peculiar financial concept much beloved by the EU. It is
the amount derived by an undertaking in the preceding fiscal year from the sale
of products and the provision of services falling within the undertaking's ordi-
nary activities after deduction of sales rebates, value-added tax, and other taxes
directly related to turnover.
987 Council Regulation 4064/89, art. 1(2), 1989 OJ. (L 395) 1, 3.
988 Id.
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ers to entry and trends in supply and demand for the relevant
good or serviceY89 Furthermore, the interests of all concerned
consumers, and the effect that the concentration may have on
technical and economic advancement must also be assessed. 990
If, after making these determinations, the Commission finds
that the concentration does not create or strengthen a domi-
nant position that would otherwise imperil competition, the
concentration should be approved.99 1 However, if the concen-
tration would endanger competition, it should be declared in-
compatible with the nature of the common market,992 even
though satisfactory concessions by the undertakings may subse-
quently bring the concentration into compliance.
Given the current wave of air-carrier alliances, the merger reg-
ulation is of particular significance to the air transport industry.
It explicitly permits actions-including joint ventures- that have
as their object or effect the coordination of competitive behav-
ior among undertakings, provided the undertakings remain in-
dependent.99 3 As noted above, however, such an operation or
joint venture might be in violation of the competition rules. But
if the joint venture functions on a lasting basis as an "autono-
mous economic entity," then it does constitute a concentration
within the terms of the regulation. 94
If the Commission determines that a concentration strength-
ens or gives rise to an undertaking's dominant position, the reg-
ulation requires the Commission to issue a decision declaring
the concentration incompatible with the common market.9 5 As
part of such a decision, the Commission may order the under-
takings separated, their joint control terminated, or any other
appropriate measures to "restore conditions of effective compe-
tition."' 96 Alternatively, the Commission may place conditions
on an incompatible concentration to bring it into conformity
with the terms of the regulation. 997 The undertakings would




992 Council Regulation 4064/89, art. 2(3), 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1, 4.
993 Id.
994 Id.
:9 Id. at 6.
:96 Id. at 6-7.
993 Council Regulation 4064/89, art. 8(2), 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1, 6.
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and proceed with theconcentration or to dissolve the concen-
tration rather than accept the Commission's conditions.
The merger regulation also gives the Commission broad pow-
ers to impose fines, both as punishment for failure to cooperate
with it procedurally and substantively. The Commission may
fine an undertaking up to 50,000 Euros for failure to provide
prompt notice of a concentration, negligently or deliberately
providing inaccurate or incomplete information, or otherwise
refusing to submit to an investigation of its business practices.99
For the more severe action of defying the terms of a decision,
the Commission may impose a fine up to ten percent of the un-
dertaking's aggregate turnover 9 9 Such a penalty would clearly
be disastrous for an air carrier, because the value of the fine
could run into the hundreds of millions, or even billions, of Eu-
ros. Given the high aggregate turnover and the slim profit mar-
gins that characterize the industry, the severe nature of the fines
that could be imposed thus makes the aviation industry ex-
tremely susceptible to intimidation by the Commission via
merger regulation.
The Court of Justice enjoys "unlimited jurisdiction" to review
the decisions of the Commission within the context of the
merger regulation. °'1° It may cancel, reduce, or increase the
level of any fine imposed by the Commission. 10 11 The regula-
tion does not explicitly give the Court of Justice the power to
alter the conditions imposed by the Commission, but that would
appear to be a logical extension of its "unlimited jurisdiction."
The regulation also imposes an obligation of professional se-
crecy on the Commission and any other parties involved in the
investigation of a concentration.10 0 2 Therefore, since the Com-
mission may not disclose any information that would fall under
the "professional secrecy" standard, decisions under the merger
regulation often take on a cryptic tone. For example,
"[a]ccording to Boeing only ... of its production capacity is in
use which leaves spare capacity of. ... "03
Finally, of particular importance for international aviation,
the merger regulation introduces the concept of reciprocity for




1002 Council Regulation 4064/89, art. 17(1)-(3), 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1, 10.
M03 Commission Decision 97/816/EC, (65), 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16, 26. (ellipses
in the original).
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investigations of concentrations. When it appears that a non-
Member State is not granting Union undertakings the same
standard of treatment as the Union grants undertakings from
that nation, the Commission may submit a request for negotiat-
ing powers to the Council. 0 °4 These negotiating powers would
be used to obtain comparable treatment for Union
undertakings. 1005
b. The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger
Although the merger regulation has been applied numerous
times since its introduction, there are few decisions as monu-
mental in nature as the Commission's decision concerning the
Boeing Company's (Boeing) takeover of McDonnell Douglas
Corporation (MDC). While not directly involving air transporta-
tion, much of the Commission's analysis in the case would have
equal applicability for air carriers.
In December 1996, Boeing and MDC concluded a purchase
agreement under which MDC would become a subsidiary of
Boeing, thus meeting the basic definition of a concentration
within the terms of the merger regulation.'006 The two under-
takings had worldwide turnover considerably in excess of 5 bil-
lion Euros, along with Union-wide turnover greater than 250
million Euros. Neither undertaking achieved more than two-
thirds of their Union-wide turnover within one Member State
and, as a result, the merger had a Union dimension.'0017 Having
established that the Boeing-MDC agreement fell within its pur-
view under the merger regulation, the Commission began its
analysis of the likely effects of the agreement.
The Commission identified the relevant product market for
the two undertakings as being the market for new, large com-
mercial aircraft (i.e., those that carried more than 100 passen-
gers and had ranges in excess of 1,700 nautical miles), since
those were the sole products that Boeing and MDC manufac-
tured that were relevant to the Commission's investigation. 1 08
The relevant geographic market was the entire world, given the
ease with which the products are distributed. 1 09 In the global
1004 Council Regulation 4064/89, art. 24(3), 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1, 12.
1005 Id.
1006 Commission Decision 97/816/EC, (5) - (6), 1997 OJ. (L 336) 16, 17.
1007 Id.
1008 Id. at 18. Because of U.S. security concerns, the Commission did not di-
rectly investigate the military aircraft divisions of the undertakings.
1009 Id. at 19
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market for new, large commercial aircraft, there were only three
manufacturers: Boeing, which was first with approximately 64%
of the market, Airbus, which was second with approximately
27%, and MDC, which was third with approximately six
percent. 0 10
The customers for the product were predominantly air carri-
ers and leasing companies. '' While there were 561 air carriers
operating the various manufacturers' aircraft, the 12 largest car-
riers accounted for half of all such aircraft in operation, while
leasing companies held another 20%.1112 This skew among cus-
tomers is particularly important, as carriers prefer to purchase
all their aircraft from a single supplier to streamline mainte-
nance.")"3 Boeing was uniquely poised to exploit this prefer-
ence, as it was the only undertaking capable of supplying aircraft
in all size-ranges within the product type, given that Airbus'
models were all of intermediate size and MDC's were of small to
intermediate size.1"14 Furthermore, there was already evidence
of Boeing moving to take advantage of the carriers' preference,
as it had recently concluded exclusive dealing contracts with
American Airlines, Delta Airlines, and Continental Airlines. 10 5
In each instance, the carriers received aircraft or purchase op-
tions on aircraft at reduced prices in exchange for an agreement
to use Boeing as their exclusive supplier for the next twenty
years. 1"6 These agreements effectively gave Boeing a guaran-
teed 13% of the estimated sales of large commercial jet aircraft
for the next twenty years. 1 117 All of these factors, combined with
the extremely high costs of starting an aerospace company,
served to ensure that no new competitors would enter the mar-
ket in the foreseeable future.""'3
The Commission concluded that Boeing already held a domi-
nant position in the market for large commercial jet aircraft. 10" 9
Particularly significant, Boeing's market share had increased
continuously over the previous seven years (primarily at the ex-
1olo Id. at 19-21. The remaining three percent was composed of aircraft whose
manufacturers had discontinued production, such as Lockheed and Convair.
101 Commission Decision 97/816/EC, (25), 1997 OJ. (L 336) 16, 20.
1012 Id.
1013 Id. at 21-22.
1014 Id.
1-5 Id. at 23.
1016 Commission Decision 97/816/EC, (43) - (44), 1997 OJ. (L 336) 16, 23.
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pense of MDC), while Airbus' market. share had remained
mostly unchanged over the same period.' ° The Commission
explained that this demonstrated that Boeing was able to act "to
an appreciable extent independently of its competitors," which
constitutes "an illustration of dominance."'' 0 2 ' Having found
that Boeing enjoyed a dominant position, the Commission was
then obliged to assess whether the acquisition of MDC would
further strengthen Boeing's dominance.
The immediate effects of the merger would be to increase
Boeing's market share to 70% and give it a monopoly on the
smallest size of large commercial jet aircraft (100-120 passen-
gers), complementing its existing monopoly on the largest
size. 10 22 This could permit Boeing to sell its intermediate size
aircraft below cost, relying on higher prices on the other sizes to
compensate for the loss, thereby undermining Airbus' market
position. °23 Even more perniciously, the elimination of MDC
would likely result in an increase in prices. The Commission
determined this by comparing purchase agreements where
MDC was a competitor for the sale with those purchase agree-
ments where it did not participate. It was found that final prices
were seven percent lower in those cases where MDC was a com-
petitor, regardless of which undertaking finally received the
purchase order. 10 2 4 Boeing would also benefit in the long run
from access to MDC manufacturing facilities and staff. Once all
remaining new aircraft are delivered by the MDC plants, Boeing
would be able to begin turning these resources to production of
its own aircraft models. 10 25 Given that the aircraft manufactur-
ing industry is characterized by large production backlogs, 10 26
this added capacity would eventually be of great benefit to
Boeing.
Boeing's subsuming of MDC would also sharply increase its
ability to negotiate exclusive dealing contracts-not merely due
to the elimination of a competitor, but also because Boeing
would be able to manipulate any pre-existing orders for MDC
aircraft and parts. 10 21 Morever, Boeing had already suggested to
1020 Id. at 21.
1021 Commission Decision 97/816/EC, (37), 1997 OJ. (L 336) 16, 21.
1022 Id. at 24-25.
1023 Id. at 29-30.
1024 Id. at 25.
1025 Id. at 26-27.
1026 Commission Decision 97/816/EC, (28), 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16, 20.
1027 Id. at 27.
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carriers that it could take back newly delivered MDC aircraft,
cancel existing orders for MDC aircraft, and substitute new Boe-
ing aircraft in their place. 1128 Boeing's newfound monopoly in
the small-size large commercial jet market would also enhance
the attractiveness of any exclusive dealing contract it might offer
a carrier.10 29 The Commission estimated that Boeing could se-
cure as much as 40% of the world's market through such
contracts. '
0 30
While the Commission withheld judgment on the direct ef-
fects of the combination of Boeing and MDC's military aviation
divisions, it expressed consternation at the possible indirect ef-
fects the combination might have on Boeing's civil aviation divi-
sion. The concentration would triple the size of Boeing's
military and space activities, thereby giving the undertaking ac-
cess to a considerable stream of revenue which would be largely
unaffected by economic fluctuations. 0 " Acquisition of MDC
would also give Boeing access to the sizeable amounts of U.S.
government-sponsored research and development (R&D) funds
of which MDC was a beneficiary. 10 -3 2 Despite Boeing's protests
that its civil and military divisions were discrete entities, the
Commission pointed out that Boeing already had a history of
diverting military research to civilian applications. "3 Further-
more, even if it were to keep its military and civilian divisions
clearly separate, Boeing still would obtain a greatly increased
number of patents as a by-product of its government-sponsored
R&D, which could serve to obstruct other manufacturers from
developing the same technologies for civilian applications. 034
Finally, the Commission expressed reservations about the
amount of influence Boeing would be able to wield over its sup-
pliers in the wake of the concentration. The actual breakdown
of sales was excised under the professional secrecy obligation of
Article 17 of Regulation 4064/89. However, it may be inferred
from the decision that a considerable percentage of suppliers of
aerospace materials rely on Boeing and MDC for the majority of
their sales. ' °33 Boeing would have a significant ability to pres-
10128 Id.
102) Id. at 28.
1)30 Id.
1031 Commission Decision 97/816/EC, (73), 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16, 28.
-31! Id. at 30.
1033 Id. at 32.
1034 Id. at 34-35.
1035 Id. at 35.
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sure these suppliers for favorable prices or preferred access to
products.'136 The Commission cited a case from earlier in 1997,
where Northrop Grumman dropped out of a development pro-
ject with Airbus, seemingly in response to efforts by Boeing to
dissuade it from cooperating with Airbus.1 3 7 For this reason,
and the others cited above, the Commission determined that
the merger of Boeing and MDC would "lead to a strengthening
of a dominant position through which effective competition
would be significantly impeded . . " - I
Nevertheless, the Commission agreed to grant permission for
the merger under a series of stringent conditions. Boeing was
obliged to maintain the civilian aircraft division of MDC as a
separate legal entity for ten years, subject to review by an inde-
pendent auditor."' : Boeing was also required to support the
existing MDC product lines, providing the same level of service
as it did to users of Boeing's product lines.10 '40 Additionally,
Boeing had to give guarantees that it would not coerce any MDC
users into purchasing Boeing's products, or deter them from
purchasing another manufacturer's products.'0 4' Until August
1, 2007, Boeing would be barred from entering into any exclu-
sive dealing contracts unless another manufacturer had already
offered such a contract to the carrier in question.114 2 Further-
more, the existing exclusive dealing contracts that Boeing had
completed were voided. 1 43
The Commission also imposed an elaborate series of restric-
tions on Boeing's R&D and patents. Upon request by another
commercial aircraft manufacturer, Boeing must provide "a non-
exclusive, reasonable royalty-bearing" license for any govern-
ment-funded patent that could be applied to commercial jet air-
craft. 0 4 4 Under the same conditions, Boeing must license any
"blocking patent" to any other aircraft manufacturer that agrees
to cross-license its blocking patents to Boeing. 10 45 To aid in ver-
ification of this, for a ten-year period Boeing must supply the
136 Commission Decision 97/816/EC, (106), 1997 0J. (L 336) 16, 35.
1037 Id.
1038 Id. at 36.
1039 Id. at 36-37.
1040 Id.
1041 Commission Decision 97/816/EC, (115), 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16, 36-37.
1042 Id. at 37.
1043 Id.
1044 Id. ("government-funded" means any patent obtained by Boeing in the
process of performing its duties under a contract with the US government).
1045 Id.
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Commission with an annual report of its unexpired government-
funded patents." 4" Also for the next ten years, Boeing must give
an annual report to the Commission detailing all of its nonclassi-
fled government-sponsored R&D, including a description of any
patents or technologies generated by the research that could
have commercial applications.' 4 7
To make certain that Boeing did not exploit its dominant po-
sition vis-a'-vis suppliers, it had to assure the Commission that it
would "not exert or attempt to exert undue or improper influ-
ence . . . by promising an increase in supplies or subcontracted
R&D activities, threatening to decrease supplies or subcon-
tracted R&D activities, or leveraging in any other way its own
supply relationships... "1048 However, the Commission did per-
mit Boeing to retain its ability to choose its own suppliers and to
enforce its contracts with those suppliers.10 49
In its final conclusion, the Commission effectively admitted
that it would have liked to have seen MDC remain a competitor
or, failing that, be purchased by somebody other than Boe-
ing. 11 51 However, as that was not possible, the Commission felt
that the conditions it imposed were a satisfactory alternative in
that "they adequately address[ed] the competition problems
identified... 15 1 Thus, the Commission approved the concen-
tration, subject to the above conditions and with the require-
ment that Boeing allow a Commission-appointed expert
investigator to examine the undertaking periodically to verify
compliance with all the terms of the decision.1 0 52
c. Regulation 1310/97
As the Boeing-MDC decision was winding its way through the
Commission's decision process, the Council was preparing to
make several significant changes to the merger regulation. The
Council had determined that the minimum turnover required
to trigger the Commission's investigative authority under Regu-
lation 4064/89 was too high; many concentrations which would
have best been handled by the Commission were instead being
left at the mercy of multiple Member States' competition au-
1046 Commission Decision 97/816/EC, (117), 1997 OJ. (L 336) 16, 37.
1047 Id.
1048 Id. at 38.
1049 Id.
I-)o Id. at 39.
10511 Commission Decision 97/816/EC, (123), 1997 OJ. (L 336) 16, 39.
1052 Id.
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thorities."1 ' 3 To rectify this and several other problems, the
Council passed Regulation 1310/97 in July 1997, although the
changes did not go into effect until the following March. 54
The most significant change for the air transportation indus-
try came in a supplement to the standards for assessing whether
a concentration was sufficiently large to come under the Com-
mission's purview. Under Regulation 1310/97, concentrations
that have a minimum aggregate worldwide turnover of 2.5 bil-
lion Euros, and where there is at least 100 million Euros turno-
ver in at least three Member States, now are considered to
possess a Union dimension provided that they meet certain ad-
ditional criteria.1155 Additional criteria require that in each of at
least three Member States, the turnover of each of at least two of
the undertakings concerned must be more than 25 million Eu-
ros and the aggregate Union-wide turnover of each of at least
two of the undertakings concerned must be greater than 100
million Euros.10 56 These reduced levels clearly bring the major-
ity of possible air carrier concentrations within the Commis-
sion's jurisdiction, with only concentrations between value
carriers likely being small enough to remain outside of it.
With respect to joint ventures, Regulation 1310/97 made
clear what Regulation 4064/89 had merely implied-joint ven-
tures where the parties remain independent are still subject to
review under the competition rules. 1115 7 The regulation also pro-
vided guidelines for such an analysis, stating that the Commis-
sion should particularly consider whether the parent
undertakings would remain in competition with the joint ven-
ture, either in the same market or related markets, and whether
the joint venture would have the possibility of "eliminating com-
petition in respect of a substantial part of the products or ser-
vices in question." 1058
The remainder of the Regulation 1310/97 amendments have
few direct consequences for air transportation, as they concern
other industries (such as the formula for calculating turnover
for financial institutions) 1151 or are clarifications that do not oth-
1053 Council Regulation 1310/97, pmbl. (1), 1997 O.J. (L 180) 1, 1.
1054 Id. at 6.
1055 Id. at 2-3.
1056 Id.
1057 Id. at 3.
1058 Council Regulation 1310/97, art. 1(2) - (3), 1997 O.J. (L 180) 1, 3.
1059 Id.
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erwise alter the substantive nature of the regulation.1 6" How-
ever, there is one procedural change of note, which likely
resulted from the Boeing-MDC case. Under Article 7(1) of Reg-
ulation 4064/89, a concentration could not be put into effect
before notification was given to the Commission or for three
weeks thereafter. Regulation 1310/97 has changed this so that
now a concentration cannot be effected until the Commission
renders a decision on its compatibility with the common mar-
ket.""6 The only exception to this is where the Commission spe-
cifically grants a "presumption" of compatibility, which will allow
the concentration to be put into effect until such time as the
Commission gives its final decision.1°62 This change would ap-
pear to be at least partially a byproduct of the EU's disgust with
Boeing's manipulation of MDC's customers during the time the
Commission was investigating the concentration.
I. STATE AID
The subsidization of the European transportation sector long
predates the aviation industry,' 6 3 but few industries have re-
ceived such vast quantities of state support relative to their share
of national GDP. "' 4 Thus, the governing bodies of the EC/EU
were reluctant to formally address the issue, despite already hav-
ing the authority under the Treaty of Rome to do so.10 65 It was
not until after the passage of the Third Package that the Com-
mission finally decided to take up the subject of state aid, on the
grounds that state aid was more of a danger to the market now
that it had been liberalized.'0 66
1. Comit6 Recommendations
In the summer of 1993, the Commission directed the Comit6
des Sages to analyze the condition of the EU's air transportation
industry and to make recommendations on future Union pol-
()';() Id. at 5.
106 Id. at 4.
1062 Id.
106 FREDERIC BAsTIAT, ECONOMIC SOPHISMS 189-92 (Arthur Goddard trans.,
The Foundation for Economic Education 1996) (1848).
101 ' Carole A. Shifrin, Market Rigors Squeeze Eurovpean Flag Carriers, Av. WK. &
SPACE TECH., Mar. 14, 1994, at 64.
1065 TREA'IY OF ROME, supra note 34, at arts. 92, 93.
-- 3 Commission Paper, 350/07, 1.1(1), 1994 O.J. (C 350) 5 [hereinafter COM-
MISSION PAPER].
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icy. 10 67 The Comit6 completed its report in February 1994, of-
fering three principal recommendations. l0 68 The first was that
state aid to air carriers or ground handling services should be
disapproved if it would be "incompatible with normal commer-
cial practices."'' 1 69 Second, the Commission should "strictly en-
force" those parts of the Treaty of Rome that govern state aid
and it should release guidelines for evaluating any exceptional
state aid.10 7' Finally, the Comit6 recommended that for "a brief
period," the Commission should consider approving state aid
where the aid "serves the Community's interest" in restructuring
a carrier so it can be commercially viable.'10 7
The Comit6 also provided seven suggested conditions for
such reorganizational aid: (i) the aid must be made on a "one
time, last time" basis, 1 72 (ii) the carrier and Member State must
submit a restructuring plan designed to lead to commercial via-
bility within a specified time frame and must ultimately lead to
privatization, 17 1 (iii) the feasibility of the restructuring plan
must be determined by independent examiners selected by the
Commission," 74 (iv) the Member State concerned must refrain
from interfering with the carrier's operations,"' 75 (v) the carrier
may not use state aid to increase its total capacity,10 71 (vi) there
must be "acceptable proof' that other carriers' commercial in-
terests are not damaged by the aid,"17 7 and (vii) the restructur-
ing plan must be monitored, preferably by independent experts,
to verify that it complies with the above terms. 11
78
The Commission agreed with most of the Comit6's recom-
mendations, but it did reject two key provisions. It was the Com-
mission's opinion that it could not, under the Treaty of Rome,
absolutely refuse a Member State the right to grant aid to a car-
rier multiple times."' 79 Furthermore, the Treaty of Rome would
also prohibit the Commission from compelling a Member State









1076 COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 1066, at 6.
1077 Id.
1178 Id.
1079) Id at 6-7
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to privatize a carrier.""" However, the Commission stated that it
would take such factors into consideration in deciding whether
to permit state aid to carriers.l"08
2. Commission Paper on State Aid
Having reviewed the Comit6s recommendations, the Com-
mission then turned to laying out its own guidelines on the sub-
ject of state aid. Aside from carriers themselves, the guidelines
apply to any operations that are "accessory to air transport,"
such as flight schools, duty free shops, and airport facilities, and
will apply to either direct or indirect subsidization. 10 8 2 Aircraft
manufacturing is beyond the scope of the guidelines, but aid
granted for the purchase of aircraft is included.0 83 The guide-
lines also only apply to Member States, but if a third country is
heavily subsidizing a carrier, it may be dealt with under the EU's
"anti-dumping" regulations. l18 4 The construction or enlarge-
ment of infrastructure like airports is beyond the scope of the
guidelines,' 85 but granting preferential access to infrastructures
for particular carriers could be considered aid.10 6 Aid defined
as "social aid" may or may not be covered by the guidelines, de-
pending on the effect of the aid.1 87 If the social aid gives a
carrier a competitive advantage, for example by lowering its
costs, then it would fall within the scope of the guidelines. l 8 8
a. Direct Operational Subsidies
The Commission strongly opposed direct operational subsidi-
zation of air routes, stating that such aid is "not compatible with
the common market."""' Although subsidization may be neces-
sary to encourage development of "disadvantaged areas," the
Commission was concerned that the subsidies given for opera-
tion of such -routes would be covertly used to subsidize other
competitive routes."') Accordingly, the Commission deter-
I, d.
l COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 1066, at 6-7.




1086 COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 1066, at 8.
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1088 Id.
1089 Id. at 9.
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mined that direct operational subsidies would only be accept-
able in two circumstances.
The first is where a public service obligation has been im-
posed on a carrier. 09 1 In such a case, a Member State may reim-
burse the carrier for any loss sustained in the process of
operating the route. 119 2 However, the carrier must clearly ac-
count for its costs in the operation of the route and the Member
State may not overcompensate the carrier. 1093 To be considered
a true public service obligation route, the right to operate the
route has to have been made open to public bids. 1094 The recip-
ient of the route should ordinarily be the lowest bidder, and if
not, the Member State should be prepared to explain its selec-
tion to the Commission. 10 9 5
The other case where direct operational subsidies would be
permitted is where they are used for "social aid," particularly for
the benefit of individual consumers rather than suppliers, as
provided for by Article 92(2) (a) of the Treaty of Rome.' 1 96 As
applied to air travel, "social aid" would most likely mean aid in-
tended to assist certain categories of passengers in obtaining
flights. 0°97 The aid must be granted without discrimination as to
the origin of the service, so the aid would have to be granted to
all Community carriers and European Economic Area (EEA)
carriers transporting those varieties of passengers. 09
b. Evaluating Other Forms of State Aid
The Commission next established the method by which it
would evaluate various types of state aid other than direct opera-
tional subsidies. A two-tier test is to be used for such evalua-
tions. The first tier is generally known as the "Market Economy
Investor Principle" (MEIP), meaning that the aid will be ex-
amined to determine if a private investor would make the same
sort investment in the carrier. 1' 9 9 If the aid fails this first tier,
then it will be examined under the second tier, which will con-
sider whether the aid is "compatible with the common market"
1091 COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 1066, at 9.
1092 Id. at 9-10.
1093 Id. at 10.
1094 Id.
1095 Id. at 10-11.
1096 COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 1066, at 11.
1097 Id.
1098 Id.
1099 Id. at 12.
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under the derogations of Article 92(3) of the Treaty of
Rome.1 00 With respect to the MEIP, the Commission observed
that it did not require the restructuring plan to assure profitabil-
ity "beyond all reasonable doubt;" it need only be "reasonably
certain" that a private investor would find the plan
satisfactory.""0o
There are three major types of possible state aid other than
direct operational subsidies identified by the Commission. The
first is capital injection. Capital injections are not considered
state aid when the public holding in a company is increased,
provided that the capital injection is proportional to the share
of capital owned by the Member State and that it is done in
conjunction with a capital injection from a private shareholder
of "real economic significance."' 1102 The MEIP will be satisfied if
the future prospects for the company are such that the cost of
the injection would be recouped through dividends or capital
appreciation within a "reasonable period."1103 The Commission
noted that a private investor would normally provide financing
if the present value of future returns exceeded the present out-
lay." 04 Therefore, to determine whether the circumstances are
appropriate, the Commission will examine, among other fac-
tors, a carrier's debt/equity ratio, cash flow, operating costs, la-
bor productivity, fleet condition, and commercial strategy along
with the "general economic environment of the airline indus-
try."' 05 Where a carrier is actively losing money, a coherent re-
structuring program to restore profitability must be offered."10 6
The second possible type of state aid other than direct subsidi-
zation is loan financing. The MEIP will be applied to assess
whether the loan is being made on regular commercial terms
and whether such a loan could have been procured from a pri-
vate bank.'""7 The Commission will consider both the level of
the interest rate and what collateral is required, as well as the
financial position of the company at the time the loan is
made.'"" The difference between the terms of the State-pro-
I I() [d.
1l COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 1066, at 12.
1102 Id.
1103 Id. at 12-13.
1 10,1 Id.
111.5 Id. at 13-14.
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vided loan and a private loan will be deemed aid.1 °9 If no col-
lateral is required by the Member State in a situation where a
private investor would have demanded it, then the entire value
of the loan is considered equivalent to a grant." 10
Finally, there are loan guarantees. The Commission will per-
mit such guarantees only where they are contractually bound to
specific conditions for the carrier's operation. 1 " The aid ele-
ment of a guarantee is the difference between the rate the car-
rier would have had to pay to obtain such a loan independently
and the rate the carrier must pay for the guaranteed loan. 12 If
a carrier's legal status is such that it cannot go bankrupt, or
where the Member State that owns it has taken on the burden of
unlimited liability for its losses, then the carrier is considered to
be permanently under a loan guarantee for these purposes.""
c. Exemptions
Where it has been determined that a carrier is receiving state
aid through one of the above methods, the Commission will ex-
amine whether an exemption may exist under Article 92(3) of
the Treaty of Rome.11 4 The first exemption is for regional aid,
under Article 92(3) (a) and (c), which permits state aid to un-
dertakings investing in "disadvantaged areas," as defined by
Commission Communication O.J. No. C 212 of August 12,
1988.11 5 The second exemption under Article 92(3)(c) is for
aid which "facilitates the development of certain economic activ-
ities ... of particular interest."'' "" In the context of the aviation
industry, this usually will mean aid for corporate reorganization
or for social purposes such as "facilitating the adaptation of the
work force to a higher level of productivity. "1117 However, such
aid must be accompanied by a comprehensive restructuring
plan to restore the carrier's commercial viability,1" 8 and it must
be "self-contained" (i.e., a one-time delivery of aid without ex-
pectation of future assistance). 19 The Commission will only
1109 Id.
iii0 Id.
111 COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 1066, at 14.
1112 Id.
1113 Id.
1114 Id. at 15.
1115 Id.
III" COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 1066, at 15.
"11 Id. at 15-17
1118 Id. at 15-16.
1119 Id. at 16.
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permit additional aid "under exceptional circumstances, unfore-
seeable and external to the company."' 1 20 The progress of the
restructuring plan will be subject to verification by the Commis-
sion, particularly those parts of it that the Commission de-
manded be included as conditions for its approval." 2 l
d. Privatization
The guidelines also address the role of state aid in the context
of privatization. Aid is not considered to exist if the undertak-
ing is disposed by way of "an unconditional public invitation" to
bid on transparent and nondiscriminatory terms, the undertak-
ing is sold to the highest bidder, and the bidders were given a
"sufficient period" in which to prepare their offer. 1122 However,
there is a presumption that a sale includes aid if the sale is made
in a restricted manner or directly to a buyer, if the undertak-
ing's debts are cancelled or capitalized, and/or if the conditions
of the sale would not be acceptable under the MEIP. 1 23 If the
sale is made in a manner that presumes aid, the undertaking
must be valued by an independent expert, and the amount of
aid will be the difference between the undertaking's market
value and what it would be sold for, although the Article 92(3)
exemptions may apply." 124
e. Exclusive Rights
According to the guidelines, the granting of exclusive rights
for activities that are accessory to air transport can also be a
form of aid. If a Member State grants an exclusive concession to
a carrier at a price below what that concession would have cost
on the open market, then that difference is considered to be
state aid." 125 Furthermore, if the concession is put up for open
bid and a carrier other than the lowest bidder is selected by the
Member State, that choice may be subject to review by the
Commission. 1126
1120 Id.
1121 COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 1066, at 17.
1122 Id. at 17-18.
1123 Id. at 18.
1124 Id.
1125 Id.
1126 COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 1066, at 18.
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f. Reporting State Aid
The Commission was also concerned that prior to the imple-
mentation of the guidelines, many forms of state aid were not
properly reported. Consequently, the guidelines provide a list
of actions that should be reported to the Commission.' 12 7
Funds that are provided through publicly owned undertakings
or financial institutions should be reported in the same manner
as funds provided directly by the Member State.'1 2 8
g. Accelerated Clearance
Finally, recognizing that a detailed examination of all transac-
tions falling within the scope of the guidelines was not feasible,
the Commission provided for an accelerated clearance proce-
dure in certain instances.' 12 1 Where the amount of aid given to
an undertaking is one million Euros or less over a three-year
period, and the aid is tied to "specific investment objectives,"
other than operating expenses, the Commission will render a
decision within 20 working days." 1"' As the Commission noted,
the sum is so small it does not represent a meaningful amount
of aid in so costly a field as aviation, but rather is intended to
help with regional development not otherwise covered by public
service obligations." 3'
The Commission concluded the guidelines by noting that it
would periodically update them.' 112 But since the implementa-
tion of the guidelines in 1994, they have remained un-
changed" 3 and their vitality continues, subject only to the
interpretations of the Commission in its application of them.
3. The Olympic Airways Decision
Soon after the announcement of the guidelines, the Commis-
sion was confronted with a particularly grisly state aid case.' ' 4
The Greek national carrier Olympic Airways (Olympic) had
1127 Id. at 19-20. The types of actions that should be reported include: set-offs
for operational losses, the provision of capital, nonrefundable grants or loans,
forgoing profits or the recovery of sums due, forgoing the return of public funds,
and compensation for state-imposed financial burdens.
1128 Id.
112 i. at 20.
1130 h( .
1"I COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 1066, at 20.
1132 i. at 20.
1,33 As of August 17, 2000.
113" Commission Decision 94/696/EC, 1994 OJ. (L 273) 22.
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been in deteriorating financial condition for years.' 135 Despite
holding a government-granted monopoly on all domestic sched-
uled air travel, along with ground handling and aircraft mainte-
nance at all Greek airports, by 1992 Olympic's total debt load
exceeded its assets by a ratio of almost three-to-one. 136 The car-
rier had no realistic possibility of recovery on its own, as its ex-
penditures on debt maintenance alone consumed 67% of its
annual revenue by 1993, while its passenger loads had fallen
continuously since 1988.1137 Even factoring out the cost of
maintaining its debts, Olympic was suffering losses as high as
16.7% annually on its operations account. 138 The Commission
itself stated, "This financial structure is the worst of all compara-
ble Community airlines."1139 The only way Olympic was still able
to operate was because the Greek government would guarantee
unlimited borrowing. 1 40
a. The Commission Inquiry
The full scope of this situation first came to the Commission's
attention in July 1992 when the Greek government, in response
to an inquiry by the Commission, notified it of the loan guaran-
tees it had extended to Olympic for the previous six years." 4'
For reasons that are at best unclear, no further action on the
subject occurred for an entire year, at which time the Greek gov-
ernment sent a letter to the Commission requesting recognition
of a restructuring plan for Olympic which would involve further
state aid." 142 The request claimed that the aid should be permit-
ted under Article 92(3) (b) of the Treaty of Rome, which per-
mits state aid to remedy a "serious disturbance" in a nation's
economy. 1 43 The Commission felt that the plan, as submitted,
was too vague and sent two letters to the Greek government in
August 1993 asking for further clarification.1 44
As the Greek government failed to respond to the letters by
March of the following year, the Commission published a notice




1 3- Commission Decision 94/696/EC, Sect. 1, 1994 OJ. (L 273) 22, 23.
1140 id. at 31.
1141 Id. at 24.
1142 Id.
1143 Id.
144 Commission Decision 94/696/EC, Sect. II, 1994 O.J. (L 273) 22, 25.
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in the Official Journal of the European Communities of its in-
tent to investigate Greek state aid practices and the restructur-
ing plan and it invited other parties to submit their
comments.1 45 Four Member States (Finland, Norway, Sweden
and the UK) and numerous other private parties responded to
the Commission's notice before the Greek government did."46
The private parties almost universally condemned the restruc-
turing plan, 147 while the Member States demanded that strin-
gent conditions be placed on any aid." 48 Ultimately, these
comments, combined with a further two-month delay by the
Greek government in responding to the Commission's notice,
probably did little to predispose the Commission to be sympa-
thetic to the restructuring plan when it was finally presented.
b. The State Aid Analysis
The Commission began its analysis of the restructuring plan
by noting that, under Article 92(1) of the Treaty of Rome, any
assistance given by a Member State or assistance given at the
behest of a Member State "which distorts or threatens to distort
competition" is incompatible with the common market to the
extent it affects trade between Member States and/or con-
tracting parties."" However, as the Treaty of Rome does not
prejudice the rights of publicly owned undertakings, the Com-
mission noted that it was obligated to assess any possible case of
state aid on its own merits, rather than having a per se rule
against such aid. 150 Instead, the Commission must apply the
logic of the Treaty of Rome and the MEIP in each instance, al-
though "the conduct of a private investor ... need not be the
conduct of an investor laying out capital... [for] a profit in the
relatively short term,"'1 15' but rather the conduct of an investor
"guided by prospects of profitability in the longer term."' 152
The restructuring plan contained four provisions that could
be state aid: (i) loan guarantees, (ii) debt relief, (iii) conversion
1145 Id.
1146 Id. at 26.
1147 Id. Only one party supported the restructuring plan, the bank Credit Ly-
onnais, which admitted in its comments it was concerned that its loans to
Olympic would not be repaid if the Commission refused the restructuring plan.
1148 Id. at 26. Norway and the UK took particularly strident positions on the
subject.
1149 Commission Decision 94/696/EC, Sect. VI, 1994 O.J. (L 273) 22, 30.
1150 Id.
1151 Id.
1152 Id. at 31.
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of the debt to equity, and (iv) capital injections. The Commis-
sion stated that it considered all loan guarantees extended by a
Member State to be within the terms of Article 92(1) of the
Treaty of Rome and that it had to be notified of all such guaran-
tees under Article 92(3).""5 The Greek government had failed
to notify the Commission in a timely manner of any of the loan
guarantees it had made previously; therefore, those guarantees
were provided illegally." 54 Future loan guarantees, because the
Greek government would guarantee them "indiscriminately,"
would be considered aid equal to the amount of the loan itself,
as they would be "disguised subsidies."'" 5  The Greek govern-
ment's plan to assume 427 billion Drachmas worth of Olympic's
debt (over 90% of the carrier's total debt load), without
Olympic providing anything in return, would also be considered
an equal amount of aid.'""6 While under the MEIP, it could be
possible for a conversion of debt to equity to not be considered
state aid, the complete "absence of any prospect of a return, at
any point in time, on the capital invested" meant that in the case
of Olympic this too would constitute state aid." 5 7 Finally, the
capital injections as well would be labeled state aid under the
MEIP as well, once more because there was no reasonable possi-
bility of Olympic becoming profitable.'
c. Exemptions
Having established that all of the proposed assistance to
Olympic would fall under the rubric of state aid, the Commis-
sion next turned to the possible exemptions that would permit
state aid. The Commission quickly disposed of the Article 92(2)
exemptions, noting that the aid was not of a "social character,"
was not for the repair of damage caused by a natural disaster or
"exceptional occurrences," nor were the other exemptions in
that paragraph relevant."9
Next, the Commission turned to the three Article 92(3) ex-
emptions, which were the ones the Greek government actually
1153 Id.




158 Id. at 32.
1159 Commission Decision 94/696/EC, Sect. VII, 1994 0.J. (L 273) 22, 32. The
remaining exemptions in Article 92(2) concerned aid for the former East
Germany.
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raised in its proposal. The Commission explained that aid
under those exemptions must be compatible with the common
market as a whole, rather than merely the domestic economy of
the Member State." 6 Furthermore, the exemptions may only
be applied where the Commission determines "market forces
would not have sufficed to persuade the future aid recipient" to
act in the desired manner.1 61 Article 92(3) (a), which permits
aid for development purposes, did not apply as the Greek gov-
ernment was solely offering aid to Olympic, rather than to all
carriers serving an underdeveloped area.1'1 62 The Commission
also rejected the Greek government's request for an Article
92(3) (b) exemption because that provision allows aid to rectify
"a serious disturbance" in the Member State's economy, rather
than merely assisting one undertaking."" 3 Finally the Commis-
sion turned to Article 92(3)(c), which permits aid for the re-
structuring of an undertaking. There are three criteria that
must be met to exempt aid under the Article 92(3) (c) exemp-
tion. First, the aid must be part of a Commission-approved re-
structuring plan that will help the undertaking become
profitable within a reasonable period of time. 1 64 Second, the
delivery of aid must be transparent and verifiable." 65 Lastly, the
aid may not "shift the Member State's problems onto the rest of
the Community."' 166
As Article 92(3) (c) was obviously the only possible basis for
granting an exemption, the Commission focused its attention
on whether the Greek government's restructuring plan met the
necessary criteria. To ascertain whether a restructuring plan
could restore an undertaking's profitability, the Commission
stated it must be determined that the aid component is suffi-
cient to meet the undertaking's needs under the plan, and that
the assumptions of the plan are reasonable.' 161 In the case of
Olympic, the debt relief and debt conversion, combined with
the capital injections, would, within three years, reduce the car-
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Theoretically this would produce a sharp enough decline in
Olympic's finance costs to allow the carrier to break out of the
debt spiral in which it had found itself."69 Furthermore, the
traffic projections used in the plan were more conservative than
the projections of AEA and IATA for the same period," 170 so the
Commission did not consider them to be unreasonably optimis-
tic.I17' Olympic also had already initiated measures that would
significantly lower its operating costs over the following years,' 172
and, combined with the debt restructuring, would "create an op-
eration of lasting viability within three years without receiving
further aid." '17
The Commission quickly determined that the restructuring
plan and aid met the requirement of transparency and ver-
ifiability. Since that May, the Greek government had supplied
all requested information and offered to provide follow-up re-
ports on the progress of the restructuring.' 17' Additionally, the
Greek government agreed to permit the Commission to appoint
an independent investigator to verify compliance with the terms
of the restructuring plan." 7 5 Finally, the Commission con-
cluded that the restructuring plan would not shift the burdens
of the Greek government and Olympic to the rest of the Com-
munity. The plan would not lead to an "over-capitalization" of
the carrier that would "give it privileged access to the capital
market," nor would the plan increase Olympic's overall capacity,
and Olympic guaranteed that it would not acquire any holdings
in other carriers.'
1 76
d. Conditions Imposed on the Restructuring Plan
Having established to its satisfaction that the criteria for grant-
ing an Article 92(3) (c) exemption existed, the Commission ap-
proved the Greek government's restructuring plan and all of the
aid components within it. 1 17 7 However, approval was not with-
out its costs, for the Commission attached twenty-one distinct
conditions for granting its acceptance to the restructuring
1169 Commission Decision 94/696/EC, Sect. VII, 1994 O.J. (L 273) 22, 33.
1170 Id. at 27.
1171 Id. at 34.
1172 1d.
1173 Id.
1174 Commission Decision 94/696/EC, Sect. VII, 1994 OJ. (L 273) 22, 34.
1175 Id.
i 176 Id.
1177 Id. at 35.
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plan. 1 78 Many of the conditions were relatively specific to the
terms of the plan (such as the need to submit progress re-
ports), 179 but several major concessions were also among them.
The Commission demanded that the Greek government repeal
by December 31, 1994 the law that permitted it to guarantee
unlimited quantities of borrowing to Olympic. I"' Olympic's le-
gal status had to be made equivalent to any other Greek under-
taking, except for specific tax exemptions related to the
restructuring plan. 181 Most importantly, Greek aviation law was
to be brought into compliance with the terms of the Third Pack-
age by December 31, 1994, as well.' 1 2
This last condition, combined with many of the Commission's
own comments and displays of logic in its decision, betrays its
real interests in the application of the state aid sections of the
Treaty of Rome. For example, there is a peculiar discrepancy in
the Commission's analysis of the proposed aid for Olympic. The
Commission observed that there was "no doubt ... about the
absence of any prospect of a return, at any point in time, on the
capital invested," and therefore under the MEIP no private in-
vestor would choose to provide Olympic with funding."8 3 How-
ever, the Commission later stated that under the restructuring
plan Olympic would achieve "lasting viability within three years
without receiving any further aid."'1 84 Given that the Commis-
sion explicitly stated that the MEIP is not predicated on purely
short-term profitability, but extends to the long-term as well,' , "
it seems peculiar that the restructuring program would not have
qualified under it. The most plausible explanation for this dis-
crepancy is that the Commission wished to be able to sculpt
Greek transportation policy. But if the restructuring plan ful-
filled the MEIP, then the Greek government would have been
able implement it without the Commission's oversight.
This theory of the Commission's motivation in treating the
restructuring plan as state aid, yet still approving it, is further
supported by many of the Commission's statements during its
1178 Id. at 36-37.





1183 Id. at 31.
1184 Commission Decision 94/696/EC, Sect. VII, 1994 OJ. (L 273) 22, 34.
1185 Id. at 31.
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discussion of the criteria for granting an Article 92(3) (c) ex-
emption. The Commission observed that the Greek govern-
ment's offer to implement the provisions of the Third Package
(particularly 2408/92) showed the government's "desire to
place [Olympic] in a truly competitive environment."' 18 While
this may have been commendable, none of the criteria the Com-
mission had articulated required such an action. 187 The same
was true of the Greek government's proposal to repeal its loan
guarantee law and to liberalize ground handling." '88 Finally,
while the Commission's statement that all such aid must be eval-
uated on an individual basis'"8" appears to be the height of fair-
ness, it also effectively permits the Commission to invent new
terms and criteria for permitting aid.' I" This all seems to sup-
port the theory that the Commission considers the state aid pro-
visions to be a tool for promoting liberalization, rather than as
an end in themselves, a theory born out by later state aid
cases." 9 ' Indeed, in 1998, nine air carriers brought a suit in the
European Court of Justice against the Commission for failing
properly to apply the state aid provisions in assessing a proposed
capital increase for Air France.' 192 The Court concluded that
the Commission used "insufficient reasoning" in permitting
some actions on Air France's behalf and therefore annulled the
Commission's decision. "'" Whether the Court's ruling will lead
the Commission to a more strict interpretation and application
of the state aid provisions is yet to be clear.'"'
1 -8 Id. at 34.
1187 Id,
1188 (i
1189 Commission Decision 94/696/EC, Sect. VI, 1994 OJ. (L 273) 22, 30.
11 It should be noted that in its decision the Commission made only one
specific reference to the state aid guidelines it had just articulated, in the context
of defining the MEIP in Sect. VI.
M" See Commission Decision 94/698/EC, 1994 Oj. (L 279) 29 (permitting
Portuguese state aid conditional on application of 2408/92); Commission Deci-
sion 97/789/EC, 1997 OJ. (L 322) 44 (permitting Italian state aid conditional on
cessation of preferential traffic rights, slot allocation, and ground handling for
Alitalia).
92 Joined Cases T-371 & T-394/94, British Airways PLC and Others v.
Comm'n of the EC, 1998 E.CJ. CELEX LEXIS 5043 (1998).
1193 Id.
1194 As a postscript to the Olympic case, it was later found that the Greek gov-
ernment failed to comply with many of the conditions of the initial decision,
leading to another Commission decision that largely reiterated the original
terms. See Commission Decision 1999/332/EC, 1999 OJ. (L 128) 1.
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J. REGULATION OF NON-ECONOMIC ISSUES
As the Commission and Council have progressively eliminated
the major obstacles to air transport in the EU, they have increas-
ingly turned their attention to other related areas, ranging from
the congested state of airports in the Union to the compensa-
tion of passengers who are refused seats on overbooked flights.
Most of these reforms are targeted at improving the condition
of air passengers.
1. Air Traffic Congestion
Historically, air traffic control has been the strict province of
national governments.11 ' 5 However, given the congested nature
of European airspace, it became apparent by the late 1950s that
some sort of transnational air traffic system had to be arranged.
This consensus led to the formation of EUROCONTROL in
1961, which, while independent of the EU, includes all of the
Member States and membership in it is mandatory for admis-
sion to the EU.'196 The purpose of EUROCONTROL was to or-
ganize cooperation between its members' respective air traffic
control systems.' 17
While EUROCONTROL was initially hailed as a triumph of
international cooperation, by the 1990s its performance was less
than satisfactory. One-third of all flights experienced delays,
with an average delay of 20 minutes, and delays of several hours
being not uncommon during peak traffic periods." 9 Half of
these delays were directly attributable to air traffic congestion,
causing an estimated loss of five billion euros annually. 1 9
This less than satisfactory situation prompted the Council, in
June 1999, to request that the Commission investigate the condi-
tion of air traffic congestion in the Union and present a commu-
nication on what steps were being taken to improve the
situation. 200 The Commission reported back six months later,
stating that although EUROCONTROL had formulated a 15-
year plan for reducing congestion, "it is doubtful whether this
initiative ... is the right response if major structural reforms are
1195 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament, EUR. PARL. Doc. COM(99) (614 final 2), Introduction (4) [hereinaf-
ter COMMUNICATION FROM COMMISSION].
1196 d.
1197 Id.
1198 Id. at Introduction (1).
199 d.
1200 COMMUNIcATION FROM COMMISSION, supra note 1195, at Introduction (6).
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not made both at national and at European levels."'' The
Commission hastened to point out that the recommendations it
made were not intended to undermine EUROCONTROL, but
should be viewed as part of "the will of the Commission to high-
light the complementarity of the Community's political goals
and the specific responsibilities of EUROCONTROL."' 120 2
The Commission brought forward several proposals for im-
proving air traffic flow. It suggested that in the short-term
EUROCONTROL should devise contingency plans to deal with
"crises due to unforeseen events," such as strikes or severe
weather, and make provisions for rerouting traffic around the
affected area." 1 For the long term, the Commission advocated
the adoption of a "Single Sky policy," which would dissociate air
traffic control from national governments and vest more author-
ity in a European-wide system. 120 4 Under the aegis of the Single
Sky policy, traffic corridors and sectors would be established
without regard to national boundaries, while civil and military
traffic zones would be reorganized as well. 120 5 New regulations
standardizing air traffic control systems and procedures in Mem-
ber States would also be used to further promote uniformity
among the EUROCONTROL members. 120 6
Since the Commission's report there has been little advance-
ment in the development of a true Single Sky.1207 However,
Transport Commissioner Loyola de Palacio appears determined
to make the subject the focus of her term in office, calling the
present air traffic situation "catastrophic."'120  De Palacio has
gone so far as to personally meet with striking air traffic control-
lers to assure them that the Single Sky policy would not cost
them their jobs. "" Yet Europe's air traffic control unions re-
main tropismatically suspicious that the Single Sky policy is a
covert attempt to privatize air traffic control, despite de Pala-
cio's repeated assurances that it is not.1211° If de Palacio is able to
1201 Id.
02 Id. at 1I( 1).
1203 Id. at 1(8).
1204 Id. at 11(12) - (13).
1205 COMMUNICATION FROM COMMISSION, supra note 1195, at 11(13).
12061 Id. at 11(16).
1207 Ministers Welcome Single Sky Initiative, ATC MKT. REP. 1, at 1 (Feb. 3, 2000).
1208 Simon Warburton, De Palacio Offers to Meet French Controllers, AIR TRANSP.
INTELLIGENCE, JUly 12, 2000.
120(1 Id.
1210 De Palacio Slams 'Disinformation, Manipulation' by French ATC Strikers, AVIA-
TION DAILY, Jun. 27, 2000, at 1.
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overcome this opposition, the future looks bright for the Single
Sky, as the Member States almost unanimously support such a
change. 1211
2. Noise Limitations
Unlike North America, where airports are normally con-
structed on the periphery of urban areas, European airports are
usually surrounded by dense population concentrations.1 2 1 2 It
comes as no surprise then that the EC/EU has been among the
world's leaders in efforts to restrict noise emissions from avia-
tion. 12 13 However this leadership has often drawn criticism from
nations outside the Union, which view the noise limitations as
being used to restrict market access for non-Union carriers and
to protect European aircraft manufacturers. Yet the EC/EU has
soldiered on with its attempts to reduce noise pollution. The
Council's most recent action on the subject has proven to be its
most controversial yet, prompting a series of threats from the
United States, whose carriers, aircraft manufacturers, and air-
craft reconditioning firms stand to lose considerable sums of
money. 12 1 4
The regulation in question is Regulation 925/1999, which es-
tablishes significantly more stringent standards for noise emis-
sions than the current ICAO convention demands.1 21 5 A full
understanding of the regulation would require an elaborate ex-
planation of the technical aspects of ICAO noise emission stan-
dards.12 16 Suffice it to say that aircraft are divided into four
categories termed Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4, after the relevant
chapters of Volume I, Part II of Annex 16 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, third edition. 1217 Chapters 3 and 4
set considerably higher standards for reducing aircraft noise
than Chapters 1 and 2.1218 Most Member States independently
1211 Simon Warburton, EC Ministers to Discuss Worsening ATC Delays, AIR TRANSP.
INTELLIGENCE, Jan. 4, 2000.
1212 Benedicte A. Claes, Aircraft Noise Regulation in the European Union: The
Hushkit Problem, 65 J. AIR L. & CoM. 329, 341 (2000).
1213 Id. at 342.
1214 Id. at 346-47. It has been estimated that within a year of the regulation's
enactment US firms lost $2.1 billion in cancelled orders for hushkits, spare parts,
accelerated air fleet depreciation, etc.
1215 Council Regulation 925/1999, 1999 0.J. (L 115) 1.
1216 See Claes, supra note 1212, at 329 for a detailed discussion of how aircraft
noise is measured and classified under the ICAO's standards.
1217 Council Regulation 925/1999, pmbl. 5, 1999 0.J. (L 115) 1, 1.
1218 Claes, supra note 1212, at 339-40.
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banned Chapter 1 aircraft in 1988, 12 11 while the Council banned
Chapter 2 aircraft in 1990.122o However, nothing in these earlier
efforts at limiting aircraft noise prevented a carrier from recon-
ditioning its aircraft or changing their operating profile and
then having them "recertificated" as meeting the standards of
Chapters 3 or 4.1221 As a result, many carriers took these less
expensive options rather than scraping their noncompliant
aircraft.
The EU was displeased by these less-than-absolute measures,
for while the reconditioned aircraft did meet the Chapter 3 stan-
dards, they were still not as quiet as newer aircraft specifically
manufactured to meet those standards. 1222 Therefore, Regula-
tion 925/1999 was drafted with a particular eye towards closing
this loophole. The regulation sets a baseline for evaluating air-
craft by defining a "civil subsonic jet aeroplane" as one with a
maximum take-off weight of 34,000 Kilograms or with 19 or
more passenger seats, and with an engine "bypass ratio" of more
than three-to-one. 1223  The bypass ratio is the volume of air
drawn into the engine compared to the volume of air actually
used in the fuel burning process. 1224 (This technical detail has
become the focus of the EU-U.S. dispute.) The regulation de-
fines "recertificated civil subsonic jet aeroplane" as those meet-
ing the size requirements laid out above, but which were initially
designed to meet Chapters 1 or 2 noise restrictions and have
subsequently been reconditioned or placed under operational
restrictions in order to comply with Chapter 3 limits.1 22 5 How-
ever, if an aircraft has been "re-engined" and its new engines
1219 Id. at 339. Chapter 1 includes such aircraft as the Boeing 707, the Hawker
Siddeley Trident, and the Arospatiale Caravelle.
122 Council Directive 89/629/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 363) 27. Chapter 2 includes
the Boeing 727, early models of the Boeing 737, and early models of the McDon-
nell Douglas DC-9.
122 Reconditioning is done in one of two ways. The aircraft's existing engines
may be modified through the use of a "hushkit," or, in a process called "re-engin-
ing" the engines may be entirely stripped and replaced with engines having a
higher rating. Changing an aircraft's operating profile means altering the way
the aircraft is operated, such as not loading it to full capacity, flying only to air-
ports at particular elevations, flying only during certain times of day, etc.
1222 Council Regulation 925/1999, pmbl. (5), 1999 0.J. (L 115) 1, 1.
1223 Id. at 2. Please note that there is an error in the text of the regulation as
published, which states that the aircraft must have a bypass ratio of less than
three, however a full reading of the regulation and other relevant sources makes
clear that it must be greater than three.
1224 Claes, supra note 1212, at 331.
225 Council Regulation 925/1999, art. 2(2), 1999 0. (L 115) 1, 2.
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meet the three-to-one bypass ratio it will not be considered as
being recertificated, but will instead be treated like an aircraft
that was initially designed to meet Chapter 3 standards. 26
The regulation barred Member States from registering recer-
tificated aircraft after April 1, 1999, although recertificated air-
craft registered as of that date would not be stripped of their
registration provided that they have remained continuously reg-
istered in a Member State. 1227 Recertificated aircraft that are
registered in a Member State may not be operated within the
Union as of April 1, 2002, unless it has operated in the Union
prior to April 1, 1999.1228 Furthermore, as of April 1, 2002,
recertificated aircraft registered outside the EU would not be
permitted to fly to airports in the Union unless they had been
on the register of their home country as of April 1, 1999, and
had operated in the Union between April 1, 1995, and April 1,
1999.1229 There are certain exemptions, however, which Mem-
ber States may grant, including for emergencies and other con-
ditions of "an exceptional nature," as well as for aircraft that
operate exclusively outside of the Union's territory. 1231 The reg-
ulation also does not apply to the overseas possessions of the
Member States. 123 1
The dispute between the EU and the U.S. arises principally
from Regulation 925/1999's use of an aircraft's engine bypass
ratio to evaluate its noise emission status rather than directly im-
posing a standard of how much noise an aircraft can emit. The
EU has argued that the engine bypass ratio is a good measure of
how noisy an aircraft is and that it is less subjective than setting a
specific decibel level, as decibel levels can vary according to envi-
ronmental conditions. 1232 The U.S. has countered by pointing
out that there are aircraft models with bypass ratios less than
that prescribed by the regulation which have lower noise emis-
sions than aircraft that are capable of meeting the regulation's
standards. 1233 The issue of protectionism for European manu-
1226 Id.
1227 Id. at 3.
1228 Id.
1229 Id. The date requirements in Article 3(3) appear to be designed to pre-
vent carriers whose home territories are far from the Union from transferring
older short-range aircraft, which would not have been able to reach the Union
ordinarily, to carriers based on the Union's periphery.
1230 Council Regulation 925/1999, art. 4(1)-(2), 1999 O.J. (L 115) 1, 3.
1231 Id.
1232 Tom Gill, Europe Breaks Rank on Noise, AIRLINE Bus., Apr. 1999, at 32.
1233 Claes, supra note 1212, at 369.
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facturers has also been raised by the U.S., as U.S.-based corpora-
tions are the sole suppliers of hushkits and many of the engine
models produced by American manufacturer Pratt & Whitney
do not meet the bypass ratio requirement.
123 4
The EU agreed to delay implementation of Regulation 925/
1999 by one year to permit U.S. carriers an opportunity to elimi-
nate more of their noncompliant aircraft through attrition or
advanced re-engining rather than scrapping them. 1235 Yet this
will likely not forestall the U.S. government from taking some
form of retaliatory action, either unilaterally or multilaterally
through the ICAO and/or the WTO. The United States has
chosen to resist the Union over such a seemingly minor issue
because it is widely believed in the aviation community that Reg-
ulation 925/1999 represents a first step towards banning all
Chapter 3 aircraft, 123 6 which would encompass a majority of the
fleets of U.S. carriers. The EU has done nothing to assuage the
fears of U.S. carriers or manufacturers, but rather has been
pressing for revising the Convention on International Civil Avia-
tion to increase the stringency of noise limitation standards. 12 37
Thus, it appears likely that the subject of noise limitations will
remain a bone of contention between the EU and The U.S. for a
number of years to come.
3. Air Carrier Liability
Another area where the EU has recently shown dissatisfaction
with the global aviation community's standards is in the realm of
air carriers' liability for accidents. The Warsaw Convention of
1929 governs the policies concerning liability for accidents in
international air travel absent any countervailing national
laws. 23" The Warsaw Convention was to bring uniformity to air
carrier liability; but as its last fully ratified amendment was made
in 1961 a preponderance of national laws and regulations has
sprung up to replace it. '2 39 The EU recognized that it was desir-
able, both for passengers and carriers, to have consistent liability
1234 Gill, supra note 1232, at 32.
1235 Colin Baker, The Next Chapter, AIRLINE Bus., Mar. 2000, at 54.
1236 Id. at 55-56.
1237 Id.
1238 Council Regulation 2027/97, pmbl., 1997 OJ. (L 285) 1.
123, Id. In May 1999 the Warsaw Convention was finally amended to increase
the liability ceilings on carriers to levels more in line with current price levels,
however this amendment has not been ratified by all nations, so in many coun-
tries the 1961 liability ceilings still apply.
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policies throughout the union, and to that end the Council
adopted Regulation 2027/97 in October 1997. 1240
Regulation 2027/97, which applies whenever a passenger is
killed or injured on board an aircraft while it is in flight, em-
barking, or disembarking, 124 is a peculiar mix of pro-plaintiff
and pro-defendant policies. Article 3 of the regulation provides
that the liability of a carrier is not subject to any limit defined by
law, convention, or contract. 242 Furthermore, up to a level of
100,000 SDRs (Special Drawing Rights, the "currency" of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund which is used in IATA calculations),
a strict-liability regime applies. 243 In other words, a carrier can-
not defend itself by showing that it has taken all necessary safety
precautions, nor can it claim that it was impossible to have done
anything to avoid the loss. However, despite the strict liability
regime, contributory negligence still applies, so if the injured or
deceased passenger caused, or contributed to, the damage, the
carrier may be partly or wholly exempted from liability. 1244
The regulation also describes the assistance the carrier must
render in the event of an accident. Within fifteen days of identi-
fying the dead or injured passenger, the carrier has to provide
such money "as may be required to meet immediate economic
needs," proportional to the damage suffered. 2 45 Yet in the
event of death, the advance payment cannot be less than 15,000
SDRs per passenger. 1246 Any advance payments cannot be con-
sidered admissions of liability and they may be deducted from
any future settlement or judgment against the carrier. 1247 Ordi-
narily, the carrier cannot demand the return of advance pay-
ments, unless it is proved that the passenger contributed to the
damage or was otherwise not entitled to compensation. 1248
Finally, it is stipulated what carriers must do to notify passen-
gers of the terms of the regulation. Carriers licensed by the
Member States are required to include the provisions of the reg-
ulation in their conditions of carriage, 2411 and they must make
"adequate information" in "plain and intelligible language" on
1240 i.
1241 Id. at 2.
1242 Id.
1243 Council Regulation 2027/97, art. 3(2), 1997 O.J. (L 285) 1, 2.




1248 Council Regulation 2027/97, art. 5(3), 1997 OJ. (L 285) 1, 3.
1249 Id.
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the regulation available to passengers at travel agencies, check-
in counters, company offices, and at other points of sale.1 250
Carriers from outside the Union may choose to not apply the
provisions of the regulation, but they must "expressly and
clearly" notify passengers of that at the time of sale of the
ticket. 1251
Regulation 2027/97 has appeared to be relatively unconten-
tious. However, the Council provided as part of the regulation
that the Commission should prepare a report on the effective-
ness of it. 1252 The Commission's report should be available by
the end of 2000.
4. Civil Aviation Accident/Incident Investigations
Within the EC/EU, the procedures and mechanisms for inves-
tigating civil aviation accidents had long been governed by the
Chicago Convention, which gave exclusive control of the pro-
cess to the Member State in which such an accident occurred
and, where different, the home state of the carrier that suffered
the accident.'2 5 : But with the passage of the Third Package, it
would be increasingly difficult to neatly identify which Member
States had an interest in such an investigation. Therefore, the
Council determined that it was necessary to provide guidance
on harmonizing investigation processes in the Member States.
To this end, in 1994 the Council issued Directive 94/56 with
the goal of "facilitating the expeditious holding of investigations
".. ,,1254 The terms of the directive apply to all investigations of
accidents or incidents within the territory of the Union, along
with accidents or "serious incidents" outside of the territory of
the Union if the aircraft concerned are registered in a Member
State or owned by an undertaking established in a Member
State, and the state where the event took place does not conduct
such an investigation. 1255 For the purpose of the directive, an
"accident" is defined as an event that occurs while passengers
are on board the aircraft and where the event results in the
death of, or serious injury to, a person, where the aircraft is seri-




12-53 Council Directive 94/56/EC, pmbl., 1994 OJ. (L 319) 14.
1254 Id. at 15.
1255 Id.
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inaccessible."' 1216 An "incident" is an event, other than an acci-
dent, which affects or would affect the safety of the aircraft,
while a "serious incident" is an event that involves circumstances
suggesting an accident nearly occurred.
1257
Every accident and serious incident must be the subject of an
investigation, while lesser incidents may be investigated at the
discretion of concerned Member States.12 5a The scope and na-
ture of the investigation is to be determined by the appropriate
investigating bodies, but the investigation is not to assign blame
or liability for the event. 1259 A Member State may use whatever
procedures are appropriate within its legislative system for estab-
lishing or defining an investigating body.'2 " ' However, the in-
vestigating body must have free access to all relevant materials
and evidence related to the event, such as manufacturers' de-
sign information and the site of the incident. 12 6 ' The investigat-
ing body must also be "functionally independent" from other
national aviation authorities, particularly those charged with cer-
tification of airworthiness, air traffic control, aircraft mainte-
nance, or any other duty which might conflict with the duties of
the investigating body. 126 2 The investigating body must have suf-
ficient resources to be able to conduct its duties normally. How-
ever, it may request assistance from other national agencies for
the supply of installations and equipment for certain aspects of
the investigation process. 126 3 This would include everything
from hangars to store crash debris to specialized lab facilities for
examination of flight data recorders. This assistance should be
supplied at no cost where possible. 264 A Member State may
choose instead to delegate its investigatory duties to another
Member State. 1265
Any investigation into an accident must be the subject of an
accident report summarizing the investigating body's findings
and its safety recommendations if any.' 266 The report must be
1256 Id.
1257 Id. at 16. See the Annex to the Directive for a list of possible events which
would constitute a "serious incident."




1262 Id. at 16-17.
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made public, preferably within 12 months of the accident. 1267
The conditions attached to an incident report are significantly
more stringent, presumably because the less severe nature of the
event militates against the release of superfluous information.
While an incident report must be generated, including safety
recommendations where appropriate, it should guard the ano-
nymity of any persons involved in the incident. 1268 Further-
more, unlike the accident report, which is to be publicly
distributed, an incident report need only be provided to "the
parties likely to benefit" from its determinations. 1269 Any safety
recommendations included in either type of report must be pro-
vided to all of the concerned parties and to the Commission. 1270
Such recommendations shall not give rise to a presumption of
blame or liability for the event being investigated. 1271
Since it was adopted in November 1994, Directive 94/56 has
proven to be uncontroversial. Almost six years after its enact-
ment, no Commission decisions have even cited it, let alone
turned on it, nor has it been cited in a ruling by the Court of
Justice. 1272
5. Denied-Boarding Compensation
As part of an effort to stem the "constant stream of com-
plaints" about customer service received by the EU's governing
bodies and the Member States' air authorities, 1273 the Council
took action in 1991 to address the particularly trying subject of
denied boardings. 1274 (A denied boarding is when a carrier ref-
uses to permit a passenger on a flight despite the passenger
holding a valid ticket, having a confirmed reservation, and hav-
ing presented himself for check-in within the required time.) 1275
Regulation 295/91 encompasses all instances of denied
boarding due to overbooking for scheduled flights within the
Union's territory, regardless of the nationality of the passenger
1267 Id.




1272 As of August 16, 2000.
1273- Air Passenger Rights in the European Union: A Consultation Document on Con-
sumer Protection in Air Transport, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/en/comm/
dg07/pass-protcons/passprotcons.pdf (last visited Aug. 10, 2000).
1274 Council Regulation 295/91, 1991 OJ. (L 36) 5.
1275 Id. at 5.
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or carrier. 1276 Carriers must devise their own rules for how pas-
sengers will be loaded in the event of overbooking, which
should include a procedure for requesting volunteers to remain
behind 1277 and also address the needs of passengers who should
have boarding priority, such as handicapped persons or unac-
companied children. 1278  Carriers are required to make the
terms of their boarding policies available to the public and to
notify the Commission and interested Member States as well. 1279
Regardless of the carrier's boarding rules, if a passenger is de-
nied boarding due to overbooking he or she must be given a
choice between a full refund of the unused portion of the ticket,
re-routing to their final destination at the earliest opportunity,
or re-routing at a later date at the passenger's convenience.12 80
The regulation also provides for compensation that the pas-
senger must receive in the event of such a denied boarding in
addition to the refund or re-routing laid out above. If the final
destination was 3,500 Kilometers or less from the point where
boarding was denied, the carrier must pay the passenger 150
Euros, or 300 Euros if the final destination was more than 3,500
Kilometers from where boarding was denied. 128- ' The payment
must be made in cash, unless the passenger agrees to accept it in
some other form, such as a discount voucher, 128 2 although the
payment may be reduced by 50% if the carrier is able to re-route
the passenger in a manner that allows him or her to reach the
destination within a brief length of time after they were origi-
nally scheduled to arrive. 128 3 Furthermore, the payment "need
not" exceed the original cost of the ticket. 128 4 If the passenger
agrees to accept a seat in a class lower than that paid for, the
carrier must reimburse the difference in price between the two
seats. 1285
Regardless of what form or amount of compensation a passen-
ger receives under these provisions, the carrier must also pro-
vide, free of charge, a telephone call or fax to the passenger's
final destination, meals and refreshments "in a reasonable rela-
1276 Id.
1277 Id. at 6.
1278 Id.





1284 Council Regulation 295/91, art. 4(4), 1991 OJ. (L 36) 5, 6.
1285 [d.
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tion" to the wait time, and hotel accommodations if the passen-
ger will be delayed overnight. 2 6 In the case of a metropolitan
area served by multiple airports, if a passenger agrees to travel to
a different airport than he was originally destined for, the car-
rier must pay for the cost of travel between the respective air-
ports or to another nearby location.1 287  If the passenger
obtained his or her ticket through a package tour, the tour op-
erator is to be the point of contact for matters relating to the
denied boarding. 12 8 Carriers must provide a passenger who has
been denied boarding a document enumerating all their rights
under Regulation 295/91.289 Interestingly, the regulation spe-
cifically states that it is without prejudice to any subsequent de-
termination by courts that further compensation is
appropriate. 121),
The Union practices governing denied-boarding compensa-
tion have remained unchanged since the implementation of
Regulation 295/91. However, there was some movement, begin-
ning in late 1999, to amend and expand the terms of the regula-
tion. The proposals before the Commission were to increase
the level of compensation and possibly extend compensation to
those passengers whose flights are delayed longer than is
deemed acceptable.' 21' By mid-2000 though, they had still not
been enacted.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the genesis of international aviation, all nations have
jealously guarded their sovereignty over aviation, allowing air-
lines owned by foreign nationals to enter their own markets only
on a reciprocal basis, carefully negotiated in a series of bilateral
air transport agreements. But truly open markets require that
traditional notions of air sovereignty, and the complex matrix of
bilateral air transport agreements which codify the concept,
must be superseded by a regime that treats all of the EU as a
domestic cabotage market.
1286 Id.
1287 Id. at 6-7.
21 Id. at 6.
289 Council Regulation 295/91, art. 8, 1991 O.J. (L 36) 5, 7.
1290 Id.
129 1 Air Passenger Rights in the European Union: A Consultation Document on Con-
sumer Protection in Air Transport, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/en/comrnm/
dg07/pass-prot-cons/passprotcons.pdf (last visited Aug. 10, 2000).
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Another traditional concept that already appears to be crum-
bling is the notion of "effective ownership and control" of a flag-
carrier by citizens of its nation. For example, where the Ireland-
Portugal bilateral air transport agreement allowed a carrier fly-
ing the flag of each nation to serve the Dublin-Lisbon market, it
was required that each nation's carrier be effectively owned and
controlled by citizens of the nation whose flag the airline flew.
Thus, more than 50% of Aer Lingus is owned by Irish nationals,
and more than 50% of TAP, the national airline of Portugal, is
owned by Portuguese. "Effective ownership and control" is a
concept that has long dominated the air transport relations of
most nations, although a few multinational carriers existed here
and there, the most notable among them being the Scandina-
vian Airline System (SAS), a consortium of Scandinavian na-
tions. Under the regulations proposed by the Commission in
1991, an airline registered in any Member State would have vir-
tually unhindered freedom to transport passengers in any intra-
Community cabotage or Fifth Freedom market. Hence, entry
would largely be deregulated. Carriers like British Airways or
Swissair have already expressed interests in acquiring carriers
like KLM and Sabena. Hence, multinational European airlines
are likely eventually to be the norm, rather than the exception.
With their eyes on the U.S. "megacarriers" that have emerged
from American deregulation (where fewer than a half-dozen air-
lines control more than 80% of the U.S. domestic market),
privatization and merger discussions between carriers have be-
come increasingly popular in Europe. The five largest EC air-
lines (i.e., British Airways, Air France, Lufthansa, KLM, and
Iberia) account for nearly 70% of scheduled European traf-
fic. 1292 Jan Carlzon, former president of SAS, predicted that ulti-
mately only five airlines will survive liberalization. 1293 The global
impact of deregulation is predicted to result in a consolidation
of the industry into 15 to 20 multinational airlines, competing in
markets around the world. 1294
If the U.S. experience is any indication of what will occur in a
liberalized regulatory environment in Europe, bankruptcies,
consolidations, and mergers will result in a highly concentrated
1292 European Deregulation Expected to Lead to Airline Mergers, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Mar. 9, 1987, at 203. British Airways alone accounts for 22% of all EEC
revenue passenger miles, even without its acquisition of British Caledonian. Id.
1293 Carey, European Airlines Discuss Joining Forces, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1987, at
16, col. 3.
1294 Kasper, Toward Open Skies World-Wide WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1987, at 17.
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group of multinational European megacarriers, all utilizing hub-
and-spoke operations and linked to only a few sophisticated
computer reservations systems. 1211 In the short run, passengers
will enjoy lower ticket prices, as carriers become hotly competi-
tive, because their profit margins will be severely squeezed by
new entrants. 129 6 Many smaller carriers and most new entrants
will fall into bankruptcy, unless they can align themselves as
feeders for the megacarriers. 1297 The charter airline industry
will shrink radically or disappear. And once the remaining air-
lines have achieved consolidation into a handful of megacar-
riers, ticket prices will likely rise. 129
The increasing number of liberal bilateral agreements is evi-
dence that the European nations are creating a more free-mar-
ket-oriented air transport system. Individual airlines are also
taking direct action against restraints to air transport. Nations
and airlines opposed to deregulation are being increasingly sub-
jected to market forces to which they must respond or risk los-
ing ground to the more flexible, less-regulated States and
increasingly privatized carriers. Industry organizations have tre-
1295 The emergence of European computer reservations systems (CRS) has al-
ready begun, with British Airways, KLM, and Swissair linking themselves in ajoint
venture with United Airlines, and its Covia reservations system. Rose, Allegis Aims
for More Profit, Passengers with European Reservations Venture, WALL ST. J., July 13,
1987, at 2, col. 2. Recently, Allegis announced its intention to sell 35% of its
Covia system to British Airways, Swissair, KLM and Alitalia. Allegis Discloses More on
50% Sale of Its Covia Unit, WALL ST.J., Feb. 19, 1988, at 36, col. 2. Meanwhile, Air
France, Lufthansa, Iberia and SAS have teamed with Texas Air's System One CRS
to form the Amadeus computer reservations system.
129, Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Experience of Deregulation: Erosion of the Common
Carrier System, 13 TRANSP. L. INST. 121, 172-75 (1980).
1297 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Antitrust Law & Policy in Transportation: Concen-
tration is the Name of the Game, 21 GA. L. REV. 505 (1987); Paul Stephen Dempsey,
Birth of the Monster Airlines, TRAFFIC WORLD, Dec. 1, 1986, at 77; Rose, Major U.S.
Airlines Rapidly Gain Control Over Flying Low, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Aug. 9, 1987, at
73; Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Carnage of Airline Deregulation, HOUS. CHRON.,July
30, 1987, at 27; Paul Stephen Dempsey, Consolidation, a Destructive Trend, DENV.
POST, Dec. 6, 1986, at 4B, col. 1; Paul Stephen Dempsey, Deregulation's Toll Is
Rising, DENXV. POST, Sept. 4, 1986, at 5B, col. 4; Paul Stephen Dempsey, Deregulated
Skies Unfriendly to Small Airlines, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, May 25, 1986, at 77, col. 1;
Paul Stephen Dempsey, Airline Deregulation's Hostile Skies, DENyV. POST, Oct. 17,
1983, at 3B, col. 1; Paul Stephen Dempsey, Affordability, Safety of Airlines May Suffer,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1983, at 7, col. 1; Rowen, Airline Deregulation: A Bankrupt
Policy, WASHl. PosT, Sept. 29,1983, at A21; see also DEMPSEY & THOMS, supra note 4,
at 245-51.
2 98 PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, FLYING BLIND: THE FAILURE OF AiRLINE DEREGULA-
TION (1990); PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
OF DEREGULATION (1989).
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mendous influence in the European air transport industry.
ECAC has made significant strides toward liberalization with its
recent Memoranda of Understanding on tariffs and capacity.
Although the interests and objectives of each organization are
different, there is growing support for modest liberalization
from these bodies, as well.
The European Community was established to promote a free
market among Member States. Actions by the EC/EU were
delayed by political considerations and by the reluctance of a
few nations that own or subsidize their national airlines. 1299
While unable to accomplish immediate deregulation, the EC/
EU helped generate public support that pressured governments
towards more bilateral agreements to ease regulation. Through
its governing bodies, the EC/EU contributed to the creation of
a governmental climate favoring partial liberalization. Much
progress has been achieved toward that objective with the Coun-
cil's promulgation of its long-awaited regulations, group exemp-
tions, directive and decision.
Although it is far from clear what the final result of these
forces favoring liberalization of air transport regulations will be,
it is obvious that significant liberalization in the regulatory envi-
ronment of European air transport is occurring and that this
trend will likely continue. Whether it will ultimately mirror U.S.-
style deregulation or some more modest form of regulatory lib-
eralization, as many EC officials insist it should, is as yet unclear.
1299 LIBERALIZATION POLICIES, supra note 183, at 28.
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